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Abstrat
Bargaining is the building blok of many eonomi interations, ranging from bilateral to
multilateral enounters and from situations in whih the ators are individuals to nego-
tiations between rms or ountries. In all these settings, eonomists have been intrigued
for a long time by the fat that some projets, trades or agreements are not realized
even though they are mutually beneial. On the one hand, this has been explained by
inomplete information. A rm may not be willing to oer a wage that is aeptable to
a qualied worker, beause it knows that there are also unqualied workers and annot
distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse seletion. On
the other hand, it has been argued that even with omplete information, the presene of
externalities may impede eient outomes. To see this, onsider the example of limate
hange. If a subset of ountries agrees to urb emissions, non-partiipant regions benet
from the signatories' eorts without inurring osts. These free riding opportunities give
rise to inentives to strategially improve ones bargaining power that work against the
formation of a global agreement.
This thesis is onerned with extending our understanding of both fators, adverse
seletion and externalities. The ndings are based on empirial evidene from original
laboratory experiments as well as game theoreti modeling. On a very general note, it is
demonstrated that the institutions through whih agents interat matter to a large extent.
Insights are provided about whih institutions we should expet to perform better than
others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare.
Chapters 1 and 2 fous on the problem of adverse seletion. Eetive operation of
markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties.
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In terms of the example introdued above, a rm is only willing to oer high wages if
it reeives enough positive signals about the worker's quality during the appliation and
wage bargaining proess. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interation oupled
with time osts failitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining
proess ostly for the worker, the rm is able to obtain more aurate information about
the worker's type. The ost ould be pure time ost from delaying agreement or ost of
eort arising from a multi-step interviewing proess. In Chapter 2, I abstrat from time
ost and show that ommuniation an play a similar role. The simple fat that a worker
states to be of high quality may be informative.
In Chapter 3, the fous is on a dierent soure of ineieny. Agents strive for
bargaining power and thus may be motivated by inentives that are at odds with the
soially eient outome. I have already mentioned the example of limate hange. Other
examples are oalitions within ommittees that are formed to seure voting power to blok
outomes or groups that ommit to dierent tehnologial standards although a single
standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be
shown that suh ineienies are diretly linked to the presene of externalities and a
ertain degree of irreversibility in ations. I now disuss the three artiles in more detail.
In Chapter 1, Olivier Bohet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that
eliminates trade failures arising from inomplete information. In this setting, a buyer
makes oers to a seller in order to aquire a good. Whenever an oer is rejeted by the
seller, the buyer may submit a further oer. Bargaining is ostly, beause both parties
suer a (small) time ost after any rejetion. The diulties arise, beause the good an
be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed,
without the possibility to make repeated oers, it is too risky for the buyer to oer pries
that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated oers, however, at
equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental
test of these preditions. Buyers gather information about sellers using spei prie oers
and rates of trade are high, muh as the model's qualitative preditions. We also observe
a persistent over-delay before trade ours, and this mitigates eieny substantially.
Possible hannels for over-delay are identied in the form of two behavioral assumptions
missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), whih
reonile the data with the theoretial preditions.
Chapter 2 also studies adverse seletion, but interation between buyers and sellers
now takes plae within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market
it sues to let agents ommuniate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures.
The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal
their private information, beause by doing so they are able to redue searh fritions
and attrat more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions losely follows
the theoretial preditions. As a onsequene, ostless and non-binding ommuniation
(heap talk) signiantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have
doumented that heap talk alleviates ineienies due to asymmetri information. These
ndings are explained by pro-soial preferenes and lie aversion. I use appropriate ontrol
treatments to show that suh onsideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead,
the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new hannel through whih
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ommuniation an failitate trade in the presene of private information.
In Chapter 3, I theoretially explore oalition formation via multilateral bargaining
under omplete information. The environment studied is extremely rih in the sense
that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is ahieved by using so-alled
partition funtions, whih pin down a oalitional worth for eah possible oalition in
eah possible oalition struture. It is found that although binding agreements an be
written, eieny is not guaranteed, beause the negotiation proess is inherently non-
ooperative. The prospets of ooperation are shown to ruially depend on i) the degree
to whih players an renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absene
of a ertain type of externalities that an loosely be desribed as inentives to free ride.
Moreover, the willingness to onede bargaining power is identied as a novel reason for
gradualism. Another key ontribution of the study is that it identies a strong onnetion
between the Core, one of the most important onepts in ooperative game theory, and
the set of environments for whih eieny is attained even without renegotiation.
3
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Chapter 1
Better Later than Never? An
Experiment on Bargaining under
Adverse Seletion
*
1.1 Introdution
An important issue in eonomis is why mutually beneial agreements are often hard to
reah. While there are many possible impediments to reahing eient agreements, an
obvious obstale is the asymmetry of information that may prevail among parties. For
instane, when adverse seletion is severe, the prie mehanism fails to alloate goods
eiently and the market for high quality goods breaks down, Akerlof (1970).
1
While
rst-best eieny is usually out-of-reah, institutions that dier from Walrasian markets
may help alleviating the adverse seletion eet. In real-life situations, where asymmetry
of information is often prevalent, it is ommon that buyers and sellers bargain for some
time over pries before an agreement is reahed. It is also ommon that a buyer and a
seller enter in an exlusive bargaining relationship in whih both understand that they
will talk to one another for a xed period of time. For instane, in the housing market, a
*
This hapter is joint work with Olivier Bohet.
1
Adverse seletion is severe if the buyers' expeted valuation for the good falls short of the high ost
of prodution.
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potential buyer is often loked-in for several days after making an oer for a house. While
he is allowed to make several suessive oers for the same house during this time window,
he is onstrained by law not to make oers on another house. Other important examples
where bargaining between uninformed buyers and informed sellers is witnessed is for hiring
deisions (the worker may have superior knowledge about his level of produtivity), the
sale of an oil trat (the buyer may possess information about the rihness of the deposit
that is relevant to the owner's willingness to sell) or bargaining over the prie of a software
produt (the buyer's knowledge about the expenses needed for the development of a new
software may be limited).
Our Contribution: This paper is onerned with (i) the experimental test of a bar-
gaining institution and its eet on trade and eieny, and (ii) its omparison with a
benhmark ase in whih the buyer is fored to make a single oer. Our hoie of insti-
tutions is rooted in the theoretial literature. Consider rst the benhmark ase where
the buyer ommits to make a unique oer and walks away in the absene of a deal.
Samuelson (1984) shows that a take-it-or-leave-it-oer is optimal from the buyer's point
of view. Hene, any other ase where the buyer talks more than one to the seller is detri-
mental to the buyer's welfare. A downside of the buyer's full ommitment is the status-quo
on trade failures and market breakdown. At the other end of the spetrum onsider the
ase of a possibly innite number of interations between a buyer and a seller, in whih
the buyer makes an oer and the seller aepts or rejets. In a series of papers Vinent
(1989), Evans (1989), Denekere and Liang (2006) (heneforth DL) show the striking ef-
fet of the lak of ommitment of the buyer oupled with fritions (disounting). When
adverse seletion is severe, trade ours with probability one with any type of seller, and
at dierent pries whih signal qualities. Fritions drive sreening and the buyer uses a
monotoni prie sequene to sreen out low and high type sellers, while updating his belief
towards the high type following eah rejetion along the sequene. Fritions are also a
soure of eieny loss beause of the delay before reahing an agreement.
We extend DL's model to the ase where the number of oers is nite and provide an
experimental test of this extension. We show that if the number of periods is big enough,
12
there exists a unique sequential equilibrium in a fashion similar to the one obtained when
the game is innite.
2
When the number of periods is too low, the unique sequential
equilibrium is to oer a prie equal to the low quality seller's ost, having low types
randomizing between aeptane and rejetion until the last period of the game. We are
interested in the former ase where the number of periods is big enough.
In our experiment, sellers eah an produe a good at dierent ost, high (high quality
good) or low (low quality good), and this is private information to eah seller. Buyers only
know the probability distribution over sellers' types. Our experimental design ompares
two dierent institutions. In one set of treatments, the buyer makes repeated oers (R80
and R40). In a seond set of treatments the buyer's optimal mehanism is implemented:
the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer (S80 and S40). We vary the probability that the
seller has a high ost of prodution within eah set of treatments (0.4 and 0.8 respetively).
The low probability is a ase of market breakdown, while the high probability is a ase
where adverse seletion does not prelude rst-best eieny.
We nd that the bargaining situation (R-treatments) leads to sreening of low and
high type sellers, muh like the qualitative preditions of the model. Rates of trade with
both types of sellers are signiantly boosted upwards, in partiular trade failures that are
ommon in the take-it-or-leave-it oer situations are almost eliminated with bargaining.
However, buyers attempt to sreen even when it would be optimal not to do so. When the
prodution ost is high with probability 0.8, the equilibrium is to oer a single prie equal
to the high ost of prodution, and for any seller to aept this oer right away. Most
importantly, we observe a signiant over-delay ompared to the theoretial preditions,
i.e. trading pairs need longer than predited to reah an agreement if the seller owns a
high quality good. Over-delay is persistent with experiene: we observe no learning eet.
Delay mitigates eieny substantially. While welfare is overall lower than predited in
both set of treatments, we nd that bargaining leads to signiantly lower welfare levels
than in the benhmark single-oer treatments.
2
An alternative would be to follow the reent literature on experimental repeated games (see Dal Bó
(2005) and Dal Bó and Fréhette (2011)) and use a random ontinuation rule. We feel that using ran-
dom termination rules may not be appropriate when the game involves beliefs updating at eah period.
Moreover, this would prevent us from observing a suient number of omplete prie sequenes.
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Is it better to trade later than never? If alloative eieny is an important rite-
rion (e.g. keeping a market liquid" suh as the housing market), then the bargaining
treatments are suessful in alleviating the adverse seletion eet and failitating trade.
However, if total welfare is the main riterion for evaluating an institution's performane,
then the observed persistent over-delay osets the positive eets just mentioned.
What are the roots for the over-delay and its persistene in the data? First, buyers
tend to start low in their prie oer sequenes and follow atter prie sequenes than
predited. It takes them more time to reah an agreement. We show that this an
be explained by loss aversion. In onjuntion with loss aversion, there is an extra-delay
imposed by high type sellers. At a sequential equilibrium, the buyer rips all the gains from
trade with the high type seller. In pratie, sellers rejet oers and haggle over aeptable
pries, and this even when disounting has already diluted the gains from trade. These
two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model help to reonile data and
sequential equilibrium preditions.
Related Literature: The experimental studies losest to ours are Rapoport et al. (1995)
and Reynolds (2000). Both studies report on a bargaining game with the uninformed
party being the proposer. Both papers analyze the ase of independent valuations and
disuss the Coase Conjeture, i.e., whether a delining prie sequene an be observed.
3
While it is natural for us to also look at prie sequenes, our fous is dierent. We
analyze a setting in whih adverse seletion prevails, i.e. valuations are interdependent.
With interdependent values trade with high quality sellers implies an adjustment of the
uninformed agent's belief. The fat that we nd evidene for sreening and belief updating
is rather surprising in the light of a literature that states that subjets an have diulties
in inferring new information from others' ations. Eyster and Rabin (2005) refer to this
slow down in information revelation as ursed equilibrium. Moreover, with independent
values the uninformed party never runs the risk to make losses and thus trade failures are
not a onern. In partiular, trade with high quality sellers is protable even if the buyer
does not update his beliefs in the ourse of bargaining. In our setting, rates of trade are
3
In their setting, the seller is the uninformed party.
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an interesting objet to look at. Finally, our design allows to ompare the repeated oers
bargaining institution to the benhmark ase of a take-it-or-leave-it oer.
There is also a less reent related literature that tests the preditions of bargain-
ing institutions
4
or of sequential equilibrium, something whih our experiment also does.
Roth and Malouf (1979) show that with omplete information, bargaining tends to lead
to equal splits of the gains from trade. By now it is also well established that bar-
gaining power due to the bargaining protool, as for instane in the ultimatum game,
may have little impat on outomes under omplete information (see Güth and Tietz
(1990) for the ultimatum game and Ohs and Roth (1989) for sequential bargaining).
Roth and Murnighan (1982) and Roth and Shoumaker (1983) show that bargaining out-
omes are driven away from equal division if either there is asymmetri information about
valuations or bargainers have formed spei expetations about bargaining outomes, for
instane through a proess of reputation building (see Embrey et al. (forthoming)). We
indeed nd that subjets use their information strategially and the bargaining power of
buyers is often undermined by the asymmetry of information. We also nd that sequential
equilibrium predits behavior qualitatively well, and this already in the rst periods.
5
In
this respet, our results are in line with Embrey et al. (forthoming) who look at reputa-
tion building in bargaining and nd that subjets are strategi in the way predited by
sequential equilibrium.
The next setion desribes the model, provides a reap on standard adverse seletion
results and denes the nite game version of the bargaining model. It also haraterizes
the unique sequential equilibrium. In Setion 3 the experimental design and the exam-
ple used in the experiment and the orresponding theoretial preditions are presented.
Setion 4 disusses the results. Finally, Setion 5 onludes.
4
See Roth (1995) for a review of this literature.
5
Camerer and Weigelt (1988) provide an early test of sequential equilibrium in the ontext of the trust
game. Behavior orresponds roughly to sequential equilibrium, but only after subjets have played many
repetitions of the game.
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1.2 Preliminaries
1.2.1 The Model
In desribing the model, we losely follow the notation used in DL. A buyer and a seller
bargain over the prie at whih a single, indivisible good is sold. The seller's type (whih
determines the quality of the good) is determined by the random variable q, where q is
distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. The funtions v(q) and c(q) represent the valuation for
the objet of the buyer and the ost of the seller to provide the good, respetively. It is
required that v(q) > c(q) for all q. Hene, it is ommon knowledge that there are gains
from trade. The buyer's valuation and the seller's ost depend on q as follows.
v(q) =

 v if q ∈ [0, qˆ]v if q ∈ (qˆ, 1] c(q) =

 0 if q ∈ [0, qˆ]c if q ∈ (qˆ, 1]
Thus, there is a population of sellers distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. All seller types
q > qˆ are high quality sellers (in the following we will refer to high quality sellers as H-
types). All seller types q ≤ qˆ are low quality (L-type) sellers. The seller's type is private
information to the seller. The buyer only knows that the seller he faes is drawn randomly
from the distribution of q and is therefore unertain about both his own valuation and
the seller's ost of providing the good. Without loss of generality, v ≥ v and qˆ ∈ (0, 1).
The assumption that there are gains from trade for all types further implies v > c and
v > 0.
Despite the known gains from trade with both (payo) types of sellers, the uto qˆ
drives the inentive onstraints. Indeed, these may or may not prelude rst-best eient
trade, as seen in the following two examples where we emphasize the equilibrium predition
of a single-prie oer made by the buyer.
Example 1: Only lemons!
Let c(q) = 0 and v(q) = 1750 if q ∈ [0, 0.6], while c(q) = 2500 and v(q) = 3500 if
q ∈ (0.6, 1]. The buyer ex-ante average valuation of (0.6 ∗ 1750) + (0.4 ∗ 3500) = 2450
falls short of the high ost. This preludes rst-best eient trade. If the buyer makes a
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take-it-or-leave-it oer then, at equilibrium, he oers p = 0, and this is aepted only by
an L-quality seller.
Example 2: Goods hange hands
Let c(q) = 0 and v(q) = 1750 if q ∈ [0, 0.2], while c(q) = 2500 and v(q) = 3500 if
q ∈ (0.2, 1]. The buyer ex-ante average valuation is (0.2 ∗ 1750) + (0.8 ∗ 3500) = 3150.
This exeeds the high ost, a neessary ondition for goods to hange hands. Also, the
buyer expeted payo from oering 2500 exeeds the one from oering 0. If the buyer
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer then, at equilibrium, trade ours with probability one for
both type of sellers at p = 2500. The outome is rst-best eient.
Given the above parameters onstellation, high quality goods hange hands only if
qˆ ≤ 2
7
. Otherwise, the buyer single-prie oer mehanism has a unique equilibrium in
whih p = 0.
1.2.2 Repeated Oers Game and Equilibrium Preditions
In ontrast to Vinent (1989), Evans (1989) and DL, we allow the maximal number of
oers to be a nite number N .6 Let n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 0 be the number of stages left
before the nal equilibrium stage is reahed. The state variable qn denotes the buyer's
uto level of the seller population n stages before the nal equilibrium stage. That is,
n stages before the nal equilibrium oer, the buyer believes that the seller's type is
uniformly distributed on [qn, 1].
7
Note that qN−1 = 0. It follows that the mass of the
H-quality sellers is 1 − qˆ. The mass of the L-quality sellers is qˆ − qn when n stages are
left before the nal stage.
The buyer's oer is denoted by p(q) = pn for q ∈ (qn, qn−1]. The game ends if the seller
aepts an oer or rejets all oers inluding the one in stage N . After a rejetion in any
other stage, the next stage is entered. The buyer updates his belief and makes a new oer.
6
Evans (1989) also analyzes the 1 and 2 stage ase, but does not provide a solution for the general
nite horizon ase. Also, his model diers from ours in that both trading parties have a valuation of zero
for the L-quality good.
7
The buyer's belief will always be a left trunation of the prior, i.e., qn is non-inreasing in n (see DL).
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Payos are disounted after eah stage. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) denote the disount rate. If trade
takes plae n stages before the last stage N , the payos are Bn(q) = δ
N−1−n(v(q)− p(q))
for the buyer and Sn(q) = δ
N−1−n(p(q)− c(q)) for the seller. If no agreement takes plae,
both parties earn a payo of 0.
We now ome to the equilibrium preditions of the repeated oers game. All proofs
of the results mentioned here are relegated to Appendix A. In general, the buyer has two
options. The rst option is to suessively inrease his oers to sreen out the L-quality
sellers. In this ase, he faes the trade-o between sreening less nely and delaying
agreement. The seond possibility is that the buyer oers 0 in all stages, fousing on the
gains from trade with an L-quality seller.
8
To distinguish between these two patterns,
variables belonging to the sreening or the zero oer sequene are supersripted by s and
z, respetively. The following lemma states that the equilibrium oers have to follow one
of these two patterns. Let k∗(qn) denote the optimal number of sreening stages given
belief qn.
9
Lemma 1. In the bargaining game with N > 0 stages, the nal equilibrium oer is either
ps0 = c or p
z
0 = 0.
i) If ps0 = c, the sequene of equilibrium oers is given by p
s
k = δ
kc for k = k∗(0), k∗(0)−
1, . . . , 0.
ii) If pz0 = 0, the sequene of equilibrium oers is given by p
z
n = 0 for n = N − 1, N −
2, . . . , 0.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is that L-quality sellers must be kept indierent at
equilibrium between aepting the urrent oer in stage, and waiting for a future oer. If
the L-quality sellers rejeted for sure, the buyer would delay the agreement without gaining
additional information. On the other hand, ertain aeptane by L-quality sellers means
that rejetion reveals the seller to be an H-type, implying an oer of c in the next stage.
8
Note that if the potential number of oers is innite, this annot be an equilibrium pattern. Sine
the buyer's belief inreases with eah rejetion, he is eventually willing to trade with the H-quality seller.
9
If sreening ours in equilibrium, it will always start in stage 1 when q ∈ [0, 1]. The reason we
introdue this notation nonetheless beomes lear when disussing the zero oer sequene equilibrium.
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In this ase, the L-quality seller has an inentive to mimi the H-quality seller unless the
oer in the urrent stage is δc.
If ase i) in Lemma 1 prevails, we refer to Appendix A for a derivation of the L-type
seller's equilibrium behavior. Intuitively, sequential rationality requires the buyer's oers
to make the L-quality sellers indierent between a non-equilibrium oer and its subsequent
oer. Further, note that a buyer's optimal oer sequene is desribed by Lemma 1 also
after an non-equilibrium oer. These two requirements an be fullled jointly only if the
buyer is indierent between two dierent pries that belong to a sequene as desribed in
Lemma 1: he an then mix between the two pries suh that the L-type seller's expeted
prot in the next stage orresponds to the one he would obtain from aepting the o-
equilibrium oer. This uniquely pins down the sellers' aeptane deisions.
In ontrast to the innite horizon ase, the onstant prie sequene (0, ..., 0) is a
possible equilibrium if the time span given for sreening is too short. However, when N is
large enough, the buyer's expeted prot from the zero oer sequene approahes 0 or a
ondition is violated suh that the equilibrium is then given by the sreening equilibrium.
10
We next provide the intuition for this result. Knowing the prie sequene and the
aeptane deisions of the sreening equilibrium allows to derive the aeptane proba-
bilities for the zero oer sequene. The important idea here is that the sellers' aeptane
deisions must render the buyer indierent between oering the optimal sreening prie
(given the urrent belief) and oering 0. Obviously, if oering a prie that belongs to
the sreening sequene leads to a higher expeted prot, the buyer would swith to the
optimal sreening strategy. On the other hand, if the zero prie oer is the unique best
oer then sequential rationality o the equilibrium path is violated. To see this, suppose
that the unique best oer is zero and onsider a non-equilibrium oer just slightly above
0. The L-type seller has to be indierent between aepting and rejeting, and hene the
buyer has to randomize between an oer of 0 and the optimal sreening oer in the next
stage. This implies a stritly larger probability of aeptane for the oer slightly above
10
It is noteworthy that there an also be sreening equilibria that are not idential to the one found
in the literature for the innite horizon game. This instane ours if N restrits the optimal number of
sreening stages, but the buyer still prefers to sreen rather than to follow the zero oer sequene.
19
0 than for an oer of 0.11 But then this is a protable deviation for the buyer.
The zero oer equilibrium requires that in eah stage a positive fration of the L-
quality sellers aepts an oer of 0. Hene, if N is large, the delay assoiated with
the zero oers sequene is then too large to render the buyer indierent to the optimal
sreening sequene. In the appendix, we prove the following proposition. We also provide
formulas to derive N¯ as well as the equilibrium behavior of both parties.
Proposition 1. There exists a nite N suh that the unique equilibrium is the sreening
equilibrium for all N ≥ N and the zero oer equilibrium otherwise.
In light of the sequential equilibrium preditions, we now revisit the two examples
introdued in the previous setion.
Example 1 revisited: Only lemons?
Consider the parameters onstellation of Example 1. Let the disount rate be δ = 0.8 and
the number of possible prie oers be N = 50. Then the unique sequential equilibrium is
the sreening equilibrium with assoiated prie sequene ps = (1280, 1600, 2000, 2500). An
L-quality seller randomizes over aeptane and rejetion up to p = 2000. At suh a prie,
a rejetion is interpreted as the seller being an H-type. Hene, at p = 2000, the L-type
aepts for sure. The L-type's aeptane probabilities support the prie sequene on the
equilibrium path. Notie that δ3 ∗ 2500 = δ2 ∗ 2000 = δ ∗ 1600 = 1280.
Example 2 revisited: Goods hange hands
Consider the parameters onstellation of Example 2. Let the disount rate be δ = 0.8
and the number of possible prie oers be N = 50. Interestingly, the predition oinide
with the take-it-or-leave-it oer. The prior to be with an H-type seller is too high (0.8)
so that the inentive to sreen is too small. Indeed, the buyer trades o the ushioning
of losses obtained on low types with the delay before an agreement is reahed. Consider
the andidate sreening prie sequene ps = (2000, 2500). If this is an equilibrium prie
sequene, a low-type seller aepts the rst oer of 2000 with probability one, so that a
rejetion signals that the seller is a high quality one. However, ushioning the loss on
11
A weakly smaller probability of aeptane would lead to a unique best oer of 0.
20
Table 1.1: Experimental Design
Treatment Sessions Subjets No. Oers Probability H-type
R80 6 70 50 0.8
R40 6 70 50 0.8
S80 4 48 1 0.4
S40 4 48 1 0.4
a low quality seller makes the buyer to trade with the high quality seller with one period
delay. This is dominated by the equilibrium prie p = 2500 in whih trade ours right
away with both type of sellers. There is thus no delay before an agreement is reahed.
If an uninformed buyer an make repeated oers, he may extrat information about
the quality of a good by following a spei prie sequene. Through this mehanism the
buyer is able to reah an agreement with an H-type seller whereas this is not be possible in
a single oer setting whenever adverse seletion is severe, like in Example 1. The obvious
downside of making repeated oers is that delay is ostly. This tradeo determines the
equilibrium number of sreening stages. The lesson from Example 2 is that the ushioning
of losses obtained from low type sellers through sreening may not be optimal when the
probability of an H-type is high enough. In ontrast, we will show in the experimental
part that the ushioning of losses is an important driver of the buyers' behavior.
1.3 Experimental Design
We now desribe our experimental design. The experiment took plae in the fall of
2012, and spring of 2013 at the experimental laboratory of the University of Bern. 236
students (both undergraduate and master's) from business and eonomis took part in the
experiment. A session is in general omposed of 12 partiipants, exeption made of two
session that had 10 partiipants. 20 sessions were run.
12
A session last approximately 70
minutes and average earnings were 32 CHF (onversion rate 0.004, inluding a show-up
fee of 10 CHF). We run four dierent treatments.
12
Sessions were run using the z-Tree software developed by Fishbaher (2007).
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We used as xed set of parameters the ones introdued in the previous examples.
Namely, the buyer's valuation is given by v = 3500 and v = 1750. The seller's ost is
c = 2500 and c = 0. The disount rate is given by δ = 0.8.13 Our design varies two
parameters: the length of the bargaining game and the probability that the seller is an H-
type seller (or, respetively qˆ). The treatments are summarized in Table 1.1. Treatments
R80 and R40 allow for a maximum of 50 stages with prior probability that the seller
produes an H-quality good to be 0.8 and 0.4, respetively. In the benhmark ases S80
and S40, buyers make a take-it-or-leave-it oer. The two treatments dier in probabilities
in the same way as R80 and R40.
The instrutions for treatment R80 are provided in Appendix B. After reading the
instrutions every subjet had to ll out a set of ontrol questions. Subjets were then
randomly assigned to be one of the 6 buyers or one of the 6 sellers. Roles are xed
throughout the experiment. In eah session, there is exlusive bargaining between a
buyer and a seller. Eah pair (omposed of a buyer and a seller) plays a bargaining
game whose rules depend on the treatment either a repeated oers or a single-prie oer
game. Subjets play ten bargaining games in total. There is random re-mathing after
eah bargaining game. Hene reputation plays little to no role due to the mitigation
eet of the random mathing proedure. A seller an be either an L or H-type. Sellers'
types an hange from one bargaining game to the next. Before eah bargaining game,
sellers' types are randomly determined aording to the xed probability qˆ. Eah seller is
informed of his own type. Buyers are not.
We give in Table 2 a summary of the preditions of the model as well as the (ex-ante)
welfare level generated by eah suh predition.
14
Notie that in the seond row of the
table, the aeptane probabilities of the L-type seller should be understood as the ex-
13
The buyer is required to make prie oers in inrements of 0.1. Restriting the set of possible prie
oers to spei inrements does not hange the equilibrium as long as all prie oers that are used by
the buyer in equilibrium are still available.
14
Notie that neither the single-prie oer nor the bargaining institution is the mehanism whih
maximizes total welfare. Indeed onsider a ase in whih the buyer oers (θ(pL) = 1, pL = 1750) and
(θ(pH) = 0.7, pH = 2500), i.e. the seller hooses between transferring the good for sure and reeiving
1000, or transferring the good with probability 0.7 and reeiving 2500 in ase the good is transferred. It
an be heked that total welfare generated by this mehanism is 1330, as opposed to 1050 for S40 and
1105 for R40.
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Table 1.2: Theoretial Preditions
Aeptane Probabilities
Prie Oers L H Ex-Ante Welfare
R80 2500 1 1 1150
R40 (1280, 1600, 2000, 2500) (0.5, 0.23, 0.27, 0) (0, 0, 0, 1) 1105
S80 2500 1 1 1150
S40 0 1 0 1050
ante randomization over aepting or delaying aeptane. The orresponding aeptane
probabilities in eah stage are then (0.5, 0.46, 1, 0) an L-type seller that is still around in
stage 3 aepts p1 = 2000 with probability 1. An H-type seller rejets all pries but the
last one. In the single oer treatments S80 and S40, the buyer oers p0 = c if (1− qˆ)v ≥ c
and p0 = 0 otherwise. It follows that p0 = c and both seller types aept the oer in
S80. For S40 it holds that p0 = 0, whih is aepted only by the L-type seller. Hene,
while theory predits no trade failures in S80, S40 is an example of a situation where
asymmetri information leads to unrealized gains from trade between the buyer and the
H-type seller. Its ounterpart repeated oers treatment R40 allows for trade with both
types of sellers and yields a higher ex-ante welfare level.
The benhmark ase given by S80 and S40 is important to understand the perfor-
mane and limitations of the repeated oers bargaining protool. A omparison of the
outomes between R40 and S40 allows to test whether repeated oers in onjuntion with
disounting indeed inreases the probability to reah an agreement. Comparing R80 to
S80 provides evidene on how repeated oers hange behavior if adverse seletion is no
issue, i.e. if trade failures should be absent even in the single oer setting. The preditions
on how a hange in qˆ aets behavior an be tested by omparing R80 and R40 for the
repeated oer setting; S80 and S40 for the single oer setting.
In a subset of the R-treatments, subjets were presented a lottery task that allowed
us to measure loss aversion. The lottery task is the same as in Fehr et al. (2013). At
the beginning of the experiment, subjets were informed that the experiment would be
omposed of two parts but did not know what the seond part would be during the rst
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part. Subjets played rst the bargaining games (Part 1), and then the lottery task (Part
2). We are interested in loss aversion, beause buyers who oer a prie aeptable to
H-type sellers run the risk of making a loss in ase they happened to be mathed with an
L-type seller. The lottery task will be desribed in Setion 4.3.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Statistis on Pries
Table 1.3: Opening Pries
Mean Median SE Min Max
R80 H 1357 1000 809 0 3000
L 1271 1000 833 0 1800
R40 H 818 875 303 0 1500
L 749 850 339 0 2400
S80 H 2409 2600 578 0 3500
L 2333 2550 653 1000 3000
S40 H 723 500 799 1 3000
L 757 500 789 1 3300
Table 1.4: Trading Pries
Mean Median SE Min Max
R80 H 2799 2900 390 500 3500
L 2248 2600 745 600 3050
R40 H 2656 2750 529 650 4000
L 1197 1000 655 100 3200
S80 H 2659 2600 205 2505 3500
L 2385 2550 559 500 3000
S40 H 2672 2600 182 2500 3000
L 885 750 812 1 3300
Some First Impressions: Looking at Tables 1.3 and 1.4 side-by-side is instrutive as
one an make inferene on several possible senarios. First notie that in R80 and R40,
there is a dierene between opening and aepted pries aepted pries are between
1.6 and more than 3 times bigger than opening pries. These dierenes are signiant
for both seller types Wiloxon signed-rank test, all p-values between 0.03 and 0.046.
15
What information do these dierenes onvey? In R80, reall that bargaining should
stop in stage 1. Dierenes between median rst oers (resp. mean) and median pries
(resp. mean) signals delay before agreements were reahed. We also see that there were
most probably attempts at sreening in R80, sine median (and mean) pries aepted
15
All non-parametri tests reported in this paper use session averages as the unit of observation.
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dier between L and H-types Wiloxon signed-rank test, p-values both at 0.046. In
R40, average and median prie sequene start low ompared to the theoretial predition
(875 and 850 vs 1280); a rst indiation that there ould be extra-delay ompared to
the theoretially predited sequene. There is an obvious attempt at sreening given the
sharp dierene in median aepted pries (resp. mean) between both types of sellers
Wiloxon signed-rank test, p-values both at 0.03. Standard errors on opening pries
are signiantly higher in R80 than in R40. In R40, buyers tend to start with an oer
that splits equally the gains from trade that would be obtained with an L-type seller. In
ontrast in R80, there is less onsensus on what the right" rst oer is. Like in R40,
many subjets rst oer around an equal split of the gains from trade (57% between 800
and 1000), while 18% of subjets right away announe oers aeptable by H-type sellers.
For the S-treatments, in S80 median oered and aepted pries are the same. This
hints at possibly high rates of trades. Also notie that in S80, the dierene between
median aepted pries (resp. mean) between L-type and H-type sellers is not signiant,
in line with the theoretial preditions. On the other hand, in S40, the dierene between
median oered and aepted pries (resp. mean) for H-type sellers is large. This indiates
trade failures. Surprisingly, there is also a dierene for the L-type seller, from an opening
median prie of 500 to a median aepted prie of 750. Hene, there are trade failures
also with L-type sellers.
We an also make some rst omparisons between the repeated and the single prie
oer treatments. First, in R80 the median aepted prie (resp. mean) for H-type sellers is
at 2900 (resp. 2799) while in S80 it is 2750 (resp. 2656). These dierenes are signiant
at the 1% level (aording to a Mann-Whitney U test (MW)), indiating that H-type
sellers probably use the possibility oered by R80 to delay agreement in order to trade
at a higher prie. There are no suh dierenes for L-type sellers. Indeed, L-type sellers
get a high informational rent in both S80 and R80. On the other hand, both types of
sellers aept dierent pries in R40 and S40 (p-values all between 0.01 and 0.02 for both
medians and means, for both types of sellers). Beause buyers attempt at sreening in
R40, L-type sellers get a higher rent than in S40 where the equilibrium prie should be 0.
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Likewise, beause of the possibility to delay agreement, H-type sellers are likely to rejet
aeptable pries in the hope to get a better subsequent oer.
Result 1. Prie Wedges
(i) The possibility of repeated oers draws a prie wedge between opening and aepted
pries.
(ii) Trade with H-type sellers ours at higher pries than trade with L-type sellers.
(iii) Aepted pries are higher in the R-treatments as ompared to the S-treatments.
Conformity to Theory: In S80, aepted pries seem to be in line with the theoretial
preditions (2600 with H-type sellers, and 2550 with L-types). The same is not true for
aepted pries in S40 whih are muh higher than predited (median aepted prie of
750 with L-type sellers), and even some H-type sellers traded, ontrary to the market
failure predition. For R80 and R40, these statistis are not suient to fully evaluate
departures from the theoretial preditions. We look now at the prie sequenes for both
treatments, restriting our attention to trades with H-type sellers. Our disussion will be
in support of Result 2.
Result 2. Conformity and Deviations
Buyers follow inreasing prie sequenes in R80 and R40. This is in aordane with the
theoretial predition in R40. In R80, the inability of the buyer to ommit not to make
repeated oers drives observed behavior away from preditions.
Figure 1-1 displays four graphs of observed prie sequenes. Quadrants show prie
sequenes for pairs that traded within ve, ten, fteen and twenty stages, respetively.
Sine we are interested in omplete prie sequenes, only observations with an H-quality
seller are used.
16
First, we notie a strong prie inrease for R80. Starting from median oers lustered
between 1100 and 1375, buyers who traded with an H-type seller double their oers in
16
Higher pries are more likely to be aepted earlier by L-quality sellers. By inluding observations
with an L-quality seller, ases involving an inreasing prie sequene would be underrepresented in later
stages. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p-value 0.845) does not rejet equality of distributions of rst stage
oers between H and L-quality sellers, but generally rejets equality of oer distributions for stages later
than stage 7. See Appendix E for a graphial representation.
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Figure 1-1: Prie Sequenes
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Notes: (1) Subgures 1-4 show the median prie sequene for R80 and R40 for H ases when trade was
ahieved within 5 stages (1), 10 stages (2), 15 stages (3), or 20 stages (4). (2) The prie sequenes are
alulated by rst taking for eah buyer individually the median and then the median over all buyers.
(3) The solid horizontal line orresponds to ost c¯ = 2500 of H-types.
stage 2. For pairs that traded within ve stages, a median prie oer higher than c¯ is
made in stage 2, while for the three other quadrants the ost of the H-type seller is always
overed in stage 3, at the median oer. Exept for the rst quadrant, prie oers stabilize
around 2600. The mean prie jumps are generally positive and dereasing until stage 20,
as shown in Figure 1-2. Beyond stage 20, mean prie jumps osillate between positive
and negative jumps possibly beause payos are then lose to 0 due to disounting.
The above observations are in stark ontrast with the predition that trade should our
immediately at a prie of c¯: the inability of buyers to ommit not to make repeated oers
drive observed behavior towards inreasing prie sequenes. Figure 1-2 also shows the
fration of ases for whih the buyer has oered at least one prie equal to or above 2500.
While only 18% of all ases start with an H-aeptable oer, this fration inreases to
85% by stage 4, and it is above 95% by stage 14.
In omparison, behavior in R40 is sluggish. Figure 1-1 shows that the median prie
oers are at 875 in stage 1. For pairs that traded within ve stages, the rst three oers
are between 875 and 1050 with a sudden jump to an oer exeeding c¯. For the three other
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Figure 1-2: Prie Jumps
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Notes: (1) The bars indiate the mean observed prie jumps. The rst bar represents the mean oer in
stage 1. Bars 2 to 50 represent the mean prie jumps from one stage to the next. (2) The solid line shows
for R80 and R40 the fration of H ases that involve prie sequenes with at least one oer above 2500
in a given stage.
quadrants (10,15 and 20 stages), an oer aeptable by the H-type seller is not reahed
before stage 7, 10 and 12 respetively. In the same fashion, Figure 1-2 shows that in R40
the fration of oers aeptable by H-type sellers inreases but it takes ten stages to reah
60% of ases with an oer above 2500. In 23% of all ases, buyers never oer a prie equal
to or above 2500 and hene these ases must involve trade failure.
1.4.2 Bargaining, Adverse Seletion, Trade and Eieny
We disuss in this part our entral ndings regarding the performane of both bargaining
protools used in our experiment.
Trade Dominane of the Repeated Oer Treatments: Treatments S80 and S40
exhibit two dierent onlusions in the presene of adverse seletion. In the former, the
probability that the seller is an H-type is so high that the buyer is willing to take a risk
and oer c¯. In suh a ase, adverse seletion does not ause trade failures and the outome
is predited to be rst-best eient goods hange hands so that the full gains from trade
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Table 1.5: Trade Frequeny
Treatment Type Cases Trade Frequeny
≤ 50 ≤ 20 ≤ 10 ≤ 5 ≤ 3 ≤ 2 ≤ 1
R80 H 286 0.98 0.94 0.86 0.67 0.46 0.31 0.12
R80 L 64 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.89 0.70 0.58 0.30
R40 H 140 0.81 0.73 0.55 0.31 0.11 0.06 0.00
R40 L 210 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.66 0.53 0.35
S80 H 202 0.63
S80 L 38 0.92
S40 H 114 0.11
S40 L 116 0.82
Notes: Trades frequenies for R80 and R40 are provided separately for trades ourring
within the rst 50 stages (≤ 50), 20 stages (≤ 20), 10 stages (≤ 10), 5 stages (≤ 5), 3
stages (≤ 3), 2 stages (≤ 2), and 1 stage (≤ 1).
are realized. On the other hand, S40 shows a ase of market failure. Buyers should always
oer a prie of 0 and H-type sellers never trade. In ontrast, R80 and R40 predit trade
with probability 1 for both type of sellers. We look at the rates of trade in light of these
preditions.
Result 3. Rates of Trade
The possibility to make repeated oers has a strong impat. Rates of trades are boosted
upward in R80-R40 ompared to their respetive single-prie treatments S80-S40. In ad-
dition, the more likely the seller is an H-type, the higher the rates of trades.
Table 1.5 lists the observed trade frequenies for all treatments separated by seller
quality, and distinguishing between dierent timelines over whih trade ourred. For
instane, the rst olumn ≤ 50 shows rates of trade treating all trades as suessful; while
the seond olumn ≤ 20 ounts trades as suessful only if they our within 20 stages
et.
17
In S80, trade should our with probability 1 for both type of sellers. Trade with
H-type sellers our in 63% of ases and is statistially dierent from a rate of trade of
1 (One-Sample median test, p-value= 0.07), while trade with L-types is 92% and ts
17
Obviously, Table 1.5 shows only one olumn for S80 and S40.
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with the theoretial predition. In ontrast, in S40, rates of trade dier from preditions
(p-values= 0.07 for both types). Some buyers make aeptable oers to both types and
11% of H-type sellers trade (13 out of 114 observation with H-type sellers). Rate of trade
with L-types is then 82%. Trade failures in S40 are thus quite high. In the ounterpart
R-treatments, looking at olumn≤ 50 shows that rates of trades are as predited exept in
R40 with H-types (p-value= 0.03). Reall however our earlier omments when disussing
Figure 1-2: beyond stage 20, mean prie jumps beome volatile and our intuition for why
this is happening is that gains from trade beyond that stage fall to almost 0. If we restrit
to pairs trading within 20 stages, then rates of trade with H-type sellers in both R80 and
R40 are dierent from 1 (p-value=0.05 for R80 and p-value=0.03 for R40).
Coming to the treatment omparisons, a quik look at Table 1.5 shows dierenes
when going from the S to the R-treatments. While there are many ases of trade failures
with H-types in S80, this issue is mostly avoided in R80 where rates are 98% and 94% for
the H and L-type sellers when trade ours within 20 stages. As expeted, there is little
statistial signiane in the hange of rates with L-types between R80 and S80 (Fisher
exat test, p-value=0.14). However, the gap between R80 and S80 is large for the H-types
(p-value< 0.01). The omparison between R40 and S40 is even more onlusive as both
trades with H and L-types dier (both p-values< 0.01). A large fration of the trade
failures predited in S40 are thus avoided with R40 even though in R40 there is still a
signiant rate of trade failures.
The onlusions on rates of trade are also onrmed in Table 1.6. The rst olumn
shows a linear regression on whether trade ourred.
18
Compared to S40, trade is easier
in all other treatments (p-values < 0.01) respetively easier in R80 than in R40, and
easier in R40 than in S80. Therefore repeated oers greatly failitate trade. Moreover,
the probability of trading with an H-type seller is signiantly lower than with an L-type
seller.
19
18
Estimating a pooled probit model with standard errors lustered on the individual level yields similar
results.
19
Combining the oeient of H with eah interation term, we an rejet the null hypothesis that
there is no signiant dierene between rates of trade with H and L-quality sellers at the 5% signiane
level for R80 and at the 1% level for the other treatments.
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Table 1.6: Random Eets Regressions
Dep. Var.: Trade (1) Atp. Stage (2) Welfare (3)
R80 0.18
∗∗∗
(0.04) -165
∗
(100)
R40 0.13
∗∗∗
(0.04) 1.08
∗
(0.60) -286
∗∗∗
(89)
S80 0.15
∗∗∗
(0.06) 218.4
∗∗
(99)
H -0.70
∗∗∗
(0.05) 2.19
∗∗∗
(0.47) -1324
∗∗∗
(66)
R80*H 0.66
∗∗∗
(0.06) 576
∗∗∗
(98)
R40*H 0.47
∗∗∗
(0.08) 2.28
∗∗∗
(0.84) 395
∗∗∗
(86)
S80*H 0.37
∗∗∗
(0.09) 296
∗∗∗
(112)
Constant 0.83
∗∗∗
(0.04) 3.01
∗∗∗
(0.72) 1521
∗∗∗
(66)
R2 (overall) 0.36 0.14 0.49
Observations 1170 631 1170
Individuals 117 70 117
Referene Group S40 / L R80 / L S40 / L
Notes: (1) Standard errors are lustered on individuals (in parentheses). (2)
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (3) All estimations inlude period dummies.
The estimated oeients are insigniant for all models and all periods.
We onlude on Result 3 with the impat of an inrease in the probability of an H-type
seller within eah set of treatments. For the S-treatments, suh an inrease has a positive
impat for trade with both types (MW p-values respetively less than 0.01 and 0.05). For
the R-treatments rates of trade with L-type sellers are already not dierent from 1 in both
R80 and R40. Not surprisingly there is no statistial dierene there (p-value=0.55). On
the other hand, the gap in rates of trade with H-type sellers between R80 and R40 is
important and this is statistially onrmed (MW, p-value< 0.01).
We lose with a quik glane at the remaining olumns of Table 1.5. An interesting
observation there is the time it takes for trade with H-type sellers to pik up in R40
ompared to R80. Trade with H-type sellers in the former reah a mere 31% within ve
stages whereas it is at 67% in the latter; likewise for trade within ten stages (respetively
55% and 86%). Overall, in R40, 50% of trades with H-type sellers our where potential
welfare has already fallen to a third of the gains from trade; 30% in R80. Table 1.5 gives
a rst snapshot of the over-delay present in both R-treatments: rates of trade are high,
but agreements seem diult to reah.
Later or Never? A Late Blooming of Trade: As Table 1.5 already hinted, trade
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Table 1.7: Trading Stage
H L
Median Mean SE Min Max Median Mean SE Min Max
R80 4 5.7 6.6 1 47 2 3 2.6 1 15
R40 7 9.7 7.6 2 36 2 3 8.2 1 50
in the R-treatments takes time. Column 2 of Table 1.6 shows the aeptane stage as
funtion of the treatments and interation variables. The oeient of R40 shows that
trade with L-types ours later in R40, but this is signiant only at the 10% level.
Striking a deal with an H-type seller takes signiantly longer than with an L-type in
both treatments. Coeient R40*H onrms, however, that agreeing with an H-type
seller takes longer in R40 than in R80. Finally ombining estimates shows that, in R40,
H-type sellers aept an oer on average 4.5 stages later than L-type sellers. We now go
to the data more preisely and summarize our ndings below.
Result 4. A Long Delay
Trade ours signiantly late in the R-treatments, in partiular for H-type sellers. L-
type sellers aept earlier than H-types. Also, the more likely the seller is an H-type, the
earlier trade ours. Most importantly, delay is a persistent phenomenon aross bargaining
games.
From Table 1.7, we get that the median aeptane stage of an H-type seller is 4 in R80
while it is 7 in R40 (MW, p-value< 0.01). It takes more time to reah an agreement with
an H-type when the probability that the seller is an H-type is rather low. Importantly,
there is a signiant over-delay in both treatments for trade with both seller types (Median
test, p-values< 0.01). Obviously, two soures an be at play to explain over-delay. On the
one hand, buyers ause delay: they open prie sequenes with lower pries than expeted,
and they inrease pries slower. On the other hand, an important hannel explaining
over-delay is that H-type sellers rejet aeptable oers. If H-type sellers never rejeted
aeptable oers, the median aeptane stages are redued in both treatments from 4
to 2 in R80, and from 7 to 6 in R40.
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Figure 1-3: Period Eets
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Note that the value of the disount rate should push trade to our sooner rather than
later reall that at a disount rate of δ = 0.8, already more than half of the gains from
trade with an H-type seller are gone after stage 4. In ontrast, we saw that bargaining
pairs seem to experiene diulties in reahing agreements in a small number of periods
in both treatments. We are therefore ondent that over-delay is a robust phenomenon.
This is onrmed in Figure 1-3. There we see that opening oers are ompletely stable
throughout the experiment. Trading stage is always in exess of the preditions, and
hene over-delay is persistent. In addition, it is lear that delay does not derease with
experiene. We see, however, that R40-H is not as quiet as the others in terms of trading
stage utuations. Figure 1-3 (), although not diretly related to delay, highlights the
relative stability of behaviors aross bargaining game. In Setion 4.3, we will show that
over-delay an be explained by buyers' loss aversion and sellers' haggling.
Eieny, Payos and Dominane of Single-Prie Oers: So far we have dou-
mented the amplifying eet on rates of trade of the R-treatments over the S-treatments.
However, Result 4 on delay already points at failures of the R-treatments. Indeed, pos-
sible diulties linked to (i) the inability of buyers to ommit, (ii) fear of making losses
with L-type sellers, and (iii) the ombination of rejetion of aeptable oers by both L
and H-type sellers push delay way beyond the sequential equilibrium preditions. But
observing a systemati over-delay begs the question ontained in our title: is it better to
trade later than never? In terms of eonomi performane, is it better to have a signiant
inrease in rates of trade, at the prie of delay?
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Figure 1-4: Observed Welfare
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Result 5. Eieny Failures
Eieny falls short of the theoretial preditions for all treatments. Moreover, the R-
treatments perform worse than their single-prie oer ounterparts.
The left panel of Figure 1-4 shows the observed average welfare levels over all bargain-
ing pairs.
20
A rst look at the gure reveals that average welfare in all treatments are
lower than their respetive predited levels. Median tests onrm that the R-treatments
perform worse than predited (p-values< 0.05) although the signiane is only at the
10% level for the S-treatments. Reall that, theoretially, we expet little to no dierene
in ex-ante welfare levels aross treatments see Table 2. Indeed, there is not enough dif-
ferenes aross the R-treatments (MW, p-value=0.109), even though the welfare level is
higher in R40 than in R80. However, the dierene between S80 and S40 is onrmed at
the 5% level, with higher gains from trade exploited in S40 (p-value= 0.021)
The main message oming out of the left panel of Figure 1-4 are the dierenes aross
set of treatments. The average welfare level trade is higher in the S-treatments than in
their respetive R-treatments, and this irrespetive of the probability of ourrene of
H-type sellers. S-treatments seem to perform better than R-treatments for R80-S80,
20
Note that the gure on the left panel is omputed by using the observed welfare by types of the right
panel, and weighted by the theoretial probabilities on L and H-types. For instane the bar for R80 gives
a level of welfare of 667. This is obtained as (0.2 ∗ 1246)+ (0.8 ∗ 523), as shown on the right panel, R80-L
and R80-H.
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p-value= 0.055, for R40-S40, p-value= 0.011 (MW tests). Importantly, this shows that,
given our parameters onstellation, R-treatments fail to be seond-best eient in pra-
tie: they deliver on average lower ex-ante eieny levels than their ounterpart single-
prie treatments.
21
With respet to rst-best eieny, notie that the R-treatments
aount for only 58% in R80 and 54% in R40 of the rst-best eieny level.
Given that observed welfare falls short of the theoretial predition, one ould expet
that subjets learn to adjust pries in order to reah more eient outomes. This is true
in partiular for the R-treatments where there is too muh delay. However, reall that
Figure 1-3 shows that opening as well as trading stages are rather stable aross the 10
repetitions of the bargaining game.
Figure 1-4 also breaks down gains from trade between bargaining pairs with an H and
with an L-type seller. This allows us a rst attempt at disentangling where the failure of
the R with respet to the S-treatments may ome from. We notie rst that welfare in
pairs with an H-type seller does not signiantly dier between S40 (105) and R40 (238)
MW, p-value=0.136. Sine the rate of trade with an H-type in R40 is high (81%), it is
lear that delay must aount for a signiant part of the loss ompared to its theoretial
predition.
22
In ontrast, welfare in pairs with an L-type is signiantly lower in R40 than
in S40 (p-value< 0.05), and this is expeted.23
Regarding R80 vs S80, realized welfare in pairs with an H-type seller diers at the 10%
level (523 and 629, respetively). Here, the hange in rate of trades when going to R80
is large, from 63% to 98%, yet the welfare is higher in S80. The dierene between the
two treatments is thus a pure onsequene of over-delay, and welfare levels in pairs with
an H-type are roughly at half of their theoretial predition. Likewise, welfare levels with
L-type sellers are signiantly lower in R80 than in S80 (MW, p-value< 0.05). Notie that
21
Our ndings here are also onrmed in the third olumn of Table 1.6.
22
The unexpeted rate of trade of 11% in S40 is not suient to explain the small dierene in welfare
generated in pairs with H-types in both treatments in partiular given that the theoretial gains in R40
are 1000 ∗ 0.83 = 512.
23
On top of that, the inrease in rate of trade with an L-type from 82% in S40 to 99% in R40 does
not ompensate for the loss due to delay. Notie that realized welfare with an L-type in S40 aounts for
82% of the expeted welfare, and for 75% in R40 (and only 46% of the expeted welfare when trading
with an H-type).
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Table 1.8: Payos
R80 R40 S80 S40
Buyer H 376 (1000) 166 (512) 528 (1000) 87 (0)
L -328 (-750) 435 (220) -585 (-750) 708 (1750)
Seller H 147 (0) 72 (0) 100 (0) 18 (0)
L 1574 (2500) 696 (1280) 2197 (2500) 725 (0)
Notes: Average payos for buyers and sellers separated by sellers' types. The-
oretial preditions are given in brakets.
realized welfare with an L-type in S80 aounts for 92% of the expeted welfare, while
only for 71% in R80. Overall, when exibility in making oers is introdued, buyers are
not able to ommit to avoid this option.
Result 5 already indiates the failure of the R-treatments. In its own right, it gives
a rst piee of information regarding dierenes in welfare generated between R and S-
treatments as well as between H-type and L-type bargaining pairs. What is still missing
is an additional step of disaggregation of payos between buyers and sellers. It is impor-
tant to know how gains from trade are shared, in partiular ompared to the theoretial
preditions.
Result 6. Cushioning of Losses and Ineetive Commitment
In the R-treatments, buyers ushion potential losses with L-type sellers by delaying high
oers. This implies that buyers bear most of the welfare losses in R80 (relative to the
theoretially expeted welfare), while sellers do in R40. In the S-treatments, buyers bear
all the welfare losses, beause ommitment power annot be used eetively.
Table 1.8 displays the buyers' and sellers' average payos separated by H-type and
L-type ases (theoretial preditions are given in brakets). By weighting the observed
payos aording to the probability of ourrene of H-type and L-type sellers, one an
derive the average payos over both types. For instane, in R80, the buyers' average
payo is 0.8 ∗ 376 + 0.2 ∗ (−328) = 235.2. The buyers' theoretially expeted payo is
0.8 ∗ 1000 + 0.2 ∗ (−750) = 650. In the same way, the sellers' average payo in R80 is
432.4, while it should be 500 at the SE. Hene, the buyers bear 86% of the welfare loss
36
in R80. Following the same proedure for the other treatments yields that sellers bear
97% of the welfare losses in R40 and that buyers bear 100% of the welfare losses in the
S-treatments (sellers earn more than the theoretial predition, yet welfare falls short of
the theoretial predition).
24
It is instrutive to look at the payos separated by H-type and L-type ases in more
detail. A ommon feature in R80 and R40 is that buyers trade o gains obtained with
H-type sellers to get higher gains from L-type sellers, beyond the theoretial preditions
(Median test p-values are all < 0.03). By shifting to dierent prie sequenes in R40 than
the predited one, buyers are able to redue the losses made with some of the L-type
sellers at the SE (those ourring with trades at 2000). Indeed, buyers are able to ushion
losses obtained with L-type sellers in R80 from −750 to −328 and inrease their payos in
R40 L-type ases from 220 to 435. Both omes at the expense of lower generated gains in
bargaining pairs with an H-type seller. Overall, buyers seem to be hurt by their inability
to ommit in the 80s-treatments (average payos are signiantly lower in R80 than in
S80) but not in the 40s-treatments.
In S80, the informational advantage of the L-type sellers is at its maximum beause
parameters do not prevent rst-best eieny. An L-type seller is paid the ost of an
H-type seller. Beause buyers attempt at sreening in R80 (and ushion losses), it is not
surprising to witness a signiant redution in the informational rent from an average of
2197 to 1574 (MW, p-value < 0.05). On the other hand, H-type sellers are able to extrat
some rent so that overall, buyers bear all the welfare losses in S80: even though most
buyers make oers exeeding 2500, H-type sellers rejet suh oers in 27% of the ases.
This redues buyers' payos below the theoretial predition.
A remarkable observation is the absene of signiant dierene between sellers' payos
in R40 and S40 (MW, p-value= 0.831 for L-type ases). Hene, under severe adverse
seletion L-type sellers are equally well o if the buyer has full ommitment power (single-
prie oer) or uses repeated oers. On the one hand, despite the ommitment power of
24
Median tests onrm that buyers earn less than theoretially predited in all treatments (p-values
< 0.03 for the R-treatments and < 0.07 for the S-treatments). In R80 and S80 sellers' payos are not
signiantly dierent (p-values > 0.3) from preditions and in S40 sellers earn more than theoretially
expeted. On the other hand, sellers' payos are redued in R40 (p-value < 0.03).
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Figure 1-5: Soures of Ineieny
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Notes: (1) The bars show the perentage of welfare loss due to delay relative to the ex-ante welfare
predited by sequential equilibrium. (2) In the seond gure, we do the same omputation but restriting
to trades ourring within 20 stages, (≤ 20).
buyers in S40, buyers are unable to fully apitalize on the advantage of a single-prie oer.
In partiular, gains from trade in S40 are roughly split in half with L-type sellers. This is
reminisent of ndings from ultimatum games with omplete information.
25
On the other
hand, in R40, L-type sellers are only at 54% of the predited payo level, beause buyer
inreases pries relatively slowly.
Two Channels of Eieny Loss: We now lose this setion with a quantiation of
the two hannels generating welfare losses. The two soures of eieny loss are trade
failures and delay. By design, any deviation from the theoretial predition observed in
the S-treatments ome from trade failures. In ontrast, in the R-treatments both soures
an be at play. In Figure 1-5, we expliitly show the perentage of ineieny due to
delay for both types of sellers in the R-treatments. The gure shows eieny loss by
types over all 50 stages, but also for trades ourring only over the rst 20 stages thereby
ounting trades beyond stage 20 as unsuessful.
26
25
See for instane the survey by Güth and Tietz (1990).
26
Both gures are omputed as follows. Consider R80 and the bar assoiated with the H-type. We rst
onsider (i) all ases with an H*1000 (whether trade ourred or not), this gives us the potential welfare.
We then ompute the total eieny loss as the potential welfare minus the ahieved welfare in all these
38
Figure 1-6: Empirial Cumulative Distribution of Trading Stage
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Not surprisingly, in R80 delay almost fully explains welfare losses. This indiates also
that trades our mostly within the rst 20 stages. In ontrast, both hannels of eieny
loss are at play in R40. For instane, when onsidering trades within the rst 20 stages
delay and trade failures are eah responsible for roughly half of the welfare loss in pairs
with an H-type seller and delay is responsible for 73% of the welfare loss in pairs with an
L-type seller. Contrary to R80, there is a dierene between the ≤ 50 and the ≤ 20 ases,
and this even with L-type sellers. This is reminisent of Result 4 showing that trade is
sluggish in R40.
1.4.3 Roots of Over-Delay
In this setion we further explore the reasons for over-delay. A glane at Figure 1-6
provides a good overview. The gure shows the fration of bargaining pairs that have
traded at or before a partiular stage. It is apparent that in both treatments there is
more delay with H-type sellers than with L-type sellers and that delay with H-types is
relatively large, in partiular in R40. The separation of H and L-types is muh stronger
ases. (ii) Next we do the same operation but only for ases in whih trade was ahieved. This gives the
eieny loss that is due to delay (no trade failure here). Dividing (ii) by (i) gives the eieny loss that
is due only to delay.
39
in R40 than in R80. In R40 buyers are relutant to inrease their pries even though
L-types are sreened out relatively fast. By stage 3 already 66 perent of the L-types have
aepted. Yet, at this point only 11 perent of the H-types have traded. We show in the
following that this an be explained by loss aversion.
A seond soure of over-delay is that sellers haggle, in partiular H-types frequently
rejet oers above 2500. Suh behavior is most ommon in R80. An important fator here
is the expetations that are formed by sellers in response to observed prie sequenes. In
partiular, high oers trigger high expetations about future oers. Our analysis will be
in support of the following result.
Result 7. Loss Aversion and Haggling
Buyers and sellers both ontribute to over-delay. (i) Buyers exhibit loss aversion and
prefer to delay potential losses by following a atter prie sequene than predited. (ii)
H-type sellers tend to delay agreement. (iii) Quik sreening is ompliated by the fat
that both L and H-type sellers' expetation about future oers are strongly inreasing in
the level of the past oers.
Buyers Delay Agreement: Equilibrium prie sequenes in the R-treatments involve the
risk of making losses. We have seen that in both treatments buyers trade o lower gains
from H-types against higher gains (or redued losses in R80) from L-types. Loss aversion
seems to be a promising andidate to explain the buyers' deviation from the SE predition.
In Appendix C we show that the sreening equilibrium of the bargaining model indeed
implies more delay if we aount for loss aversion.
27
Intuitively, starting with a high oer
in R80 and sreening out L-type sellers in R40 requires oers that potentially lead to a loss.
A loss averse buyer may prefer to delay these losses. In partiular, for a reasonable amount
of loss aversion the equilibrium oer sequene beomes (1024, 1280, 1600, 2000, 2500) in
R40 and (2000, 2500) in R80.28
27
In the questionnaire onduted at the end of the experiment, some partiipants mentioned that they
tried to avoid making losses. In Rapoport et al. (1995) the uninformed party never runs the risk to make
losses. The fat that we nd over-delay and they do not is therefore onsistent with loss aversion.
28
See Appendix C for a derivation of these prie sequenes. We use a piee-wise linear payo funtion
with a kink at 0, putting more weight to losses than gains. The reported sequenes use a loss aversion
parameter of 2, i.e., losses reeive twie the weight of gains.
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Table 1.9: Loss Aversion
Opening Bargaining Trade Trade Buyer
Oer Length (Linear) (Probit) Payo
Loss Averse -594.9** 3.6*** -0.06 -0.14 211.3
(LA) (266.20) (1.07) (0.06) (0.12) (205.30)
LA x H -4.15*** -0.21** -0.27* -295.10
(1.18) (0.11) (0.15) (286.60)
R40 -1063.50*** 3.82*** 1028.20***
(229.20) (1.00) (174.20)
R40 x LA 563.40** -3.21** -154.00
(278.80) (1.41) (219.30)
R40 x H -1.25 -1224.40***
(1.52) (249.30)
R40 x LA x H 3.49* 239.40
(2.04) (297.30)
H 5.06*** -0.05 -0.09 1080.70***
(0.96) (0.05) (0.13) (237.70)
Constant 1751.10*** -0.03 0.84*** -758.30***
(249.50) (0.92) (0.08) (170.40)
R2 (overall) 0.25 0.14 0.19 0.33
Log-Likelihood -44.66
Observations 340 307 170 119 340
Individuals 34 34 17 17 34
Referene Group R80 / LA=0 R80 / LA=0 / L R40 / LA=0 R40 / LA=0 R80 L / LA=0
Notes: (1) Columns 1-3 and 5 are random eets regressions and olumn 4 is a pooled probit with the
average marginal eets reported. Standard errors lustered on individuals in parentheses. Signiane
levels * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (2) The dummy Loss Averse is onstruted suh that
it is equal to 1 if a subjet only aepted lotteries with a 50% probability of losing 4 CHF or less and
0 otherwise. (3) The variable Trade is equal to 1 if trade ourred within the rst 20 stages and 0
otherwise. Columns 3 and 4 use only data from R40, sine in R80 trade ourred almost always.
We gathered information on loss aversion in 6 of the 12 sessions for the R-treatments.
We used the same lottery task as Fehr et al. (2013). After subjets are told their earnings
from the bargaining experiment, they were presented six lotteries whih they ould either
aept or deline. Eah lottery gives a 50-50 hane between winning an additional 6
CHF or losing an amount that diers between lotteries. The amount that ould be lost
was 2,3,4,5,6,7 for the six lotteries. One of the six lotteries was then randomly seleted
and paid. In ase the seleted lottery was delined, no additional earnings or losses were
realized.
29 30
29
34 out of 36 buyers have a unique swithing point in their lottery deisions. The mean swithing
point is 2.6, i.e., it is between the lotteries with 50% probability of losing 3 and 4. We only use buyers
with a unique swithing point.
30
In priniple, the lottery task may also measure a subjet's risk aversion. However, Rabin's (2000)
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Table 1.9 summarizes the impat of loss aversion on opening oers, the length of
the bargaining proess, trade suess and buyers' payos. The dummy Loss Averse
is onstruted suh that it is equal to 1 if a subjet only aepted lotteries with a 50%
probability of losing 4 CHF or less. Subjets who aepted 50-50 lotteries between winning
6 CHF and losing 5 CHF or more are onsidered to be not loss averse.
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Column 1 shows that in R80 loss averse buyers on average start with an oer that
is around 600 points lower than oers oming from less loss averse buyers. This eet
is not present in R40 where the opening oer is generally muh lower.
32
Reall that in
R80 opening oers exhibit large standard errors. This high variability in R80 seems to be
aptured by loss aversion: while loss averse buyers are relutant to make high oers, less
loss averse buyers are willing to start with higher oers trying to inrease their payos
with H-type sellers.
The results on bargaining length show that by starting with a higher oer, buyers
were indeed able to speed up the bargaining proess in R80. Unfortunately, this is only
true for trade with L-type sellers. Delay with H-types is not signiantly lower for less
loss averse buyers, possibly beause H-type sellers' haggling is the main fator of delay
in R80. In R40, loss aversion has no impat on bargaining length.
33
This suggest that
loss aversion seems to be unimportant in R40. However, olumns 3 and 4 show that loss
averse buyers are responsible for a large part of the trade failures in R40.
34
If the seller is
an H-type and the buyer belongs to the group with a larger loss aversion, trade rates are
redued substantially.
35
This indiates that loss averse buyers were not willing to oer
high pries even if disounting has erased most gains from trade.
Finally, the last olumn in Table 1.9 shows that in R80 loss averse buyers inur smaller
losses with L-types but also realize smaller gains with H-type sellers. These dierenes are,
alibration theorem shows that the rejetion of lotteries for losses smaller than 6 would imply unreasonable
levels of risk aversion when stakes are higher.
31
Using this proedure 24 buyers are lassied as loss averse and 10 as not loss averse. Changing the
swithing point does not aet results qualitatively, but the dierenes may beome less signiant.
32
This an be seen by ombining the oeients for LA and R40*LA.
33
This an be seen by ombining the oeients for LA and R40*LA for L-type sellers and LA, LA*H,
R40*LA, R40*LA*H for H-type sellers.
34
Only data from R40 is used, sine trade failures are negligible in R80.
35
Note, however, that the signiane is only at the 10 perent level for the probit estimates.
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however, not signiant. Similarly, in R40 there are no signiant dierenes in payos
due to loss aversion. While loss aversion seems to be an important driver of buyers'
behavior, less loss averse buyers ould not realize higher prots. An important fator in
explaining this is that H-type sellers often rejeted oers above 2500, whih leads to ostly
delay. We will refer to rejetions of aeptable oers by H-types as haggling. Let us now
turn towards sellers' behavior in more depth.
Sellers Delay Agreement: Sellers' aeptane deisions are summarized in Table 1.10.
Only 22% of the oers between 2500 and 3000 were aepted by H-type sellers in R80.
Similarly, in R40 this number orresponds to 27%. For the S-treatments, aeptane
rates of aeptable oers for H-types are higher than in the R-treatments. This is a diret
impliation of the buyer's ommitment power, whih leaves the seller with no opportunity
to haggle.
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Aeptane rates of L-type sellers for oers between 500 and 2500 are non-
negligible in R80 and R40. Hene, in both treatments it was worthwhile for buyers to
start with relatively low oers to sreen out L-types.
Why do H-type sellers haggle? A simple hek of whether seller strive for higher prots
or are motivated by other onsiderations is to see how often sellers aept the best possible
oer. The best oer is the highest disounted oer in an oer sequene of a partiular
bargain.
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However, we also need to take into aount that sellers ould aept oers too
early. Therefore, we estimated prie sequenes and used these estimates to predit what
prie oers would have been made if the seller had not aepted. This allows to onstrut
omplete prie sequenes (for a detailed desription see Appendix D Table 1.C.1). Using
the predited prie sequenes, the perentages of best oers aepted for H-type sellers
are 38% for R80 and 27% for R40. L-types aepted the best oer in 62% of the ases
in R80 and in 48% of the ases in R40. Thus, L-types aepted the best oer more often
than H-types in both treatments. In ontrast to H-type sellers, L-type sellers potentially
36
Note that the aeptane rate in S80 for H-types is 73 perent for oers between 2500 and 3000.
Similarly, aeptane rates in S40 for L-types is 61 perent for oers between 0 and 500. The fat that
there is still a onsiderable fration of rejetions is in line with the literature on fairness onsiderations
in ultimatum games.
37
Only bargains that onluded in trade are onsidered.
43
Table 1.10: What Pries Do Sellers Aept?
Treatment Type Prie Range
0- 500- 1000- 1500- 2000- 2500- 3000-
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 4000
R80 H 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.22 0.72
(120) (183) (174) (156) (82) (732) (138)
R80 L 0.00 0.14 0.12 0.28 0.57 0.78 0.25
(13) (49) (39) (25) (7) (41) (32)
R40 H 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.27 0.65
(245) (554) (279) (131) (45) (249) (43)
R40 L 0.02 0.18 0.34 0.28 0.33 0.57 0.80
(252) (494) (185) (39) (9) (37) (5)
S80 H 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 1.00
(2) (5) (10) (12) (4) (158) (11)
S80 L 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00
(1) (1) (2) (2) (1) (29) (2)
S40 H 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
(53) (37) (7) (4) (1) (10) (2)
S40 L 0.61 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(46) (41) (12) (5) (2) (7) (3)
Notes: (1) The aeptane rates are omputed as the fration of aepted
prie oers among all oers made within the orresponding prie range (as
given in brakets) and within the rst 20 stages.
realize high prots. They thus seem to be more eager to aept the best oer.
Next, we estimate a disrete hoie model of the sellers' aeptane deisions.
38
We
try to distinguish between the following onsiderations that sellers potentially take into
aount when deiding to aept or rejet a spei oer. First, there may have been sellers
who followed simple rules of thumb that are diretly linked to the urrent oer they fae.
For instane, an L-type seller deision rule may be that she never aepts less than 1000
in R40. Suh rules of thumb ould also be related to disounted oers. Disounted oers
also over stage eet, e.g., the same oer that is aepted in stage 2 ould be rejeted
in later stages. Seond, previously observed oers may be important, sine they shape
expetation about future oers. From the estimation of the prie sequenes, we know that
there is a strong positive orrelation between urrent and past oers. Finally, haggling
is aptured by the variable Dierene to Best Oer. This variable gives the dierene
38
Notie that here we use the observed oers and not the onstruted prie sequenes.
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Table 1.11: Probit Estimates of Sellers' Aeptane Deisions
R80 R40
H L H L
Oert 0.10677
∗∗∗
0.02113
∗∗∗
0.12618
∗∗∗
0.01954
∗∗∗
(0.01334) (0.00668) (0.03697) (0.00431)
Oert−1 -0.06109
∗∗∗
-0.00381 -0.1198
∗∗∗
-0.01111
∗∗
(0.01387) (0.00783 ) (0.02752) (0.00545)
Disounted Oert 0.01138
∗∗∗
0.00002 0.00909 0.01393
∗∗
(0.00257) (0.00652) (0.00704) (0.00584)
Dierene to -0.0013 -0.02797
∗∗∗
-0.01008 -0.01011
∗∗
Best Oer (0.00283) (0.00983) (0.00845) (0.00408)
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -283.87 -57.12 -110.35 -304.76
Observations 751 148 231 978
Individuals 34 27 26 34
Notes: (1) Standard errors are lustered on individuals (in parentheses).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. (2) Observations with oers below 2500 for H-type sellers are ex-
luded. (3) Coeients are multiplied by fator 100, i.e., they give the eet of a hange
in the explanatory variable of 100 points.
between the best possible oer that is observed in the respetive sequene and the urrent
(disounted) oer. If sellers try to avoid unneessary haggling, we would expet a negative
oeient for Dierene to Best Oer, indiating that sellers try to aept an oer that
is as lose as possible to the best oer.
Table 1.11 presents the results of the probit estimation. The dependent variable is the
binary variable aept whih is equal to 1 if the oer was aepted and 0 otherwise. As
expeted the oeient for the urrent oer is positive and signiant for both treatments
and seller types. Note that the oeients have been multiplied by 100 for onveniene.
Hene, L-type sellers are 2 perent more likely to aept if the oer is inreased by 100
points.
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For H-type sellers only observations with oers above 2500 are inluded.
40
Therefore, a prie inrease of 100 points has a muh stronger eet, namely 11 perent in
R80 and 13 perent in R40.
The negative oeient for Oert−1 points towards an important diulty that buy-
39
At rst sight this eet seems to be small. Reall however that oers often inrease from around 800
to 2500 and more within a few stages.
40
Oers below 2500 are usually not aepted.
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ers had to overome when trying to sreen L-type sellers in R40. A high oer in the
urrent stage implies that the seller is then less likely to aept a given oer in the next
stage. Observing high oers, sellers seem to expet even higher oers in the future. This
ompliates sreening. This eet is present for H-type sellers as well. Thus, a buyer that
raises oers above 2500 relatively fast will fae a more demanding H-type seller. The fat
that high oers indue expetations for higher oers in the future may explain why less
loss averse buyers are not able to realize higher prots.
Finally, the oeient for Dierene to Best Oer is signiant only for L-type sellers.
We interpret this as evidene that L-type sellers' haggling is limited. On the other hand,
H-type sellers are not more likely to aept an oer that is loser to the best oer in the
sequene (after ontrolling for the level of the oer). This is in line with the observation
that L-type seller aept the best oer muh more often than H-type sellers.
Summing up, our disussion draws the following piture about sellers' motivation to
aept or rejet an oer. H-type sellers haggle even if this implies lower payos. Our
intuition for this is that prots for H-types are generally low, whih means that other
onsiderations dominate, suh as following simple rules of thumb. L-type sellers on the
other hand an generate high prots. Aordingly, they do not engage in ostly haggling
as muh as H-type sellers and often aept the best possible oer. However, in partiular
in R80, rules of thumb seem to be important as well. Perhaps most importantly, behavior
of sellers seems to be driven by their expetations about future oers, whih diretly
depend on past oers.
1.5 Conlusion
Better Later than Never? A welfare-based evaluation of our experimental bargaining
protools yields that the single-prie oer fares better than the repeated oer protool,
in ontrast with the theoretial preditions. However, when our main onern is whether
goods are traded or not, then repeated oers perform well: trade rates are boosted upwards
when buyers are allowed to make a sequene of oers.
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Importantly, both bargaining protools under-performed relative to the theoretial
predition. In the S-treatments sellers rejeted many oers they should have aepted
if their deisions were based exlusively on monetary payo. In the R-treatments the
buyers' lak of ommitment power leads to long delay before trades were reahed. Both
phenomena drive down eieny substantially. We identify loss aversion as a behavioral
explanation for the long delay. Another important fator is the expetations steep prie
sequenes indue: buyers who raise pries fast are expeted to raise pries even more even
if the reservation prie of H-type sellers is already overed. This makes it less beneial
to use steep prie sequenes and delays trades.
Overall, our assessment of the preditions made by sequential equilibrium is rather
positive. Naturally, we observe many deviations from these preditions, most notably a
substantial over-delay. This is true in partiular if parameters are suh that there should
be no delay even if repeated oers are possible. Despite the systemati deviations from
equilibrium preditions and the departure from the loss-neutrality assumption made in
the standard model, the main message arries over to the experimental results: buyers use
the possibility of repeated prie oers to sreen out L-quality sellers. This leads to trade
with H-quality sellers, even though inentive onstraints prelude this in the single-prie
oer bargaining protool.
Extensions: Several immediate hanges in our set of parameters ome to mind. First,
varying the disount rate seems important to evaluate the saliene of the over-delay ob-
served in our experiment. Next, the R-treatments allowed for a lengthy bargaining, pos-
sibly going to stages where payos beome very low. It seems important to evaluate
whether, under idential equilibrium preditions, shorter bargaining spans would push
trade to our faster and at the same rates.
The observed payos distribution indiates that in the ontext of exlusive bargaining,
private information may be more valuable than advantages due to the speis of the
bargaining institution. It seems important to shed light on the possible dierenes with
a set-up in whih bargaining ours in markets and the exlusivity between a buyer and
a seller is only temporary. We leave these questions open for future researh.
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Appendix
1.A Instrutions for Treatment R80
Welome to this eonomi experiment. From now on you are not allowed to ommuniate
in any other way than speied in the instrutions. Please obey to this rule beause
otherwise we have to exlude you from the experiment and all earnings you have made
will be lost. Please also do not ask questions aloud. If you have a question, raise your
hand. A member of the experimenter team will ome to you and answer your question in
private.
In this experiment you an earn money with the deisions you make. How muh you
earn depends on your own deisions, the deisions of other partiipants as well as random
events. We will not speak of CHF during the experiment, but rather of experimental
points. All your earnings will rst be alulated in points. At the end of the experiment
the total amount of points you earned will be onverted to CHF at the following rate:
100 points = 0.4 CHF
In addition, you will reeive a show up fee of 10 CHF.
The experiment onsists of two parts that are independent of one another. For eah
part you will reeive spei instrutions. These instrutions will explain how you make
deisions and how your deisions and the deisions of other partiipants inuene your
earnings. Therefore, it is important that you read the instrutions arefully.
In ase you should make losses, the show up fee of 10 CHF is used to over for these
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losses. If you make losses exeeding 10 CHF, you will have the option to leave immediately
and earn 0 CHF.
The General Setting
We will now desribe the general setting you will fae during the experiment. At the
beginning of the experiment the partiipants will be divided into buyers and sellers. Half
of the partiipants will be buyers and the other half will be sellers. When you are a
buyer (respetively, a seller) you will stay a buyer (respetively, a seller) throughout the
experiment. A deision situation (explained below) will be repeated for 10 periods. In
eah period a buyer and a seller are randomly mathed. In other words, the partiipants
are divided into pairs and eah pair onsists of one buyer and one seller. You will not get
to know the identity of the buyer or seller you are paired with, neither during nor after
the experiment. The partiipant who is paired with you will also not get to know your
identity. In eah period new pairs will be formed randomly.
The Deision Situation
The deision situation will be the same for all ten periods. We will now desribe one
suh period. After the buyer and the seller have been mathed, they fae the following
situation. The seller an be of two dierent types: type A or type B. A seller of type A
an only produe a high quality good at ost 2500. A seller of type B an only produe a
low quality good at ost 0. The buyer's valuation for the high quality good is 3500. The
buyer's valuation for the low quality good is 1750.
The seller knows whether she is of type A or type B and therefore also knows how
muh the good is worth to the buyer. However, the buyer does not know the seller's type
and hene, the buyer does neither know whether his valuation for the good is 3500 or 1750
nor whether the ost of the seller to produe the good is 2500 or 0. The type of the seller
will be determined randomly aording to the following probabilities at the beginning of
eah period: the probability that the seller is of type A (high ost / high quality good) is
0.8(80%) and the probability that the seller is of type B (low ost / low quality good) is
0.2(20%).
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To aquire the good, the buyer makes oers to the seller. The oers must be between
0 and 4000 and an be as exat as to the rst deimal plae. If you enter an oer that
is not allowed, the omputer will tell you and you will have to hange your oer. Upon
seeing the buyer's oer, the seller an aept or rejet the oer. If the seller aepts the
oer, she produes the good and sells it to the buyer at the agreed prie. The buyer does
not make further oers and the trading pair has to wait until all other pairs have nished
their trading proess and buyers and sellers are remathed to form new pairs in the next
period.
If the seller rejets the oer, the buyer an make a new oer to the seller whih an
again be aepted or rejeted. There an be at most 50 stages, i.e. a buyer an make at
most 50 oers to a seller. Likewise, a seller an rejet up to 50 oers. If all 50 oers are
rejeted, the good is not produed (and not traded) and both parties earn 0.
In whih stage trade takes plae does matter. The buyer and the seller both disount
the future at the disount rate d = 0.8. This means that a prot (or loss) realized in stage
n is disounted aording to the given disount rate. For instane, if the buyer makes a
prot of x experimental points in stage 1, he earns x experimental points sine there is
no disounting. If the buyer makes a prot of x experimental points in stage 3, he earns
x ∗ 0.8 ∗ 0.8 = x ∗ 0.82 experimental points. Generally, if an oer is aepted in stage n,
the payos are determined as follows.
The buyer's payo = (Valuation of the Good− Aepted Oer) ∗ dn−1
The seller's payo = (Aepted Oer− Prodution Cost) ∗ dn−1
For onveniene the valuations and osts are summarized below:
• Buyer's valuation for the high quality good = 3500
• Buyer's valuation for the low quality good = 1750
• Seller's ost of produing the high quality good = 2500
• Seller's ost of produing the low quality good = 0
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One all pairs have traded the good at some prie or all oers have been rejeted, the
omputer randomly mathes buyers and sellers anew and the next period starts. The
experiment ends after period 10.
1.B Charaterization of the Sequential Equilibrium
Lemma 1. In the bargaining game with N > 0 stages, the nal equilibrium oer is either
ps0 = c or p
z
0 = 0.
i) If ps0 = c, the sequene of equilibrium oers is given by p
s
k = δ
kc for k = k∗(0), k∗(0)−
1, . . . , 0.
ii) If pz0 = 0, the sequene of equilibrium oers is given by p
z
n = 0 for n = N − 1, N −
2, . . . , 0.
Proof. The only prie oered and aepted with ertainty before stage N is c. Oers
below c are rejeted with a positive probability and oers exeeding c are dominated by
c. The oer in the last stage is p0 = c if (1− qˆ)v ≥ (1− q0)c and 0 otherwise.
To prove i), suppose by ontradition that psk 6= δpsk−1 for at least one k = k∗(0), k∗(0)−
1, . . . , 1. This implies that either psk or p
s
k−1 is aepted or at least one of these oers is
rejeted for sure by the L-quality sellers. Sure aeptane requires the buyer to oer c
after a rejetion, but then the L-quality sellers would not have aepted any oer below
δc. For the seond to last stage, ps1 suh that δc < p
s
1 < c is dominated by δc. Sure
rejetion of psk by L-quality sellers implies q
s
k = q
s
k−1, ontraditing sequential rationality,
given that sellers follow a stationary strategy (see DL for a proof that the equilibrium
must be stationary).
To prove ii), note that an oer of 0 annot onlude the game for sure, unless made
in the last stage. Hene, there are N equilibrium stages. Suppose pzn > 0 for at least one
n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 1. Then pzn is aepted by L-quality sellers. Observing a rejetion
of pzn implies p
z
n−1 = c. But this either ontradits the fat that there are N stages or
that pz0 = 0.
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Denote by Rs(qn) for n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 0 the buyer's maximized ex-ante ex-
peted payo from trading with the sellers in [qn, 1]. Similarly, R
z(qn) denotes the
ex-ante expeted payo of the zero oer sequene. Let ask(qn) = q
s
k−1 − qsk for k =
k∗(qn) − 1, k∗(qn) − 2, . . . , 0 denote the ex-ante probability of agreement k stages before
the nal equilibrium stage if the buyer follows the sreening oer sequene and the buyer
believes that only seller types q ∈ (qn, 1] are left. Finally, azn = qzn−1 − qzn denotes the
ex-ante probability of agreement n stages before the nal equilibrium stage for the zero
oers equilibrium. The ex-ante payos an be separated into gains in the urrent stage
and disounted future gains, i.e.,
Rs(qn) = (v − psk∗(qn))ask∗(qn)(qn) + δRs(qsk∗(qn)−1) (1.1)
Rz(qn) = a
z
nv + δR
z(qzn−1) (1.2)
If the equilibrium involves sreening, the buyer must be indierent between oering
psk and p
s
k−1 for k = k
∗(qn), k
∗(qn) − 1, . . . , 1. The intuition for this result is given in
the main text. For a proof we refer to DL. Note that indierene between pk and pk−2
is not possible, beause then the implied uto level is suh that the oer pk−1 is the
preferred oer. The advantage of oering psk−1 rather than p
s
k is that the ontinuation
surplus Rs(qsk−1) is obtained one stage earlier. On the other hand, by oering the higher
prie the buyer loses (psk−1− psk) on the seller types in (qk, qk−1] that would have aepted
the lower prie. The gains from aelerating trade must balane out the losses, i.e.,
(1 − δ)Rs(qsk−1) = (psk−1 − psk)ask(qsk). Using this insight, one an show that the ex-ante
aeptane probabilities are given reursively by (1.3).
ask(qn) =


1− qˆ if k = 0
v−c
c
as0 if k = 1
v
δk−1c
ask−1(qn) if 2 ≤ k ≤ k∗(qn)− 1
1− qn −
∑k∗(qn)−1
i=0 a
s
i (qn) if k = k
∗(qn)
(1.3)
The equilibrium number of sreening stages is restrited by either the mass of L-quality
53
sellers or the maximal number of stages N . More speially, the number of sreening
stages is given by
k∗(qn) = min
{
max
(
k :
k∑
i=0
asi (qn) < 1
)
, N − 1
}
(1.4)
Knowing the prie sequene and the aeptane deisions of the sreening equilibrium
allows to derive the aeptane probabilities for the zero oer sequene. As explained in
the main text, the sellers' aeptane deisions must render the buyer indierent between
oering the optimal sreening prie (given the urrent belief) and oering 0. We use
bakward indution. In the last stage, the buyer must be indierent between oering
ps0 = c and p
z
0 = 0. This is the ase when q
z
0 = 1 − v(1−qˆ)c whih implies az0 = qˆ − qz0 =
(1−qˆ)(v−c)
c
.
In general, two subsequent stages an either imply a belief that leads to the same
number of sreening stages, k∗(qzn) = k
∗(qzn−1), or the earlier stage implies one more
sreening stage, i.e. k∗(qzn) = k
∗(qzn−1) + 1. It is easy to see that k
∗(qzn) < k
∗(qzn−1) is
not possible, sine the buyer's belief to bargain with an H-quality seller annot derease
over the ourse of the game and a higher belief implies less sreening. More surprisingly,
k∗(qzn) = k
∗(qzn−1) + 2 an be exluded as well. Intuitively, if a hange in the belief from
qzn−1 to q
z
n entails an inrease in the optimal number of sreening stages of 2 (or more),
then the ost from delaying trade is greater for the sreening than the zero oer sequene.
But sine the zero oer sequene yields a greater prot also for the urrent period, this is
not possible.
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If k∗(qzn) = k
∗(qzn−1) then a
s
k∗(qzn)
(qzn) = a
z
n + a
s
k∗(qzn)
(qzn−1) and thus (1.1) beomes
Rs(qzn) = (v − psk∗(qzn))azn +Rs(qzn−1) (1.5)
41
Formally, k∗(qzn) = k
∗(qzn−1) + 2 requires a
s
k∗(qzn)
(qzn) ≤ azn and therefore also qsk∗(qzn)−1 ≤ q
z
n−1.
Writing (1.1) as Rs(qzn) = (v − psk∗(qzn))a
s
k∗(qzn)
(qzn) + (v − psk∗(qzn)−1)(a
z
n − ask∗(qzn)(q
z
n)) + δ
2Rz(qzn−1) and
omparing it to (1.2) implies that Rs(qzn) < R
z(qzn), ontraditing the fat that the buyer is indierent
between the zero oer and the optimal sreening sequenes.
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Sine Rz(qzn) = R
s(qzn) for n = N −2, N −3, . . . , 0. It follows from (1.2) and (1.5) that
aznv − (1− δ)Rz(qzn−1) = (v − psk∗(qzn))azn.
The left-hand side in the above relation is the hange in expeted payo of the zero oers
sequene when the belief hanges from qzn−1 to q
z
n. This has to be equal to the hange in
the expeted payo of the sreening sequene given by the right-hand side of the equation.
Writing (1− δ)Rz(qzn−1) as Rz(qzn−1)− δ
(
Rz(qzn−2) + (v − psk∗(qzn−1))a
z
n−1
)
and using (1.2)
to replae Rz(qzn−1)− δRz(qzn−2), one obtains azn in terms of azn−1. The result is shown in
(1.6).
If k∗(qzn) = k
∗(qzn−1) + 1 then a
s
k∗(qzn)
(qzn) = a
z
n + ∆q, where ∆q = q
s
k∗(qzn)−1
− qzn−1 =∑n−1
i=0 a
z
i −
∑k∗(qzn)−1
i=1 a
s
i (q
z
n). Hene, (1.1) beomes
Rs(qzn) = (v − psk∗(qzn))(azn +∆q) + δRs(qsk∗(qzn)−1)
Sine Rz(qzn−1) = R
s(qzn−1) = (v − psk∗(qzn)−1)∆q +Rs(qsk∗(qzn)−1), (1.2) an be rewritten as
Rz(qzn) = a
z
nv + δ(v − psk∗(qzn)−1)∆q + δRs(qsk∗(qzn)−1)
Equating Rs(qzn) and R
z(qzn), it an be solved for a
z
n in terms of ∆q.
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The ex-ante
42
Note that ∆q is known, sine asi (q
z
n) for i = 1, . . . , k
∗(qzn) − 1 are given by (1.3) and azi for i =
0, 1, . . . , n− 1 are derived reursively.
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aeptane probabilities for the zero oer sequene are given reursively by:
azn =


(1−qˆ)(v−c)
c
if n = 0(
δ + (1−δ)v
δk
∗(qzn)c
)
azn−1 if 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 2 and k∗(qzn) = k∗(qzn−1)
(1−δ)v
(δk
∗(qzn)c)
∆q if 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 2 and k∗(qzn) = k∗(qzn−1) + 1
qˆ −∑N−2i=0 azi if n = N − 1
(1.6)
The zero oer equilibrium requires that in eah stage a positive fration of the L-
quality sellers aepts an oer of 0. Hene, if N is large ondition (1.7) fails to hold.
The delay assoiated with the zero oers sequene is then too large to render the buyer
indierent to the optimal sreening sequene.
N−2∑
i=0
azi ≤ qˆ (1.7)
If ondition (1.7) holds then the buyer ompares the expeted prots of the sreening
and the zero oers strategy. The strategy implying the higher expeted prot is the unique
sequential equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 2. Let psk and p
z
n be dened as in Lemma 1. Let a
s
k and a
z
n be dened
reursively by (1.3) and (1.6), respetively. Let k∗(qn) be dened by (1.4). Set R
z(0) = 0
if ondition (1.7) fails to hold. Then the unique sequential equilibrium outome if Rs(0) ≥
Rz(0) is
p(q) = psk, q ∈


[0, qsk∗(0)−1] if k = k
∗(0)
(qsk, q
s
k−1] if k = k
∗(0)− 1, k∗(0)− 2 . . . , 1
(qs0, 1] if k = 0
a(q) = ask(0), q ∈


[0, qsk∗(0)−1] if k = k
∗(0)
(qsk, q
s
k−1] if k = k
∗(0)− 1, k∗(0)− 2, . . . , 1
(qs0, 1] if k = 0
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The unique sequential equilibrium outome if Rs(0) < Rz(0) is
p(q) = pzn, q ∈


[0, qzN−2] if n = N − 1
(qzn, q
z
n−1] if n = N − 2, N − 3, . . . , 1
(qz0, qˆ] if n = 0
a(q) = azn, q ∈


[0, qzN−2] if n = N − 1
(qzn, q
z
n−1] if n = N − 2, N − 3, . . . , 1
(qz0 , qˆ] if n = 0
For a proof of uniqueness in ase of sreening behavior, we refer to DL. It is then
easy to see that if the zero oers sequene is an equilibrium, there an be no sreening
equilibrium anymore. The buyer would deviate in the rst stage to oer 0.
The dierene between the nite and the innite horizon settings is that in the nite
horizon ase a prie sequene onsisting of zero oers is a possible equilibrium. How-
ever, when N is large enough, the buyer's expeted prot from the zero oer sequene
approahes 0 or (1.7) is violated. The equilibrium is then given by the sreening equilib-
rium. It is noteworthy that there an also be sreening equilibria that are not idential
to the one found in the literature for the innite horizon game. This instane ours if N
restrits the optimal number of sreening stages through (1.4), but the buyer still prefers
to sreen rather than to follow the zero oer sequene.
Our Proposition 1 now follows as a orollary of Proposition 2 above.
Proposition 1. There exists a nite N suh that the unique equilibrium is the sreening
equilibrium for all N ≥ N and the zero oer equilibrium otherwise.
Proof. For large N the number of sreening stages remains onstant in N , i.e., N is
irrelevant in (1.4) and k∗(qzN−1) = k
∗(qzN−2). Moreover, by onstrution the aeptane
deisions in the zero oer equilibrium are suh that the buyer's expeted payo is the
same as the one he would obtain from optimal sreening for any stage exept the rst
one, i.e. Rz(qzn) = R
s(qzn) for n = N − 2, N − 3, . . . , 0. Hene, Rs(0)− Rz(0) = azN−1(v −
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psk∗(0)) + R
s(qzN−2) − (azN−1v + δRz(qzN−2)) = (1 − δ)Rs(qzN−2) − azN−1psk∗(0). Note that
(1 − δ)Rs(qzN−2) remains onstant in N one the rst remark in this proof holds. The
same applies to psk∗(0). If
(
δ + (1−δ)v
δk
∗(qzn)c
)
≥ 1 then azN−1 is higher (or remains onstant) the
higher N beomes. In this ase (1.7) is violated for a nite N . If
(
δ + (1−δ)v
δk
∗(qzn)c
)
< 1 then
azN−1 approahes 0 as N beomes large. This implies that R
s(0)−Rz(0) > 0 for N large
enough, sine Rs(q) is bounded away from zero for any q.
1.C Additional Material
1.C.1 Sreening Equilibrium under Loss Aversion
In this appendix, we present the theoretial predition for the bargaining model when
subjets' preferenes exhibit loss aversion. In partiular, the buyer's utility obtained from
trade n stages before the nal stage is now given by
Bn(q) =


δN−1−n(v(q)− p(q)) if v(q) ≥ p(q)
λδN−1−n(v(q)− p(q)) otherwise
where λ ≥ 1 is the loss aversion parameter. If λ = 1 then the utility funtion redues to
the one used throughout the paper.
Note that the seller's utility is unaeted by loss aversion, beause the seller is informed
and never runs the risk of a loss. It follows from Lemma 1 that the possible equilibrium
prie sequenes are also not hanged. However, the aeptane deisions of the L-quality
sellers in the sreening equilibrium hange. These aeptane probabilities still have to
render the buyer indierent between the urrent and the next prie oer. Sine gains from
trade with the H-quality seller are always positive as0(0) = 1− qˆ still holds. By bakward
indution the aeptane probability in the seond to last stage solves
λ(v − δc)as1 + δ(v − c)as0 = λ(v − c)as1 + (v − c)as0 if v < δc.
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or
(v − δc)as1 + δ(v − c)as0 = λ(v − c)as1 + (v − c)as0 if v ≥ δc
Hene,
as1(0) =


(1−δ)(v−c)
λ(c−v)+v−δca
s
0(0) if v ≥ δc
v−c
λc
as0(0) otherwise
Similarly, in any earlier stage it holds that either
λ(v − psk)ask + δR(qsk−1) = λ(v − psk−1)ask +R(qsk−1) if v < psk
or
(v − psk)ask + δR(qsk−1) = λ(v − psk−1)ask +R(qsk−1) if v ≥ psk and v < psk−1
or
(v − psk)ask + δR(qsk−1) = (v − psk−1)ask +R(qsk−1) if v ≥ psk−1.
Solving these equations yields for k = k∗(0)− 1, k∗(0)− 2, . . . , 2
ask(0) =


v
δk−1c
ask−1(0) if v < p
s
k or v ≥ psk−1
cδk(λ−1)+δv(1−δλ)
cδk(λ−δ)+δv(1−λ) a
s
k−1(0) if v ≥ psk and v < psk−1
Hene, the alulation of the aeptane probabilities remains idential to the ase
without loss aversion if either an aeptane by an L-quality seller does not involve losses
in two onseutive stages or it does lead to a loss in both stages. However, if the prie
hange between two stages is suh that aeptane by L-quality sellers leads to a loss
in one stage and to a gain in the other stage, then the alulation of the aeptane
probability diers.
For the parameters used in the experiment, it holds that ps1 = 2000 > 1750 = v
and ps2 = 1600 < 1750 = v. The aeptane probabilities if qˆ = 0.2 are therefore
given by as0 = 0.8, a
s
1 =
160
750λ−250 , a
s
2 =
128−307.2λ
120−160λ−600λ2 , a
s
3 =
140−336λ
120−160λ−600λ2 and so on.
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Setting λ = 2, the optimal number of sreening stages is 2. If qˆ = 0.6, λ = 2 implies
5 equilibrium stages with oers (1024, 1280, 1600, 2000, 2500) and L-type seller's ex-ante
aeptane probabilities of (0.46, 0.21, 0.20, 0.13). In general, it holds that the higher λ
the more sreening should be observed.
1.C.2 Construted Prie Sequene
In Table 1.C.1 we estimate prie sequenes. In olumns 1 and 3 we use only oers that
were made in stage 2. The oer for stage 2 is estimated separately sine only one lagged
oer an be used there. That is, for instane, the value of 0.788 in olumn 1 means that
in R80 if the rst oer was 100 points higher, the seond oer inreases by approximately
80. We use these oeients to predit oers in stage 2 for prie sequenes that involve
immediate trade in stage 1. Columns 2 and 4, on the other hand, give the preditions
for all other stages in dependene of the previous two oers. It is apparent that an
oer depends strongly on previous oers. Inluding more lags does not hange results
and higher lags are insigniant. Using these estimates we onstrut prie sequenes
by prediting the oers that would have been made had the seller not aepted an oer.
Figure 1.C.1 presents the median prie sequene when using the predited prie sequenes.
Table 1.C.1: Regression: Prie Sequene
R80 R80 R40 R40
Oert−1 0.788*** 0.647*** 1.054*** 0.532***
(0.0713) (0.0527) (0.0524) (0.0675)
Oert−2 0.0883** 0.236***
(0.0384) (0.0393)
Constant 987.4*** 722.0*** 187.3*** 494.0***
(114.1) (103.1) (30.45) (67.71)
R2 0.306 0.317
R2 (overall) 0.549 0.658
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is Oert. (2) Standard errors are
lustered on individuals (in parentheses). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01 (3) Columns 1 and 3 are OLS regressions, Columns 2
and 4 are random eets panel regressions.
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Figure 1.C.1: Construted Prie Sequene
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Figure 1.C.2: Prie Distributions
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Notes: (1) Histograms of prie oers by quality and stage along with kernel density estimates. (2)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests rejet equality of oer distribution between qualities for stages 5-6 and 9-10
but not for stages 1-2.
61
62
Chapter 2
Meet the Lemons: How Cheap Talk
Overomes Adverse Seletion in
Deentralized Markets
2.1 Introdution
It is well-known that in the presene of inomplete information the prie mehanism may
fail to alloate goods optimally and markets may be ineient due to adverse seletion
(Akerlof, 1970). However, when there are unrealized gains from trade, buyers and sell-
ers have an inentive to nd ways to apture this surplus. Indeed, the literature has
been suessful in identifying a wide range of institutional settings that alleviate the ad-
verse onsequenes of information asymmetries. Examples inlude signalling devies suh
as warranties, eolabels and building a brand name, and sreening devies suh as de-
dutibles, aptitude tests and jobs with probationary periods. While these institutions
suessfully restore the funtioning of markets, they also require agents to engage in so-
ially ostly ativities.
1
This artile is onerned with an experimental test of a mehanism introdued in Kim
1
For instane, there are signiant osts assoiated with running assessment enters, inluding labor,
physial spae, and people's time. Similarly, labels have no eonomi value besides funtioning as a signal
to onsumers.
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(2012), whih does not neessitate signalling or sreening ost. Allowing for free and non-
binding ommuniation (heap talk) sues to substantially mitigate adverse seletion.
Communiation is eetive, beause information is transmitted from the informed to the
uninformed agents and this despite the strong inentives to misrepresent information that
are usually assoiated with heap talk. The fat that ommuniation is ostless and non-
binding marks a stark dierene to the other mentioned institutions. There is neither
money-burning (e.g. aptitude tests) nor ommitment (e.g. warranties).
It should be emphasized that ommuniation is eetive in a wide range of market
settings. In fat, all that is required is that markets are deentralized to at least some
extent in the sense that agents have some power in seleting potential trading partners.
An impliation of this will be that there are mathing (or searh) fritions: the possibility
to trade is dependent on some agent of the other market side hoosing you to be the
reeiver of the prie oer.
To x ideas, onsider the following market in whih an arbitrary number of buyers
and sellers interat to exhange goods. Goods an be of two qualities, high or low.
Eah seller owns one unit of the good and is informed about its quality. Buyers are
uninformed. Eah buyer hooses a single seller to whom he makes a prie oer to buy
the good. It is possible that several buyers selet the same seller and that some sellers
do not reeive any oer (mathing frition). Finally, sellers aept at most one of their
reeived oers. This mathing tehnology has been employed in other ontexts before (e.g.
Satterthwaite and Shneyerov, 2007) and represents a deentralized version of Akerlof's
original model.
Suppose we augment the market with an initial stage in whih eah seller announes
a quality l (low quality) or h (high quality). Announements are heap talk, as sellers
are free to send both messages at no ost. Buyers observe all messages before hoosing a
seller. Assume that if messages are uninformative or in absene of ommuniation, high
quality goods do not sell due to the information asymmetries. Interestingly, there is an
equilibrium in whih messages do transmit information. This equilibrium is haraterized
by endogenous market segmentation: a market in whih only lemons sell (submarket l)
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oexists alongside a market in whih high quality goods are sold with positive probability
(submarket h). Market segmentation is based on the observation that low quality sellers
have an inentive to reveal their quality. Where does this inentive ome from? For reasons
familiar in the literature, we would expet low quality sellers to mimi high quality sellers
whenever high pries are oered in submarket h. However, in our market buyers hoose
submarkets and in fat, they frequent the lemons submarket more often than submarket
h. Low quality sellers thus trade o the opportunity to potentially extrat high pries
in submarket h against joining the lemons submarket where they tend to attrat more
buyers.
The reason buyers visit submarket l relatively more often than submarket h is the
quality unertainty in the latter. In submarket h, buyers either have to take the risk of
making a high prie oer to a low quality seller or, if low pries are oered, there is the
possibility to be mathed with a high quality seller who rejets the oer. In equilibrium,
buyers are indierent between the two submarkets and thus quality unertainty is om-
pensated for by less ompetition between buyers in submarket h. Of ourse, attrativeness
of submarkets also depends on the potential gains from trade with low and high quality
sellers.
Armstrong (2006) and Rohet and Tirole (2003) provide examples of two-sided mar-
kets where one group's benet from joining a platform (or submarket) depends on the size
of the other group that joins the same platform: for instane, if onsumers are more likely
to visit a mall where pries are generally lower, a retailer may be willing to loate in this
mall even if doing so sends a negative signal about the quality of its produts. Further
examples of real-world institutions that seem to t with the story of endogenous market
segmentation are ostless advertisement and markets where sellers post non-binding list
pries suh as used ars, housing and online posting sites. Naturally, dierent models
are also in line with suh institutions, for instane, Chen and Rosenthal (1996) interpret
non-binding list pries as eiling pries the seller ommits to aept rather than heap
talk.
We report results from an experiment with a series of deentralized markets that puts
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endogenous market segmentation to a diret test and disentangles it from other poten-
tial explanations. To isolate the eet of market segmentation, we vary the availability
and timing of messages. In the main treatment, messages ome rst and the desribed
partially separating equilibrium exists. A priori it is, however, diult to assess whether
subjets will behave in the predited way, as the partially separating equilibrium is quite
demanding: a low quality seller is only willing to reveal her true quality if she expets that
the low quality submarket is indeed heavily frequented by buyers and that high quality
sellers will be truthful as well. This is further ompliated by the fat that there are
always pooling equilibria in whih messages are uninformative. On the other hand, the
market segmentation equilibrium is seleted by a riterion alled no inentive to separate
(NITS) suggested in Chen et al. (2008). The results reported in this artile will provide
evidene in support of NITS.
2
A rih experimental literature has established that private information is often om-
muniated truthfully despite monetary inentives to lie. In these experiments, heap talk
is eetive due to pro-soial preferenes, lie aversion or guilt. Important ontributions
inlude Gneezy (2005), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Vanberg (2008), Sutter (2009),
and Charness and Dufwenberg (2011).
3
The approah taken in this artile omplements
this literature by testing a mehanism in whih ommuniation alleviates adverse sele-
tion due to equilibrium inentives of peuniary payo maximization.
4
The hallenge is
to separate market segmentation from truth-telling due to non-standard preferenes. To
aount for this, we ondut a ontrol treatment in whih the timing of messages and
mathing is reversed: buyers are mathed to sellers rst, and only then sellers send mes-
sages. Theoretially, market segmentation breaks down due to this hange, beause sellers
annot attrat more buyers by revealing their quality. On the other hand, if the ndings
2
In the present setting, an equilibrium satises NITS if low quality sellers prefer the equilibrium
outome to redibly revealing their type, if they somehow ould. Dikhaut et al. (1995), Blume et al.
(2001) and De Groot Ruiz et al. (forthoming) test dierent heap talk equilibrium seletion riteria.
3
See also Valley et al. (1998), Valley et al. (2002), Croson et al. (2003), Lundquist et al. (2009),
Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) and Erat and Gneezy (2012). Cai and Wang (2006) fous on bounded
rationality as an explanation for overommuniation.
4
Another important dierene is that the present artile explores markets, whereas the mentioned
studies employ bilateral settings. Goeree and Zhang (2014) introdue ompetition to the model of
Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). See also Cadsby et al. (1990) and Holt (1995).
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were based on lie aversion and pro-soial preferenes, they should persist in the ontrol
treatment.
Strikingly, the experimental results losely follow the theoretial preditions of the
separating equilibrium. In the main treatment, messages are informative, market seg-
mentation an be observed frequently and rates of trade and welfare are high. Welfare is
low in the ontrol treatment mentioned above. In fat, average eieny is not dierent
from a treatment in whih subjets do not have the possibility to ommuniate at all.
This demonstrates that pro-soial preferenes and lie aversion annot explain the suess
of ommuniation in the main treatment. We also eliit a onsiderable degree of risk and
loss aversion, but nd that this does not undermine market segmentation (quite to the
ontrary!).
Finally, notie that market segmentation is not a oordination devie in the sense that
it improves the eieny of the mathing tehnology. In fat, the probability of high qual-
ity sellers to meet a buyer is lower in the main treatment than in the ontrol treatments
and the probability of low quality sellers to meet a buyer is idential aross treatments.
Hene, in the partially separating equilibrium there are fewer meetings between buyers
and sellers in theory and this is fully reeted in the experimental data. Market seg-
mentation works through reduing information asymmetries, not through more eient
mathing.
5
The remainder of the artile is organized as follows. The next setion introdues the model
and haraterizes equilibrium. Setion 3 presents the example used in the experiment.
Setion 4 presents the experimental design. The experimental results are reported in
Setion 5, inluding a disussion of the model in the ontext of ost of lying and risk /
loss aversion. Setion 6 onludes.
5
Crawford (1998) reviews a small body of experiments in whih heap talk redues information asym-
metry in bilateral settings. These models assume that agents' preferenes overlap to some extent. In the
present model, heap talk only beomes eetive in markets, i.e. if there is more than one seller and one
buyer.
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2.2 Preliminaries
Model. The model presented in the following is based on Kim (2012).
6
There are nB
buyers and nS sellers interating in a market for an indivisible good. Eah seller an sell
at most one unit and eah buyer wants to buy at most one unit of the good. Goods are
available in two qualities. There are nH sellers that an sell a high (H) quality good and
nL sellers that an sell a low (L) quality good. Note that nH + nL = nS. A seller of
type θ = {L,H} has ost cθ to produe a good of quality θ. A good of quality θ yields
a value of vθ to the buyer. There are gains from trade for both qualities, i.e., vθ > cθ for
θ = {L,H}.
Denote the fration of low quality sellers by qˆ = nL
nS
. The fous is on markets in whih
adverse seletion is severe: high quality goods do not trade in a pooling equilibrium. This
is ensured by the assumption that the buyers' expeted value for the good falls short of
the high quality sellers' ost.
7
qˆ vL + (1− qˆ) vH < cH (2.1)
The trading proess is as follows. First, sellers simultaneously send messages m ∈
{l, h}.8 Messages are heap talk as they are sent without any diret osts. We will say
that sellers who sent message l are in submarket l and sellers who sent message h are
in submarket h. Seond, eah buyer observes the two submarkets, i.e., he learns how
many sellers sent message l and h. Eah buyer then hooses a seller to whom he makes
a take-it-or-leave-it oer. Several buyers may selet the same seller. This also implies
that some sellers may not be seleted by any buyer. Oers are made simultaneously and
thus buyers do not observe how many ompetitors are making an oer to the same seller.
6
There are several dierenes to Kim (2012). In order to implement the model in the laboratory, we
annot rely on a ontinuum of buyers and sellers. Another dierene is that in our ase the number of
buyers in the market is xed and buyers have no entry ost.
7
Inequality (2.1) is suient but not neessary to prevent trade with high quality goods in the pooled
market. As will be shown presently, the trading proess implies only imperfet ompetition and thus,
buyers may prefer to oer low pries even if their expeted prot from oering high is positive.
8
Riher message spaes are oneivable, for instane announing non-binding selling pries. Binary
messages are without loss of generality if there are only two qualities.
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Third, eah seller who reeives at least one oer deides whether to aept or rejet the
oer(s). At most one oer an be aepted. A buyer whose oer p is aepted earns vθ−p
if the quality of the good is θ. A seller of type θ who aepts a prie p earns p−cθ. Buyers
and sellers who do not trade earn 0. All of the above is ommon knowledge.
Buyers an distinguish sellers only on the basis of messages. Thus, eah buyer ee-
tively hooses a submarket l or h. Let us desribe a submarket by Smi,j, where m = {l, h},
i is the number of low and j the number of high quality sellers in the submarket. The
fration of low quality sellers in Smi,j is denoted by q(S
m
i,j). Let β(S
m
i,j) be the probability
that a buyer joins submarket Smi,j. Let S be the set of possible submarkets. Buyers' bid-
ding strategies are desribed by a umulative distribution funtion F : ℜ+ × S → [0, 1]
where F (p, Smi,j) is the probability that a buyer oers a prie not larger than p to a seller
in submarket Smi,j.
Equilibrium Charaterization. Heneforth, a market equilibrium refers to the stan-
dard notion of sequential equilibrium of the model introdued above. A market equilib-
rium is thus haraterized by a situation in whih sellers send messages that maximize
their expeted payos and aept the highest prie oer that exeeds their reservation
ost. Buyers' hoie of submarkets and prie oers is optimal given their beliefs about
the fration of low and high quality sellers in both submarkets.
The fous is on a symmetri partially separating equilibrium. In this market equilib-
rium submarket l onsists only of low quality sellers and submarket h ontains all high
quality sellers and possibly some low quality sellers. Sellers' behavior is thus fully de-
sribed by the number of low quality sellers who send message l and we an refer to
submarkets as Smi . Let α denote the probability that a low quality seller reveals his qual-
ity.
9
Under a mild ondition that requires a minimal degree of ompetition, low quality
sellers have an inentive to reveal their quality with positive probability.
10
Proposition 3. There exists a (partially) separating market equilibrium with α > 0.
9
There may be multiple partially separating equilibria. However, in all of them there is a lemons
submarket onsisting only of low quality sellers. We refer to Kim (2012) for a disussion.
10
The ondition is q(ShnL) − q(ShnL−1) ≤ vL−cLvH−vL , see Appendix B equation (2.4). Note that with a
ontinuum of agents, this ondition always holds; the left-hand side redues to 0. Hene, the ondition
requires the market to be suiently thik. The ondition is only required if vL − cL < vH − cH .
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The proof is relegated to Appendix B. In the introdution, we have already disussed
the intuition for the result. The main point is that low quality sellers an attrat more
buyers in submarket l, whih ompensates for the forgone opportunity to extrat high
pries in submarket h. The example presented in the next setion will provide a ompre-
hensive piture of the inentives at work.
Let the game desribed above be denoted by ΓC-Sep, where C-Sep stands for
ommuniation-separating. The following observation will turn out to be important for
the experimental preditions. Consider a variant of ΓC-Sep where eah buyer rst hooses
the seller he wants to make an oer to and only then sellers send messages. Buyers still
observe all messages and make an oer to their seller. As before, sellers aept or rejet
oers in the last step. Call this game ΓC-Pool I. A third variant of the game, ΓC-Pool II, is
idential to ΓC-Pool I exept that buyers only observe the message sent by the seller they
are mathed with. Finally, ΓNC refers to the game in whih sellers annot send messages.
Observation 1. All equilibria in ΓC-Pool I, ΓC-Pool II and ΓNC are pooling, i.e. prie oers
are stritly below vL and high quality sellers never trade.
Observation 1 states that low quality sellers do not reveal their quality, if buyers annot
hoose sellers onditional on observed messages. Inequality (2.1) then ensures that high
quality goods are not traded. The nite number of agents again requires a mild ondition
that guarantees a minimal inentive for low quality sellers to misrepresent their type.
11
Notie that in ΓC-Sep there also exist babbling equilibria in whih messages do not arry
information.
2.3 A Simple Example
The following example was implemented in the experiment. Consider a market with 6
buyers and 6 sellers. There are 3 low quality sellers and 3 high quality sellers. Parameters
are given by vH = 19, cH = 14, vL = 5 and cL = 0. Hene, surplus from trade is equal
11
We need to assume that in the submarket onsisting of all high quality sellers and a single low quality
seller, pries that exeed cH are oered with positive probability. See Appendix B equation (2.8).
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Figure 2-1: Buyers' Bidding Strategies
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The gure depits the theoretial CDF of buyers' oers for the four market strutures that are observed
with positive probability in equilibrium. Submarket l is shown in blue and submarket h in orange. The
orresponding probabilities of buyers to join submarket l are given by β(Sl0) = 0.00, β(S
l
1) = 0.29,
β(Sl2) = 0.59, β(S
l
3) = 0.50.
to 5 for both qualities. Moreover, the expeted value for buyers in the pooled market is
12 and falls short of the high quality sellers' ost. Without market segmentation, high
quality goods do not trade.
In the partially separating equilibrium, buyers observe 4 possible pairs of submarkets:
the pooled market {Sl0, S
h
3 }, the intermediate ases {S
l
1, S
h
2 } and {S
l
2, S
h
1 }, and the
ompletely separated market {Sl3, S
h
0 }. A pair of submarkets will also be referred to as
market struture.
Figure 2-1 shows equilibrium bidding by means of the umulative distribution of prie
oers.
12
Figure 2-1a depits the pooled market. Here, q(Sh3 ) = qˆ = 1/2 and buyers oer
low pries ranging between 0 and 3. This is a situation where adverse seletion leads to
large ineienies, as high quality goods never trade. The same applies to the partially
separated market struture {Sl1, Sh2 } shown in Figure 2-1b. We have q(Sh2 ) = 2/5, whih
implies that the buyers' expeted value still falls short of the high quality sellers' ost.
In ontrast, for the partially separated market {Sl2, Sh1} (Figure 2-1) and the ompletely
separated market (Figure 2-1d), oers in submarket h exeed cH = 14. Obviously, in all
lemons submarkets buyers' prie oers do not exeed vL.
It an be shown that β(Sl1) = 0.29 and β(S
l
2) = 0.59. Thus, in equilibrium buyers are
indierent between visiting either submarket. Moreover, the expeted fration of buyers
to sellers is 1.74 vs. 0.85 in {Sl1, Sh2} and 1.77 vs. 0.62 in {Sl2, Sh1}. The weaker ompetition
12
The derivation of prie oers and all other preditions follows from the proof of Proposition 3.
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Table 2.1: Theoretial Preditions
Rates of Trade Ex Ante Eieny Payos
α L H Total L H UB UL UH
C-Sep 0.48 0.7 0.25 14.26 10.57 3.69 1.04 2.46 0.21
C-Pool I, II / NC 0.00 0.67 0.00 9.98 9.98 0.00 1.00 1.32 0.00
between buyers in submarkets h ompensates for the quality unertainty.
Antiipating the buyers' partiipation and bidding deisions, let UL(S
m
i ) be a low qual-
ity seller's expeted payo onditional on being in submarket Smi . We have {UL(Sli)}3i=1 =
(2.75, 2.84, 1.32) and {UL(Shi )}3i=1 = (6.87, 1.03, 1.32). A low quality seller prefers the
lemons submarket Sl1 over the pooled market S
h
3 . Thus, α = 0 is no equilibrium, beause
a low quality seller an unilaterally move to Sl1. However, the market position that is by
far the most attrative one is to be the only low quality seller in Sh1 . The reason is the
potentially high benet from high selling pries. Hene, α = 1 is no equilibrium, beause
unilaterally moving to the high quality submarket (thereby making it a mixed quality
submarket) is protable.
What messages do sellers send? We already know that α ∈ (0, 1). Thus, α needs
to be suh that low quality sellers are indierent between sending message l or h. The
equilibrium is haraterized by a situation in whih low quality sellers' gain from their
information advantage in submarket h equals the benet from the improved ompetitive
position in submarket l. Using equation (2.7) in Appendix B yields α = 0.48.
Table 2.1 summarizes the theoretial preditions of the key outome variables. C-Sep
refers to the main treatment that implements ΓC-Sep. The C-Pool and NC treatments
represent the dierent ontrol treatments orresponding to the games ΓC-Pool I, ΓC-Pool II
and ΓNC. As implied by Observation 1, the theoretial preditions are the same for all
ontrol treatments.
Endogenous market segmentation through heap talk (C-Sep) signiantly inreases
rates of trade and eieny ompared to a setting without heap talk (NC) or with heap
talk but without the possibility to hoose sellers based on messages (C-Pool I, II). A
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remarkable nding is that heap talk leads to trades with high quality sellers without
undermining trades with low quality sellers. Table 2.1 also shows expeted payos of
buyers (UB), low (UL) and high (UH) quality sellers. In C-Sep, payos inrease for all
agents relative to the pooling equilibrium, i.e., market segmentation onstitutes a Pareto
improvement.
If all sellers trade, a total welfare of 30 ould be ahieved. However, it is important
to note that rst-best eieny is not the appropriate benhmark. Due to the fritions
of the mathing proess, the rst-best outome is not attainable even with omplete
information. If two buyers meet the same seller, this immediately implies that another
seller will not trade. In fat, we annot go beyond expeted trading rates of 67 perent for
both types of sellers simultaneously. The benhmark where trade ours in all meetings
leads to an expeted welfare of 19.95. Therefore, an ex ante eieny of 14.26 onstitutes
a substantial improvement over the pooled market.
2.4 Experimental Design
The experiment was run in Deember 2013 and January 2014 at the experimental labo-
ratory of the University of Bern. 216 students mainly from business administration and
eonomis took part in the experiment. Eah session was omposed of 12 partiipants.
18 sessions were run, using the z-Tree software developed by Fishbaher (2007). Sessions
lasted between 50 and 80 minutes and average earnings were 32 CHF inluding a show-up
fee of 14 CHF.
13
The onversion rate was 0.6 CHF per experimental point.
We ran 4 treatments summarized in Table 2.2. The main treatment Communiation-
Separating (C-Sep) implements the example presented in the previous setion for ΓC-Sep.
In the experiment, buyers did not hoose a spei seller. Instead, buyers observed the
number of l and h messages and then deided in whih of the two submarkets to make
their oer. The spei seller was then randomly seleted by the omputer and this was
ommonly known. Random mathing within submarkets avoids potential diulties with
13
At the time, 1 US Dollar orresponded roughly to 0.91 CHF.
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Table 2.2: Experimental Design
Treatment Sessions Subjets Messages Mathing
C-Sep 6 72 Observed by all buyers Buyers hoose submarket
*
C-Pool I 4 48 Observed by all buyers Random
**
C-Pool II 4 48 Observed by mathed buyer Random
NC 4 48 No messages Random
*
Buyers hoose a submarket (l or h) and are randomly mathed to a seller in this submarket.
**
Buyers are randomly mathed to one of the 6 sellers.
buyers hoosing sellers based on how the hoie is presented to them, e.g. the seller who
is displayed on the left hand side of the sreen might be seleted most often.
14
Treatment No Communiation" (NC) is implemented as a useful benhmark. In NC
sellers annot send messages to buyers. Buyers right away make oers to a randomly
assigned seller in the pooled market. Theory predits buyers to oer only pries below vL
and high quality goods never trade. The mathing proedure was arefully explained to
all subjets. In addition, in eah period it was expliitly mentioned that everybody has
now been randomly mathed. This is important, sine even though there is no mathing
deision to take, it is as important as in C-Sep for buyers to form an expetation about
the number of ompetitors oering to the same seller.
In the light of the experimental literature on heap talk and hidden information, dif-
ferenes in behavior between C-Sep and NC ould also stem from subjets' preferenes
to tell the truth or from fairness onerns. To ontrol for this, we implement treatments
with heap talk, but in whih all equilibria are pooling. In these treatments, alled
Communiation-Pooling I (C-Pool I) and Communiation-Pooling II (C-Pool II), buy-
ers are randomly mathed to sellers before they send messages. The message is then either
observed by all buyers (C-Pool I) or only by the buyer the seller is mathed with (C-Pool
II). Thus, buyers still observe messages, but they annot hoose submarkets. In absene of
soial preferenes, messages annot redibly transmit information in C-Pool I and C-Pool
II and the theoretial preditions oinide with the ones for NC (see Observation 1). On
14
Reall that the same seller an meet several buyers and thus the random draws of sellers are with
replaement. A further advantage of random mathing within submarkets is that potential onsiderations
of a seller to reward a buyer for seleting her as the partiular seller to interat with are extenuated.
74
the other hand, if sellers are lie averse or have pro-soial preferenes, messages may still
be informative.
C-Pool I provides the leanest ontrol for C-Sep, sine the only dierene is the reversal
in the timing of the message and mathing stage. C-Pool II was introdued to give
lie aversion its best shot. If buyers observe all messages, they would often see message
distributions inonsistent with truth-telling (whenever there are not 3 l and 3 h messages).
Buyers may then onlude not to believe the messages at all. If only one message is
observed, attempts at truth-telling by some sellers annot be frustrated as easily.
The instrutions for C-Sep are provided in Appendix A. After reading the instrutions
every subjet had to ll out a set of ontrol questions. A brief verbal summary of the
setting was given to ensure ommon knowledge. Subjets were then randomly assigned to
be one of the 6 buyers or one of the 6 sellers. Roles were xed throughout the experiment.
Subjets played 20 periods. In eah period, there were 3 H and 3 L-type sellers. Sellers'
types randomly hanged from one period to the next. Eah seller was informed about his
type at the beginning of eah period. Buyers were uninformed, they only knew that there
are 3 H and 3 L-type sellers. Interations were anonymous and there were no identiers
that would allow subjets to know or guess with whom they interat in dierent periods.
Upon ompletion of the 20 periods, subjets that were assigned the role of the seller
ompleted a short task that aims to measure lie aversion. We used a design similar to
that in Gneezy (2005). Sine buyers potentially suer from large losses when oering
high pries, information on subjets' risk / loss aversion was also gathered. Subjets
knew that there would be two additional parts, but no details were explained to them
until the previous parts had been ompleted. We defer a desription of the lie and risk /
loss aversion tasks.
2.5 Results
The disussion of the experimental results is organized around three questions. (1) Do we
observe endogenous market segmentation? (2) If market segmentation is observed, does
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it inrease rates of trade and eieny? We would also like to understand whether the
results are based on the proposed mehanism or if and to what extent truth-telling is
due to other-regarding preferenes and lie aversion. Thus, (3) are the results driven by
non-standard preferenes?
In the following, only data from periods 11-20 are used.
15
All non-parametri statistial
tests are based on session averages as the unit of observation. Moreover, market strutures
have so far been denoted by {Sli, ShnL−i} where the subsripts indiate the number of low
quality sellers in a submarket. In the experiment high quality sellers may sometimes send
message l. The market struture is therefore denoted by, for instane, 2 l / 4 h, indiating
that 2 sellers sent message l and 4 sellers sent message h. As will be shown, most high
quality sellers send message h and thus 2 l / 4 h is usually equivalent to {Sl2, Sh1 }.
2.5.1 Market Segmentation, Rates of Trade and Eieny
The experimental results provide lear evidene of endogenous market segmentation in
C-Sep. Our disussion will be in support of the following result.
Result 8 (Endogenous Market Segmentation). Behavior in C-Sep is onsistent with
endogenous market segmentation. Messages are informative and frequently indue market
strutures that permit trade with high quality sellers. Low quality sellers are willing to
forgo high pries in submarket h, beause by revealing their quality they on average attrat
twie as many oers.
Figure 2-2a shows that messages are a good preditor of a seller's true type. A rst
important observation is that high quality sellers almost always send message h (in 93
perent of the ases in C-Sep). While this seems intuitive, it is also immensely important,
beause it allows buyers to meaningfully interpret low quality sellers' behavior. The
gure further shows that low quality sellers reveal their quality in 72 perent of the ases
in treatment C-Sep and in 32 and 43 perent of the ases in treatment C-Pool I and II,
15
All qualitative results hold in an analysis that inludes all periods. The disussion on rates of trade
will illustrate that dierenes between C-Sep and the other treatments beome more substantive in later
periods.
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Figure 2-2: Sellers' Messages and Market Segmentation
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Figure (a) depits the fration of messages l among all messages sent by sellers separated by treatment
and seller type. Figure (b) shows the distribution of realized market strutures.
respetively.
16
Wiloxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests onrm that low quality sellers
are signiantly more likely to send message l in treatment C-Sep than in the C-Pool
treatments (p=0.01 for both omparisons). The dierene between C-Pool I and II is
not signiant (p=0.19). Moreover, low quality sellers' probability to reveal their type in
C-Sep is signiantly higher than the theoretially predited 48 perent, aording to a
Wiloxon mathed-pair signed-rank (heneforth, Wiloxon) test (p=0.03).
Buyers observe a wide range of dierent submarkets in C-Sep as well as C-Pool I.
Figure 2-2b shows the frequeny of the dierent market strutures. The most ommon
market struture in C-Sep is 3 l / 3 h, observed in more than 43 perent of the ases. In 85
perent of the ases this market struture orresponds to the ompletely separated market,
i.e. all low quality sellers send message l and all high quality sellers send message h.17 In
ontrast, in C-Pool I the most prominent set of messages is 1 l / 5 h (52.5 perent) and
omplete separation is almost never observed. Note that in 2 l / 4 h high quality goods are
16
It is interesting to note that partial information revelation in C-Sep is not only the result of aggre-
gating sellers. Using the 34 (out of 36) sellers who played the role of the low quality seller at least 3
times in periods 11-20, it turns out that around one third of the low quality sellers revealed their quality
almost always, 44 perent revealed their quality around 70 perent of the time and the remainder sent
message l in less than 50 perent of the ases.
17
In the remaining 15 perent, submarket l ontains two low quality and one high quality seller.
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also expeted to be traded. Overall, the observed market struture theoretially allows for
trade with high quality sellers in 68 perent of the ases in C-Sep and in 25 perent of the
ases in C-Pool I (assuming messages are informative). In C-Pool II the probability that a
seller who sends message h is indeed of the high quality is 0.97/(0.97+0.57) = 0.63. This
translates into an expeted value of 13.82, falling short of high type sellers' reservation
ost.
Low quality sellers' inentive to reveal their quality in C-Sep stems from their ability to
attrat more buyers.
18
Simple alulations indeed reveal that in C-Sep low quality sellers
reeive on average 1.47 oers when sending message l and 0.74 oers when sending message
h (Wiloxon test p=0.03). More speially, Figure 2-3a shows the buyers' deisions to
enter submarket l or h for eah market struture (blue) and the orresponding theoretial
preditions (red). In the ompletely separated market struture, buyers distribute almost
evenly among the two submarkets. The dierene to the theoretial predition of β(Sl3) =
0.50 is not signiant (Wiloxon test p=0.43). This is remarkable, beause buyers do not
seem to fear losses in 3 l / 3 h and onsider the two submarkets as equally attrative.
For the other market strutures, buyers are biased toward submarket l even more than
theoretially expeted.
19
Let us sidestep a potential pitfall. It is tempting to think of the market segmentation
mehanisms implemented in C-Sep as a oordination devie in the sense that mathing
beomes more eient. However, the opposite is true: the buyers' possibility to hoose
between submarkets introdues a distortion. Buyers enter the lemons submarket with a
larger probability than what would be optimal in terms of mathing. Figure 2-3b shows
that the average number of sellers that reeive at least one oer is around 4 for treatments
C-Pool I, II and NC and a little lower for C-Sep. In other words, on average 2 sellers do not
reeive an oer. It an be seen that the number of meetings for low quality sellers is stable
aross treatments.
20
On the other hand, high quality sellers enounter signiantly fewer
18
Another explanation might be lie aversion. But notie that lie aversion would apply equally well to
the C-Pool treatments. A disussion of lie aversion an be found in Setion 5.2.
19
We show in Setion 5.2 that this an be explained by risk or loss aversion.
20
WMW tests show that the number of meetings of low quality sellers does not dier between C-Sep
and the other treatments.
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Figure 2-3: Partiipation and Mathing
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Figure (a) depits the fration of buyers who joined submarket l for eah market struture (blue) as well
as the orresponding theoretial preditions (red). Figure (b) shows the average per period number of
sellers who meet at least one buyer separated by L and H-type sellers.
meetings in C-Sep than in the other treatments (WMW p ≤ 0.06 for all omparisons).
Hene, market segmentation negatively aets the number of meetings of high quality
sellers, but, as shown next, many of these meetings do not suer from adverse seletion
anymore.
Figure 2-4 depits the umulative empirial distribution of buyers' oers for eah
frequently observed market struture in C-Sep and C-Pool I, for messages l and h in
C-Pool II and for NC. Oers in submarket l are represented in blue (solid) and oers in
submarket h in orange (dashed). In aordane with theory, in all lemons submarkets of
all 4 treatments only oers are below vL = 5. Moreover, prie oers in C-Pool II are very
similar for both messages. For treatment C-Pool I about one fourth of the pries oered
in submarket h of 2 l / 4 h over the high type sellers' prodution ost of 14. For other
market strutures in C-Pool I, prie oers were low and only allow for trade with low
quality sellers.
For C-Sep, theory predits high prie oers for some market strutures. Indeed, in
submarket h of market struture 3 l / 3 h almost all oers exeed the high type sellers'
ost, and in submarket h of 2 l / 4 h 62 perent of the oers are direted at high quality
79
Figure 2-4: Cumulative Distribution of Buyers' Oers
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The gure depits the empirial umulative distribution of oers for submarkets l and h by treatment
and observed market struture.
sellers. In both market strutures oers in submarket h are signiantly larger than oers
in submarket l (Wiloxon test p=0.03 and p=0.04, respetively). Buyers orretly believe
that they are likely to meet a high quality seller when joining submarket h.21 We onlude
that buyers' partiipation and bidding behavior reets the informational ontent of the
messages well.
Result 8 hints that C-Sep is suessful in failitating trade of high quality goods ompared
to the ontrol treatments. The next result shows that this is indeed observed in the data.
Result 9 (Rates of Trade and Eieny). Rates of trade and eieny in C-Sep are
not signiantly dierent from the theoretial preditions. More importantly, the rate of
trade with high quality sellers is signiantly larger in C-Sep than in C-Pool I, II and NC.
As a result, total eieny is by far the highest in C-Sep.
Table 2.3 presents observed rates of trade with the theoretial preditions given in
brakets. The trade frequeny of high quality sellers is negligible for treatments C-Pool
21
It is interesting to observe that, as predited in Figure 2-1b, in 1 l / 5 h and 2 l / 4 h ompetition
for low quality sellers is stronger in submarket l than in submarket h, as pries targeted at low quality
sellers are higher in the lemons submarket.
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Table 2.3: Rates of Trade and Eieny
Rate of Trade Eieny
L H L H Total
C-Sep 0.70 (0.70) 0.32 (0.25) 10.50 (10.57) 4.83 (3.69) 15.33 (14.26)
C-Pool I 0.67 (0.67) 0.09 (0.00) 10.00 (9.98) 1.37 (0) 11.37 (9.98)
C-Pool II 0.77 (0.67) 0.03 (0.00) 11.75 (9.98) 0.38 (0) 11.88 (9.98)
NC 0.72 (0.67) 0.04 (0.00) 10.75 (9.98) 0.62 (0) 11.37 (9.98)
Eieny is given by the average per period surplus generated with eah seller type. Total eieny is
the sum over both types. Theoretial preditions are given in parentheses.
II and NC, 9 perent for C-Pool I and 32 perent for treatment C-Sep. WMW tests
onrm that the trade frequeny for H-type sellers is signiantly larger in C-Sep than
in all other treatments (p=0.01 for all omparisons). Moreover, the trade frequeny in
C-Sep with high quality sellers is larger than the predited 25 perent, but this dierene
is not signiant (Wiloxon test p=0.11). Trade frequenies with H-type sellers are not
dierent between C-Pool I, C-Pool II and NC (p>0.21 for all omparisons). The trade
frequeny with low quality sellers is around 70 perent for all treatments and dierenes
are insigniant exept that low quality sellers trade more often in C-Pool II than in
C-Sep (p=0.08) and C-Pool I (p=0.04). Reall that the mathing proess does not allow
surpassing average rates of trade of 0.67 for low and high quality sellers simultaneously.
The observed trade frequenies in C-Sep of 70 perent for low quality and 32 perent for
high quality sellers should thus be onsidered to be relatively high.
Table 2.3 also lists generated surplus for all treatments. Total eieny in C-Sep is
signiantly larger than in all other treatments (WMW p=0.01 for all omparisons). Total
eieny does not dier between treatments C-Pool I, C-Pool II and NC (p>0.37 for all
omparisons). Reall that trade failures are the only soure of ineieny in our setting.
Hene, the observations on rates of trade immediately imply that realized surplus with
high quality sellers is signiantly larger in C-Sep than all other treatments and moreover,
realized surplus with low quality sellers is either not dierent or lower than in the ontrol
treatments. The higher total eieny in C-Sep ompared to the ontrol treatments is
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thus exlusively due to higher rates of trade with high quality sellers.
Total eieny in C-Sep is not signiantly dierent from the theoretial predition
(Wiloxon test p=0.17) and, not surprisingly, welfare falls short of onstrained eieny
(19.95) in all treatments (Wiloxon test p=0.03 for C-Sep). Ineienies due to asym-
metri information are not fully eliminated.
Our third main question is whether the experimental results an be explained by non-
standard preferenes. If messages by themselves were suient to indue trade with high
quality sellers, the market segmentation mehanism would be of less interest. The om-
parisons between C-Sep and the C-Pool treatments disussed so far provide an immediate
answer.
Result 10 (Non-Standard Preferenes). Non-standard preferenes annot explain the
high eieny in C-Sep.
It has been shown that ommuniation only makes a dierene if sellers an use it
to attrat more buyers. If this is not the ase, as in C-Pool I and II, total eieny is
not dierent from the setting without ommuniation (NC) in whih adverse seletion is
strong. This observation highlights that the timing of the message and mathing stages
is ruial, i.e. the buyers' possibility to hoose sellers onditional on observed messages.
Stated dierently, omparing C-Sep and C-Pool I shows that irrespetive of the type of
non-standard preferenes that haraterize our subjets, the market for high quality goods
breaks down when swithing o the monetary inentives that lead to endogenous market
segmentation.
C-Pool II is loser to the setting usually analyzed in the literature on heap-talk and
hidden information insofar as every buyer only observes one message. In ontrast to that
literature, messages do not trigger trade with high quality sellers. Subjets may still be
lie averse, but the ost of lying seem to be too small to indue truth-telling. In other
words, lies, if believed, are too lurative.
22
22
In Appendix C it is shown that the threshold for truth-telling orresponds to a xed ost of lying of
9.31, almost double the surplus generated by trading the good. Another explanation is that ompetition
may lower the impat of ommuniation and vie versa (Goeree and Zhang, 2014).
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Figure 2-5: Rates of Trade
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The gure depits the evolution of rates of trade over the 20 periods separated by low and high quality
sellers. For learer presentation, averages are taken over 2 onseutive periods.
Non-standard preferenes ould still at as a atalyst for market segmentation. In fat,
this ould explain why market segmentation seems to work better than expeted. Reall
that low quality sellers reveal their type more often and market struture 3 l / 3 h is more
ommon than predited. This is reinfored in Figure 2-5, depiting average rates of trade
over the 20 periods for low and high quality sellers, respetively. The dierene in rates
of trade with high quality sellers between C-Sep and its ontrol treatments beomes more
pronouned in later periods.
We lose this setion by noting that truth-telling in C-Sep is not triggered by repeated
interation, even though the market onsisted of the same 12 subjets in all periods. First,
building up a personal reputation was impossible, as spei buyers and sellers ould not
be identied and moreover, mathing was random to at least some extent. Seond, if
sellers' behavior had been driven by suh onsiderations, we would expet the same to
happen in C-Pool I. Finally, the absene of an end game eet in Figure 2-5 is a lear
indiation that truth-telling was optimal within a single period.
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2.5.2 Lies, Risk and Losses
Market Segmentation under Non-Standard Preferenes. In this setion, we ex-
plore some impliations of non-standard preferenes. We fous on lie aversion, risk aver-
sion and loss aversion. Lie aversion is an obvious andidate. Sellers may genuinely dislike
lying or feel guilt when letting down buyers' expetations. In a setting of adverse seletion,
risk and loss aversion also seem to be of rst-order importane.
For our disussion, the speis of how to model lie, risk and loss aversion
are unimportant. For onreteness, we briey mention possible models. As in
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), lie aversion is represented by a xed ost subtrated
from an agent's utility whenever she sends a message that does not orrespond to her type.
Note that lie aversion is only relevant for low quality sellers, who now earn p − cL − κ
when sending message h, where κ is the xed ost of lying. We use isoelasti utility with
risk parameter η to model onstant relative risk aversion. Finally, loss aversion aptures
the pereption that hanges in payos below a ertain referene point have a stronger
impat on utility than hanges in payo above this point. The natural referene point is
the no trade outome. Loss aversion is only relevant for buyers. We assume onstant loss
aversion as in Tversky and Kahneman (1991), i.e. a buyer's utility is vθ − p if vθ ≥ p and
µ(vθ − p) otherwise, where µ ≥ 1 is the loss aversion parameter and θ = {L,H}.
Observation 2. The probability α that a low quality seller sends message l is inreasing
in lie aversion (κ), risk aversion (η), and loss aversion (µ).
We omit a formal disussion, but the intuition for the result is straightforward. Lie
aversion has a diret negative eet on payos when misrepresenting ones type, eteris
paribus α inreases in κ. For loss aversion, note that as µ inreases, potential losses
in submarket h reeive more weight in the buyers' alulations. Loss averse buyers are
therefore more likely to join submarket l. Antiipating this, submarket l beomes more
attrative for sellers as well. The same argument holds for risk averse buyers, but in
addition the eet is amplied by risk averse low quality sellers who value the higher
probability to meet a buyer in submarket l (less risky option) relatively more than the
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possibility to extrat high pries in submarket h (risky option).23 Observation 2 reinfores
the mehanism's relevane as a means to alleviate adverse seletion. However, the eet
of risk and loss aversion on eieny is in general ambiguous. The reason is that buyers
beome less willing to oer high pries in the mixed quality submarket.
24
Behavioral Measures. Following the market experiment, subjets ompleted a lie aver-
sion task. The task is a variant of Gneezy (2005) and allows to ategorize subjets on
two dimensions, whether or not they are lie averse and whether or not they are other-
regarding. Appendix C explains the task and the lassiation in detail. It also ontains
Table 2.C.1, whih presents random eets regressions exploring the relation between
low quality sellers' messages and being ategorized as a truth-teller or liar and as other-
regarding or selsh. We nd no signiant impat of lie aversion in C-Sep. On the other
hand, other-regarding low quality sellers were more likely to reveal their quality than
selsh sellers.
Upon ompleting the market experiment and the lie aversion task, subjets were pre-
sented 6 lotteries whih they ould either aept or deline. Eah lottery is a 50-50 hane
between winning an additional 6 CHF or losing an amount that diers between lotteries
(2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). One of the 6 lotteries was randomly seleted and paid. In ase the
seleted lottery was delined, no additional earnings or losses were realized. We fous
our disussion on treatment C-Sep. Almost all subjets (97 perent) swith at a unique
point from aepting lotteries with relatively small losses to delining all lotteries that
entail larger losses. Subjets are lassied as loss averse if and only if they do not aept
the lottery between winning 6 CHF and losing 3 CHF.
25
The lottery task may also mea-
sure a subjet's risk aversion around 0. Sine the theoretial preditions are qualitatively
idential, the following results an be interpreted in the light of risk or loss aversion.
26
23
Proving these intuitions requires plugging in the new utility funtions in the expressions used to
derive the equilibrium in Proposition 3. Also note that high quality sellers' behavior in the separating
equilibrium is unaeted by the parameters κ, η and µ.
24
Consider submarket Sh1 for whih we know that risk and loss neutral buyers oer only pries that
exeed cH . We show in Appendix C that if µ = 1.25 buyers mix between low and high pries (as observed
in the experiment) and with µ = 2 pries never exeed vL.
25
24 out of the 36 buyers in C-Sep are lassied as loss averse. Choosing a dierent threshold does not
alter the qualitative results.
26
The task does not allow to disentangle risk and loss aversion. See Fehr et al. (2013) for a thorough
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Table 2.4: Loss Aversion in C-Sep
Submarket l Prie Oers in h Trade with H
1 l / 5 h 0.039 (0.092) -4.563** (2.130) -0.212 (0.234)
3 l / 3 h -0.144* (0.078) 2.135* (1.275) -0.110 (0.136)
4 l / 2 h -0.183* (0.098) 2.407 (1.907) 0.129 (0.203)
Loss Averse (LA) 0.238** (0.119) -6.087*** (2.136) -0.444** (0.174)
1 l / 5 h x LA -0.258** (0.106) 3.043 (2.415) 0.226 (0.244)
3 l / 3 h x LA -0.028 (0.130) 6.832*** (2.382) 0.518*** (0.173)
4 l / 2 h x LA -0.045 (0.165) 5.919** (2.503) 0.156 (0.224)
Constant 0.457*** (0.139) 12.890*** (1.482) 0.583*** (0.221)
R2 (overall) 0.065 0.570 0.175
Observations (Groups) 696 (36) 280 (34) 245 (36)
Random eets regression for C-Sep using data of all periods. Standard errors in parentheses lustered
on individuals.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variables by olumn are buyers'
hoie of submarket (1=l, 0=h), buyers' prie oers in submarket h, and trade with H-quality sellers
(0=no trade, 1=trade). The baseline is LA=0, market struture 2 l / 4 h. All estimations inlude period
dummies.
Table 2.4 displays random eets regressions on loss (or risk) aversion. Data now
inludes all periods to ensure a suient number of observations for all submarkets. The
dummy Loss Averse is equal to 1 if the subjet is lassied as loss averse and 0 otherwise.
The baseline are buyers who are not loss averse in market struture 2 l / 4 h. We fous on
this market struture, as in theory it is the only one where loss aversion aets behavior
and Figure 2-4 has shown that buyers are torn between oering low and high pries. In
olumn 1 of Table 2.4 the dependent variable is the buyers' hoie of submarkets (1=l,
0=h). In market struture 2 l / 4 h, loss averse buyers are 24 perentage points more
likely to hoose submarket l. Reall that low as well as high prie oers were made in
submarket h of 4 l / 2 h. The estimation results in olumn 2 suggest that most low pries
were oered by loss averse buyers. As a onsequene of olumn 1 and 2, olumn 3 shows
that loss averse buyers are less likely to trade with a high quality seller in 2 l / 4 h. Note
disussion of the lottery task. We fous on loss aversion, sine (i) sellers lassied as loss (risk) averse
were not more likely to send message l and (ii) subjets' omments in the questionnaire at the end of the
session indiate that the fear of making losses was a rst-order onern.
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that this is not true for 3 l / 3 h, where most buyers are ertain that submarket h onsists
of H-types only.
27
Result 11 (Loss Aversion). Sellers' antiipation of loss averse buyers has likely been
onduive to endogenous market segmentation.
Buyers' loss aversion has to be antiipated to inrease low quality sellers' inentives
to reveal their type. It seems plausible that over the 20 periods, sellers have learned
that buyers join submarket l more often than expeted and are somewhat relutant to
oer high pries in submarket h of 2 l / 4 h. This is also onsistent with Figure 2-5b
showing that C-Sep beomes more eient in the ourse of a session. Antiipated loss
aversion therefore seems to be a ompelling hannel that helped to establish the suess
of treatment C-Sep.
2.5.3 Over-Bidding and Payos
Comparing average observed to average predited trade pries in Table 2.5 shows that
buyers over-bid in all treatments exept in submarkets h in C-Sep (Wiloxon test p<0.07
for all omparisons). This is reminisent of the experimental literature on autions and
over-bidding.
28
Potential explanations for over-bidding inlude risk aversion, noisy behav-
ior, or a joy of winning (Goeree et al., 2002). Another explanation ould be that buyers
overestimate ompetition by other buyers. Beause sellers rejet the highest aeptable
oer only in 2 perent of all ases, over-bidding is not explained by the buyers' inability
to exploit the bargaining power implied by take-it-or-leave-it oers.
Figure 2-6 displays realized average payos of buyers and sellers as well as the theoret-
ial preditions. Buyers' payos fall short of the preditions for all treatments (Wiloxon
test p<0.07 for all treatments). Conversely, low quality sellers earn signiantly more
than expeted (p<0.07 for all treatments).
27
Interestingly, whereas loss averse buyers are more likely to join submarket l in 3 l / 3 h, they do not
oer lower pries onditional on joining submarket h.
28
One buyers are mathed, our setting is similar to a rst-prie sealed-bid aution with an unknown
number of ompetitors and a stohasti reservation value.
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Table 2.5: Average Trade Pries
Observed Predited
l h l h
C-Sep
1 l / 5 h 3.17 3.80 2.69 1.55
2 l / 4 h 3.21 10.23 2.75 14.35
3 l / 3 h 2.80 15.29 1.76 15.76
C-Pool I 2.89 4.94 1.76 1.76
C-Pool II 3.51 4.21 1.76 1.76
NC 3.51 1.76
Figure 2-6: Average Payos
0 1 2 3 4 5
NC (Predicted)
C−Sep (Predicted)
NC
C−Pool II
C−Pool I
C−Sep
Buyer L H
From Figure 2-6 we an also onlude that C-Sep provides a Pareto improvement
over the C-Pool and NC treatments. The payo inrease is strongest for high quality
sellers, who are signiantly better o in C-Sep than in the other treatments (WMW
tests p<0.02 for all omparisons). An interesting observation is that buyers in C-Pool
I on average barely make positive earnings.
29
Reall that in C-Pool I there were some
attempts at trading with high quality sellers: it turns out that this was a ostly endeavor
for buyers.
2.6 Conlusion
This artile reports experimental evidene on deentralized markets with asymmetri
information and mathing fritions. We show that a simple form of ommuniation 
sellers an send a ostless binary message  sues to substantially alleviate adverse
seletion. In ontrast to the existing experimental literature on heap talk and asymmetri
information, the importane of ommuniation is not based on lie aversion or other-
regarding preferenes. Instead, low quality sellers have monetary inentives to reveal
their type and separate themselves from high quality sellers in order to improve their
ompetitive position by attrating more buyers.
29
WMW tests onrm that buyers earn less in C-Pool I than in the other treatments (all p<0.06).
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On a more general note, this artile explores a setting in whih ineienies due to one
frition (inomplete information) are alleviated by exploiting the presene of additional
soures of ineieny (mathing fritions). In reent years, the theoretial literature has
made onsiderable progress in understanding what features of deentralized markets are
onduive or detrimental to eieny. Lauermann (2013) provides a general approah
to suh questions and emphasizes the role of ompetition, inomplete information and
rules of bargaining. It seems worthwhile to generate more experimental insights into how
dierent ombinations of these aspets may interat and impat outomes.
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Appendix
2.A Instrutions for Treatment C-Sep
Welome to this eonomi experiment! In this experiment you an earn money with the
deisions you make. How muh you earn depends on your own deisions, the deisions of
other partiipants as well as random events. We will not speak of Swiss Frans during
the experiment, but rather of points. All your earnings will rst be alulated in points.
At the end of the experiment the total amount of points you earned in this part will be
onverted to Swiss Frans at the following rate: 1 point = 0.6 CHF. In addition, you will
reeive a show up fee of 14 CHF.
From now on you are not allowed to ommuniate in any other way than speied
in the instrutions. Please obey to this rule beause otherwise we have to exlude you
from the experiment and all earnings you have made will be lost. Please also do not ask
questions aloud. If you have a question, raise your hand. A member of the experimenter
team will ome to you and answer your question in private.
The experiment lasts approximately 80 minutes. The experiment onsists of three
parts that are independent of one another. For eah part you will reeive spei instru-
tions. These instrutions will explain how you make deisions and how your deisions and
the deisions of other partiipants inuene your earnings. Therefore, it is important that
you read the instrutions arefully.
In ase you should make losses, the show up fee of 14 CHF is used to over for these
losses. If you make losses exeeding 14 CHF, you will have the option to leave immediately
and earn 0.
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Part 1. We will now desribe the general setting you will fae during the experiment. At
the beginning of the experiment the partiipants will be divided into buyers and sellers.
There will be 6 buyers and 6 sellers. You will be one of these buyers or sellers. When you
are a buyer (respetively, a seller) you will stay a buyer (respetively, a seller) throughout
the experiment. You will not get to know the identity of the buyers or sellers you interat
with, neither during nor after the experiment. Similarly, no partiipant will get to know
your identity.
A deision situation will be repeated for 20 periods. In eah period the 6 buyers and
the 6 sellers an trade a good in the market. Eah buyer wants to buy at most one unit
and eah seller an produe and sell at most one unit of this good. The seller an be of
two dierent types: type L or type H. A seller of type L an only produe a low quality
good at ost 0. The buyers' valuation for the low quality good is 5. Hene, the surplus
generated from trading a low quality good is 5. A seller of type H an only produe a high
quality good at ost 14. The buyers' valuation for the high quality good is 19. Hene, the
surplus generated from trading a high quality good is also 5.
We will tell the seller her type (L or H) at the beginning of eah period. In eah period
there will be 3 type L and 3 type H sellers. Whih sellers are of type L or H is randomly
determined. Note that a seller also knows how muh her good is worth to the buyers.
However, the buyers do not know the sellers' types and hene, a buyer does not know
whether his valuation for the good is 5 (and the seller's ost is 0) or 19 (and the seller's
ost is 14). The buyer only knows that there are 3 low quality sellers (type L) and 3 high
quality sellers (type H).
Sellers and buyers interat in this market in three steps: First, sellers send messages
low or high to all buyers. This generates 2 submarkets. Seond, eah buyer hooses
a submarket low or high and makes an oer in this submarket. It is important to
understand that buyers hoose the submarket in whih they want to make an oer and
the oer they want to make. However, the omputer randomly determines to whih exat
seller in the hosen submarket the oer goes. The impliations are disussed below in
detail. Third, sellers reeive the oer(s) and aept at most one oer. We will now
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explain eah step in detail.
Step 1: Sellers send a message. Before sellers and buyers potentially trade, eah
seller an send a message. The two possible messages are low and high. The messages
are sent at no osts and both types of sellers (L and H) may send both messages. That
is, type L may send message low or high and likewise for type H. What happens with
these messages? When buyers make their oers (see step 2 below), they are rst informed
about how many of the 6 sellers sent message low and how many sent message high.
Buyers an then hoose to make an oer either to the sellers who sent low or to the
sellers who sent high. Therefore, the way we think about the messages is that they
divide the initial market into two submarkets low and high. For instane, suppose 2
sellers sent message low and 4 sellers message high. Then buyers are given the hoie
between oering in submarket low with 2 sellers or submarket high with 4 sellers.
Below you see a sreen shot of the sellers' deision sreen.
Step 2: Buyers hoose submarkets and make oers. In this step, buyers make prie
oers to the sellers. Eah buyer makes an oer to exatly one seller. A buyer an hoose
in whih submarket low or high (generated by the messages in step 1) he wants to
make an oer. However, to whih spei seller the oer is made is randomly determined
by the omputer. In partiular, a seller may reeive an oer from several buyers or may
not reeive an oer at all. Let us give an example.
Suppose 2 buyers deide to make an oer in submarket low. Also suppose that there
are 2 sellers in this submarket (that is, 2 sellers sent message low). Thus, the 2 buyers'
oers an be reeived only by one of the 2 sellers in the same submarket and not by a seller
in submarket high. It is randomly determined by the omputer to whih of the 2 sellers
in submarket low the oer goes. In this example with 2 sellers, eah buyer's oer is made
to a spei seller in submarket low with probability 0.5 (50 perent). This means that
either 1 of the sellers reeives both oers or eah seller reeives 1 oer. More preisely,
the probability that spei seller reeives 2 oers is 0.52 = 0.25. This orresponds to
the probability that buyer 1 oers to this seller (50 perent) times the probability that
buyer 2 also oers to this seller (50 perent). Of ourse, then the probability that a seller
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reeives no oer is also 0.25. The probability that both sellers reeive one oer is 2 * 0.5
* (1-0.5)=0.5, where the 2 ours, beause there are two ways this an happen (Buyer
1 oers to seller 1 and buyer 2 to seller 2, or buyer 1 oers to seller 2 and buyer 2 to
seller 1). In summary, in a submarket with 2 sellers and 2 buyers the probability of a
seller to reeive no oer is 0.25, the probability of a seller to reeive 1 oer is 0.5, and the
probability to reeive 2 oers is 0.25.
These probabilities depend of ourse on the number of buyers and sellers in a submar-
ket. A submarket may ontain a dierent number of buyers and sellers than in the above
example. The idea is not that you alulate all these probabilities in detail (although you
an do some alulations if you like). What is important is that given you are in a spei
submarket (a group of sellers who sent the same message together with a group of buyers
who hose to make an oer to these sellers), your oer as a buyer only goes to one of the
sellers and eah seller has the same probability to reeive your oer.
The above implies in partiular that if you are a buyer and there are a lot of buyers
in the same submarket as you, the seller who reeives your oer is likely to also reeive
other oers. On the other hand, if you are the only buyer in a submarket, you are ertain
that your oer will be the only one. Of ourse, you do not know how many buyers make
oers in the same submarket when you make your oer.
A similar remark holds for sellers. If you are a seller, the more sellers are in the same
submarket as you, the lower your probability to reeive many oers and the higher your
probability to reeive no oer. If you are the only seller in a submarket and there is at
least one buyer who makes an oer in this submarket, you are ertain to reeive this oer.
Let us give one more example. Suppose 1 seller sends message high and 5 sellers send
message low. Also suppose that, after observing the sellers' messages, 5 buyers hoose
to oer in submarket high and 1 buyer hooses to oer in submarket low. Then the
seller in submarket high is ertain to reeive 5 oers and eah of the 5 buyers ompetes
with 4 other oers. On the other hand, in submarket low only 1 of the 5 sellers will
reeive an oer from the buyer and the buyer will not ompete with any other oer.
Finally, note that oers have to be between 0 and 19 and an be as exat as to the
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seond deimal plae. Hene, oers of 1, 7.9, 16.11 are possible. Oers of -3, 5.557, 19.2
are not possible. Below you are shown a sreen shot of the buyers' deision sreen in step
2: buyers hoose a submarket and an oer.
Step 3: Sellers aept or rejet oers. In this nal step, sellers deide whih oer (if
any) to aept. If a seller does not reeive an oer, she annot trade. If a seller reeives 1
or more oers (see step 2 to understand how more than one oer an be reeived) she an
aept at most one of these. A seller an also rejet all oers. See the sreen shot below
for an example where a seller reeived 2 oers. If the seller aepts an oer, she produes
the good and sells it to the buyer at the agreed prie. The payos of the seller and the
buyer who has made the oer are determined as follows.
• Seller's payo = Aepted Oer - Prodution Cost
• Buyer's payo = Valuation of the Good - Aepted Oer
To alulate payos, reall the valuations and osts. Seller's prodution ost: low
quality good 0, high quality good 14. Buyer's valuation: low quality good 5, high quality
good 19. As an example, onsider a buyer who oers a prie of 6 and a seller who aepts
this oer. If the seller is a type L (low quality) seller, his payo is (Aepted Oer -
Prodution Cost) = 6-0 = 6. The buyer's payo is (Valuation - Aepted Oer) = 5-6
= -1. On the other hand, if the seller is a type H (high quality) seller, his payo if he
aepts the oer is (Aepted Oer - Prodution Cost) = 6-14 = -8. The buyer's payo
in this ase is (Valuation - Aepted Oer) = 19-6 = 13.
The sellers who did not reeive an oer or rejeted all oers earn a payo of 0. The
buyers whose oers were rejeted also earn a payo of 0.
One sellers have deided whih oers to aept (if any) and the goods are traded,
you are shown your earnings in this period. Then the next period starts (there are 20
periods). The setting is the same in all periods. As a seller you may sometimes be type
L and sometimes type H.
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2.B Proofs
2.B.1 Proposition 1
The sellers' aeptane deision is trivial: aept the highest oer as long as it overs
the reservation ost. In the putative symmetri partially separating equilibrium, sellers'
behavior is thus fully desribed by α and buyers an infer q(Smi ).
The probability that a buyer ompetes with k other buyers for the same seller when
going to Smi is denoted by λ(k, S
m
i , β(S
m
i )). A buyer's expeted payo is then
UB(S
m
i , λ(0, S
m
i , β(S
m
i ))) = λ(0, S
m
i , β(S
m
i ))
max{q(Smi )(vL − cL), q(Smi )(vL − cH)+ (1− q(Smi ))(vH − cH)}. (2.2)
To understand (2.2), note that buyers must follow a mixed strategy. In fat, F (·, Smi ) has
no atom, beause in a symmetri equilibrium deviating to a slightly higher oer would
be protable. This entails that the lowest oer over whih buyers are mixing orresponds
to the oer that is optimal onditional on being the only bidder (k = 0). Whether a
monopsonist oers cL or cH depends on q(S
m
i ) as in (2.2).
Suppose there is only one buyer in the market and he faes market struture {Sl1, ShnL−1}.
He will stritly prefer to join submarket Sl1 if and only if
q(ShnL−1) >
vH − cH − (vL − cL)
vH − vL . (2.3)
This is obviously satised if vL − cL > vH − cH . Otherwise, from (2.1) we have q(ShnL) >
vH−cH
vH−vL
. Hene, (2.3) holds if we assume (2.4).
q(ShnL)− q(ShnL−1) ≤
vL − cL
vH − vL (2.4)
Under (2.4), β(Sl1) > 0 for any number of buyers (ompetition between buyers in submar-
ket h will make it even more protable to deviate from β(Sl1) = 0). If β(S
l
1) = 1, α > 0 is
obvious. For β(Sl1) ∈ (0, 1), buyers are indierent between submarkets and β(Sl1) is given
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by
UB(S
l
i, λ(0, S
l
i, β(S
l
i))) = UB(S
h
nL−i
, λ(0, ShnL−i, β(S
h
nL−i
))) (2.5)
for i = 1. Beause of (2.2) and (2.3), we need λ(0, ShnL−1, β(S
h
nL−1
)) > λ(0, Sl1, β(S
l
1)) for
(2.5) to hold.
Note that λ(k, Shi , β(S
h
i )) =
∑nB−1
b=k β(S
h
i )
b(1 − β(Shi ))nB−1−b
(
nB−1
b
)
( 1
i+nH
)k(1 −
1
i+nH
)b−k
(
b
k
)
and λ(k, Sli, β(S
l
i)) =
∑nB−1
b=k β(S
l
i)
b(1− β(Sli))nB−1−b
(
nB−1
b
)
(1
i
)k(1− 1
i
)b−k
(
b
k
)
,
where i > 0 for the latter and using the onvention that 00 = 1. It follows
that λ(0, Sl1, β(S
l
1)) = (1 − β(Sl1))nB−1. Using the Binomial Theorem we also obtain
λ(0, ShnL−1, β(S
h
nL−1
)) = (1 − 1−β(Sl1)
nS−1
)nB−1. Hene, λ(0, ShnL−1, β(S
h
nL−1
)) > λ(0, Sl1, β(S
l
1))
implies β(Sl1) >
1
nS
.
Let UL(S
m
i ) be a low quality seller's expeted payo onditional on being in submarket
Smi . If we an show that UL(S
h
nL
) < UL(S
l
1), then there is an equilibrium with α > 0.
Sine it is optimal for a buyer to oer cL, a buyer's expeted payo is U
α>0
B ≡ (1 −
β(Sl1))
nB−1(vL − cL) in Sl1 and Uα=0B ≡ (1 − 1nS )nB−1(vL − cL) in ShnL . The probability
that a low quality seller trades is xα>0L ≡ 1 − (1 − β(Sl1))nB in Sl1 and xα=0L ≡ 1 −
(1 − 1
nS
)nB in ShnL. Sine the sum of the expeted payos of the expeted number of
buyers plus the sum of the expeted payos of the sellers has to equal the total expeted
gains generated in a submarket, we obtain UL(S
l
1) = x
α>0
L (vL − cL) − β(Sl1)nBUα>0B and
UL(S
h
nL
) = xα=0L (vL − cL) − nBnS Uα=0B . It follows that UL(Sl1) > UL(ShnL) if and only if
(1 − 1
nS
)nB−1(1 + (nB − 1) 1nS ) > (1 − β(Sl1))nB−1(1 + (nB − 1)β(Sl1)). The latter holds if
β(Sl1) >
1
nS
. QED.
Equilibrium Derivation. For ompleteness, we provide the remaining expressions
needed to alulate F (·, Smi ) and α. The probability that p is a winning oer in sub-
market Smi is πSmi (p) =
∑nB−1
k=0 λ(k, S
m
i , β(S
m
i ))F
k(p, Smi ). The expeted payo of a buyer
who bids p is equal to πSmi (p)q(S
m
i )(vL − p) if p < cH and πSmi (p)(q(Smi )(vL − p) + (1 −
q(Smi ))(vH − p)) if p ≥ cH . Buyers' bidding strategies an be derived by setting these
expressions equal to (2.2). One also nds
Lemma 2. Let q = (vH − cH)/(vH − cL) and q(Smi ) = (vH − cH)/(vH − vL +
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λ(0, Smi , β(S
m
i ))(vL − cL)). Let p(Smi ) and p(Smi ) be the maximum and minimum oer
in the support of F (p, Smi ).
(i) If q(Smi ) ≥ q(Smi ) then p(Smi ) = cL and p(Smi ) < vL.
(ii) If q < q(Smi ) < q(S
m
i ) then p(S
m
i ) = cL and p(S
m
i ) > cH .
(iii) If q(Smi ) ≤ q then p(Smi ) = cH and p(Smi ) > cH .
Low quality sellers' expeted payo onditional on being in submarket Smi is
UL(S
m
i ) =
nB∑
b=1
[
β(Smi )
b(1− β(Smi ))nB−b
(
nB
b
)
b∑
k=1
(
1
i+ IhnH
)k(1− 1
i+ IhnH
)b−k
(
b
k
) ∫ p(Smi )
p(Smi )
(p− cL)dF k(p, Smi )
]
, (2.6)
where m = {l, h} and Ih = 1 if m = h and 0 otherwise.
Note that α = 1 is possible if UL(S
l
nL
) ≥ UL(Sh1 ). Otherwise, α ∈ (0, 1) is given by
setting equal the expeted payos from sending message l (LHS) and h (RHS):
nL−1∑
i=0
αi(1−α)nL−1−i
(
nL − 1
i
)
UL(S
l
i+1) =
nL−1∑
i=0
αi(1−α)nL−1−i
(
nL − 1
i
)
UL(S
h
nL−i
). (2.7)
2.B.2 Observation 1
In every (partially) separating equilibrium there is a submarket that exlusively onsist of
low quality sellers (see Kim, 2012). Sending message l thus reveals a seller to be of the low
type. Moreover, messages annot impat buyers' mathing deisions. Hene, low quality
sellers are at best indierent between l and h. If α > 0, there is a positive probability
that all other low quality sellers send message l. Assuming
q(Sh1 ) < q(S
h
1 ) (2.8)
guarantees that in Sh1 pries above cH are oered with positive probability (see Lemma
2). Sending message h is then a stritly protable deviation. QED.
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2.C Lie and Loss Aversion
2.C.1 Lie Aversion Task and Analysis
The lie aversion task is a variant of Gneezy (2005). A sender ommuniates one of two
possible messages to a reeiver. The message is either Option A will earn you a higher
payo than option B or Option B will earn you a higher payo than option A. The
sender is informed about the payo onsequenes of both options. The reeiver is not
informed and observes only the message. Payos depend exlusively on the option hosen
by the reeiver. The list of payos if option A is hosen is: (9, 11), (8, 12), (7, 13), (6, 14),
(5, 15), (4, 16), (3, 17), (2, 18), where the rst entry orresponds to the sender's payo
and the seond entry to the reeiver's payo. Option B gives the same payos exept that
the reeiver now earns the lower amounts. Thus, Message A is always the truth. One of
the 8 deisions was randomly seleted and paid. Reeivers only observed their own payo.
Note that total surplus is always 20 and the indued inequality is always the same for
option A and B. Preferenes for eieny and pure inequality aversion therefore do not
aet a sender's deision. Option B is the senders preferred message if he exhibits no lie
aversion and the inentives to lie inrease as dierenes in payos grow.
71 perent of the senders have a unique swithing point. We keep the remaining
subjets in the sample and use the most unequal payo pair for whih the subjet is
truthful as truth-telling index. Reeivers followed the senders' advie in 75 perent of the
ases. Senders are also asked to state their beliefs on whether reeivers will follow their
advie, and are paid for a orret guess. Only 54 perent believed the reeiver would
follow their advie. This alls for a areful ategorization of senders. Subjets who send
message B for payo distribution 7-13 (and all more unequal distributions) are lassied
as liars. We further divide subjets into selsh and other-regarding. Consider a liar who
believes that the reeiver will not follow his advie. Clearly, he must are about the gains
of the other, beause he expets the reeiver to hoose option A in response to reeiving
message B. In other words, he is an other-regarding liar. A liar who expets the other
to follow his advie is referred to as a selsh liar. A non-liar who believes that the other
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Table 2.C.1: Does Lie Aversion Explain Truth-Telling by Low Quality Sellers?
All Treatments C-Sep C-Pool I C-Pool II
Non-Liar -0.155 -0.114 0.169 -0.158
(0.105) (0.133) (0.182) (0.189)
Other-Regarding -0.086 0.258** -0.083 -0.134
(0.147) (0.101) (0.159) (0.240)
Non-Liar x Other-Regarding 0.430** -0.010 0.218 0.697**
(0.176) (0.159) (0.248) (0.297)
Constant 0.525*** 0.682*** 0.166 0.361***
(0.076) (0.0845) (0.141) (0.133)
R2 (overall) 0.069 0.060 0.109 0.195
Observations (Groups) 420 (84) 180 (36) 120 (24) 120 (24)
The table presents random eets regressions for low quality sellers. The dependent variable takes value
1 if the seller sends message l and 0 if h. Standard errors in parentheses are lustered on individuals.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. To allow for a diret interpretation of the onstant, no period
dummies are used. Inluding period dummies does not aet variables other than the onstant. Probit
regressions yield similar results.
will follow his advie is an other-regarding non-liar. Finally, there were truth-tellers who
antiipated not to be believed, i.e. in some ases saying the truth may be misguiding
(see also Sutter, 2009). Thus, selsh non-liars are those who send message A but expet
the reeiver to hoose option B in response. In total there are 22 selsh liars, 36 selsh
non-liars, 13 other-regarding liars and 23 other-regarding non-liars.
Table 2.C.1 reports results of random eets regressions. The dependent variable is the
low quality sellers' messages (1=l, 0=h). The dummies Non-Liar and Other-Regarding
follow the lassiation desribed above. Notie that in C-Sep other-regarding (liar and
non-liar) low quality sellers are more likely to reveal their quality than selsh sellers.
Lie aversion, on the other hand, has no signiant impat in C-Sep. Looking at the
results over all treatments indiates that it was mostly other-regarding non-liars who
were willing to send message l (a t-test for Non-Liar + Other-Regarding + Non-Liar x
Other-Regarding=0 yields p=0.06).
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2.C.2 Preditions with Lie and Loss Aversion
Table 2.C.2 shows preditions for dierent ombinations of lie and loss aversion. Loss
aversion leads to more market segmentation. Lie aversion leads to information dislosures
for the C-Pool treatments if κ ≥ 9.31. In this ase full separation is obtained. Sine there
is either full separation or pooling, loss aversion plays no role in the C-Pool treatments.
Table 2.C.2: Theoretial Preditions with Lie and Loss Aversion
Rates of Trade Ex Ante Eieny Payos
κ µ α L H Total L H UB UL UH
C-Sep 0 1 0.48 0.70 0.25 14.26 10.57 3.69 1.04 2.46 0.21
0 1.25 0.71 0.70 0.32 15.34 10.57 4.77 1.24 2.15 0.48
2 1 0.72 0.70 0.45 15.66 10.57 4.80 1.30 2.05 0.56
2 1.25 1.00 0.67 0.67 19.95 9.98 9.98 2.01 1.32 1.32
C-Pool I, II <9.31 [1,∞) 0.00 0.67 0.00 9.98 0.00 9.98 1.00 1.32 0.00
>9.31 [1,∞) 1.00 0.67 0.67 19.95 9.98 9.98 2.01 1.32 1.32
Figure 2.C.1 depits the bidding behavior for market struture {Sl2, Sh1} for µ =
{1, 1.25, 2}. Bidding in other market strutures is unaeted by loss aversion.
Figure 2.C.1: Buyers' Bidding Strategies in {Sl2, S
h
1 } with Loss Aversion
0 5 14 19
p0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(a) {Sl2, S
h
1 }
0 5 14 19
p0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(b) {Sl2, S
h
1 }, µ = 1.25
0 5 14 19
p0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
() {Sl2, S
h
1 }, µ = 2
101
102
Chapter 3
Gradual Coalition Formation with
Externalities
3.1 Introdution
A remarkable result in the literature on oalition formation is that despite the possibility
to write binding agreements, equilibrium outomes often fail to be eient. At the same
time, it has been shown that a larger exibility in renegotiating agreements may restore
eieny. This latter nding is in line with the Coase Theorem, whih states that if (re-
)negotiation fritions are negligible, the eient outome should eventually be reahed.
Behind this assertion lies the idea that moving to a more eient state sets free additional
resoures that an be used to ompensate potential losers.
This artile analyzes an environment in whih the degree of renegotiation is endoge-
nous. In partiular, after forming a oalition players have two options: either they stay
available for future renegotiation or they irrevoably leave the negotiation table. This
modeling approah is suitable for situations that involve deisions that are irreversible
or very ostly to reverse. Examples inlude the delaration of a war, urreny unions,
the adoption of a tehnologial standard, the deision to build environmentally friendly
failities, mergers between rms, or the position a politial party takes on important is-
sues during an eletion ampaign. In all these situations, allianes form to steer outomes
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in the diretion preferred by its members. The question impliit in the Coase Theorem
is then whether the inentives to form oalitions are aligned with the soially optimal
outome.
The previous literature on endogenous renegotiation has identied two main soures
of ineieny. The rst one is linked to the so-alled Outside Option Priniple, whih
refers to the result in the bargaining literature that outside options merely serve as a
onstraint on payos (Sutton, 1986). In our ontext, this implies that if a oalition is
already in a position that guarantees a high payo, it has little inentives to further
expand ooperation, even if this is soially desirable. Intuitively, suh oalitions prefer to
simply walk away, beause they are unable to apture a share of the gains realized by
moving to a more eient outome.
1
The seond reason ineienies may our is the
presene of externalities between oalitions. However, to the best of our knowledge, it has
so far remained unanswered what types of externalities prevent ooperation.
In this artile, we propose a oalition formation model that eliminates ineienies
linked to the Outside Option Priniple. By foussing on externalities, we demonstrate
that suessful ooperation through renegotiation may only be forestalled in environments
that feature free riding opportunities. This is an important insight, beause for a broad
lass of games  whih inludes harateristi funtion games eieny is always attained
through renegotiation.
Having established this result, we ontinue to explore free riding as an obstale to
eieny and nd that the notion of gradualism is key. Gradualism refers to oalition
formation proesses in whih players do not immediately form the omprehensive agree-
ment, but ooperation ensues in several steps. What are the roots of gradualism? A on-
vining mehanism is explored in Seidmann and Winter (1998): partial oalitions form
to inrease their bargaining leverage in future negotiations.
2
For instane, in 2010 and
2011 Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania signed a Cooperative Framework
Agreement to seek more water from the River Nile. This move seems to have shifted
1
In Seidmann and Winter (1998), this is indeed the major reason for ineienies. They also hint at
a third potential soure of ineieny, based on oordination failures within a oalition.
2
This also hints at the fat that full ooperation does not neessarily entail a fair (and ertainly not
equal) division of surplus.
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the relative bargaining power in water politis between the Nile riparian states in favor
of the signatories, as it was strongly opposed by Egypt and Sudan. In partiular, they
demanded to omit the qualiation signiantly in Artile 14b on water seurity, whih
requires member ountries to avoid to signiantly aet the water seurity of any other
Nile Basin State.
3
This line of explanation is, however, inappliable for agreements on publi good provi-
sion. In this ase, players within a oalition tend to internalize the positive externalities
on the other members and thus, it is the outsiders who are better o, as they equally
benet from the inreased provision levels. Consequently, the players who initiated oop-
eration will have less leverage in subsequent negotiations. Indeed, it will be shown that
in environments with free riding opportunities, gradualism an never our in order to
improve the own oalition's bargaining position. Yet, it is these environments in whih
ooperation is important and gradualism is frequently observed. For instane, in the on-
text of limate hange, The Kyoto Protool is seen as an important rst step towards a
truly global emission redution regime that will stabilize GHG emissions, and an provide
the arhiteture for the future international agreement on limate hange.
4
An extension of the oalition formation model allows us to explain gradualism in
publi good settings by unovering the other side of the oin: oalitions may form to
onede bargaining power. Players are willing to do so in order to provide others with an
inentive to enter into negotiations with them. Parties who initiate ooperation weaken
their position relative to the ones who do not onede bargaining power, but the size of the
ake grows suh that everybody is better o. Forming a oalition an thus be interpreted
as a deliberate ommitment to not make use of free riding opportunities. Indeed, it seems
plausible that the ommitments observed in limate hange negotiations were made to
keep negotiations going, in partiular with developing ountries.
5
3
Our analysis further suggest that the game of water politis between Nile riparian states has a non-
empty (strit) Core, as we will show that gradualism ours if and only if the strit Core is empty.
4
The statement is taken from the UNFCCC website.
5
As another illustration, onsider the federal eletions in Germany, whih are typially followed by
extensive negotiations on the formation of oalitions between the winning party and parties whih the
winning party needs to ahieve the required majority to form the government. In these negotiations, it
is ommon that parties make publi onessions early on. Conessions weaken the bargaining position
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This paper is organized as follows. The next setion presents the model and laries the
onnetion to the existing literature. In Setion 3, equilibrium is haraterized. We derive
our entral results on gradual oalition formation, eieny and renegotiation in Setion
4. Setion 5 applies the ndings to the publi goods ase. Setion 6 onludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 The underlying ooperative game
Let N = {1, 2, . . . n} be the set of players. A oalition struture π is a partition of N .
The set of all oalition strutures is denoted by Π. Let the restritions to S ⊂ N be π(S)
and Π(S), respetively. The value of a oalition S in oalition struture π is summarized
by a TU partition funtion v(S, π). Let v ≡ {v(S, π)S∈pi}pi∈Π. Thus, v determines for all
possible oalition strutures the value of all oalitions. We normalize the minimum payo
a player an guarantee itself to be bounded away from 0, i.e. v({i}, π) > 0 for all i ∈ N ,
π ∈ Π.
The partition funtion v is the primitive of our setting. However, v ould in general
be derived from a strategi form game (we will do so in Setion 5). The interpretation is
then that when a oalition leaves the formation proess, it hooses its ation as part of a
non-ooperative game between oalitions.
3.2.2 Bargaining with irreversible ations
We model oalition formation as innite horizon bargaining with the possibility to write
binding agreements. There are two distint phases, a bargaining phase and an implemen-
tation phase. We refer to the lapse of both phases as a negotiation round, or simply round.
The game starts with the bargaining phase of the rst negotiation round. In the bargain-
ing phase, players make, aept, and rejet proposals to determine whih oalitions form
when it omes to agreeing on the government's position on minimum wage, tax raises, and so on. On
the other hand, parties who ommit not to bargain on these issues one the government has formed are
more attrative to ooperate with and an thus avoid negotiation breakdowns.
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and to pin down how the value of a oalition will be shared among its members. After on-
trat(s) have been signed, the implementation phase starts. Coalitions now sequentially
hoose between implementing the urrent ontrat or remaining available for negotiations
in future rounds. If a oalition hooses to implement, it eetively leaves the game by
exeuting an irreversible ation. When doing so, it will predit the nal oalition stru-
ture and in partiular how this struture depends on the fat that the oalition leaves.
One all oalitions have ompleted the implementation phase, the next negotiation round
starts. We now turn to a formal desription.
Negotiation rounds
Negotiation rounds are indexed by τ = 1, 2, . . . At the beginning of eah negotiation
round there is a set N ⊆ N of players who ontrol a oalition, the meaning of whih
will beome lear presently. There is also a set A ⊆ N of ative players who have not
yet implemented their ontrats. Finally, as the negotiation round unfolds, there is a set
B ⊆ A of negotiating players who have not yet signed a ontrat in the urrent round. A
state is desribed by ω = (N ,A,B). Let Ω be the set of all possible states.
Proposals and ounter-proposals in the bargaining phase
The bargaining phase begins with some player, say i, proposing a ontrat (S, t) to S ⊆ B
suh that i ∈ S. Thus, proposals an only be made to negotiating players. Note that
a oalition an make a proposal to itself, thereby leaving the set of negotiating players
without merging.
The seond part of a proposal is a vetor of transfers t satisfying
∑
j∈S tj = 0. It is
interpreted as the amount i oers to eah j to obtain ontrol over j's resoures. When a
proposal is aepted, player i beomes the ontrolling player of the newly formed oalition
S. Players who aepted the proposal reeive their transfers and will never be able to
take another deision (nor will they be aeted by the resulting oalition struture).
We therefore use N ⊆ N to refer to the urrent set of players who ontrol a oalition.
107
This interpretation of a proposal follows the one used in Bloh and Gomes (2006).
6
Its
advantage is that gradual oalition formation beomes tratable: a oalition an always
be identied with a single player and thus we an abstrat from potential disagreements
within oalitions. To be sure, who the non-ontrolling players in a oalition are matters,
beause v is dened on the initial set of players N . Also note that oalitions an never
disintegrate.
7
After proposal (S, t) by player i is made, all j ∈ S−i sequentially deide whether to
aept or rejet. Coalition S (with ontrolling player i) only forms if all j ∈ S−i aept
the proposal. If a proposal is rejeted, the oalition struture remains unaltered and
the rejetor seizes the initiative.
8
Notie that players an pass the initiative by making
unaeptable proposals. At the start of the game and after any aeptane, the bargaining
protool ρ selets a player in B to make the next proposal. Let ρ(i, ω) be the probability
that i is seleted at ω. We assume ρ(i, ω) > 0 for all i ∈ B and all ω ∈ Ω.9
Time t = 0, 1, . . . runs disretely. It is assumed that there is a geometri time ost
δ (as in Rubinstein (1982)) inurred on all players only if a rejetion is followed by a
ounter-proposal, where a ounter-proposal is dened as follows.
Counter-Proposal. A proposal (S, t) by player i at ω is a ounter-proposal if and only
if at least one j ∈ S has previously made a proposal at ω that was rejeted by i.
By linking time osts to ounter-proposals, we depart from the standard assumption
that every rejetion entails time osts. This departure is well motivated. Disounting in
bargaining models funtions as a tehnial devie to i) fore players to reah an agreement
at some point and ii) redue the set of equilibria by introduing a minimal degree of
asymmetry between players. As will be shown, a model of ostly ounter-proposals is
6
Ray and Vohra (1999) allow for more exible sharing rules that depend on realized oalition stru-
tures. One ould also let players renegotiate sharing rules. This, however, leads to oordination failures
inside oalitions suh as in Lemma (i) of Seidmann and Winter (1998), p. 808.
7
See Gomes and Jehiel (2005) and Hyndman and Ray (2007) for ontributions that allow for disinte-
gration.
8
This is in aordane with most of the oalition formation literature disussed in the next setion.
For an alternative approah see Okada (1996).
9
The protool also pins down the order in whih players respond to a proposal, whih turns out to
be inonsequential. The assumption ρ(i, ω) > 0 ould be replaed by assuming that whenever a player is
indierent in the implementation stage, it hooses to remain ative.
108
fully apable of assuming this role of disounting.
10
Time osts are also widely applied
beause they are intuitively onvining: it seems natural that formulating oers requires
time and eort. We believe that the model of ostly ounter-proposals does not lose this
intuitive appeal. It orresponds to the view that approahing another player per se is
free of ost, but that it is haggling that makes bargaining ostly. Formulating a ounter-
proposal takes more eort, beause players know that they are in onit about how to
share the gains from ooperation. Moreover, from a psyhologial perspetive, haggling
with the same player over a long period of time seems more exhausting than initiating
new potential ooperations. Finally, our model is a natural generalization to n players of
the two-player bargaining model presented in Sutton (1986) and Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990). In these artiles, it is assumed that a rejetor an onsume its (exogenous) outside
option before disounting sets in. In a similar vein, ostly ounter-proposals guarantee
eah player its (endogenous) outside option. This last point is ruial and will beome
lear when disussing Example 1.
Implementation phase: three models of renegotiation
Three dierent models of renegotiation will be onsidered. Model ΓNR assumes that
agreements annot be renegotiated.
No Renegotiation. In ΓNR an aepted agreement (S, t) implies that oalition S leaves
the game immediately. There is thus no need for an implementation phase, as a oalition
is fored to leave.
In the remaining two models, renegotiation is possible. In the implementation phase,
all players in A are asked sequentially whether they want to implement their urrent
ontrat. If player i implements in negotiation round τ , it is removed from A for all
future negotiation rounds. If player i does not implement in round τ , i returns to the set
B in τ + 1.
10
All studies disussed in the next setion minimize the asymmetry in the bargaining protool by
looking at the outomes when disounting fritions are negligible. In fat, our model further redues the
asymmetry in the bargaining proess, beause players are not fored to suer time osts from rejeting
proposals of players they have no interest in ooperating with, but who (perhaps arbitrarily) move earlier.
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Renegotiation. In ΓR an aepted agreement (S, t) immediately triggers the implemen-
tation phase. The player who ontrols S hooses whether to implement the ontrat or
stay available for further negotiations. Players who ontrol a oalition S ′ 6= S do not
have the possibility to implement in this round, but have to wait until they are the ones
signing a ontrat in the bargaining phase of a future round.
11
In ΓR implementation deisions are taken before observing ooperation eorts of other
oalitions. For instane, in ommittees or boards of diretors it may be unlear what other
members are going to do and the very fat that a oalition forms may ruially aet the
deisions of the remaining parties. In other ontexts, a more natural assumptions seems
to be that when a oalition deides to leave the bargaining table, it is aware of other
ongoing negotiations. For instane, in limate hange negotiations ountries have a good
understanding of all potential partnerships. This motivates a model of renegotiation
rounds. It diers from ΓR with respet to the timing of the implementation phase.
Renegotiation Rounds. In ΓRR the implementation phase is entered when there are
no negotiating players left, i.e. B = ∅. In other words, eah ative player signs one (and
only one) ontrat in the bargaining phase of eah round. In the implementation phase,
the order in whih players take deisions is the same as the order in whih ontrats were
written in the bargaining phase of the same negotiation round.
The game ends if and when all oalitions have implemented their ontrats. Payments
are realized when the oalition formation proess ends. If the oalition formation proess
never ends, all players are assumed to reeive 0.12
11
Reall that the ontrat ould also be the singleton ontrat, i.e. S′ does not need to grow to be
implementable.
12
Assuming that transfers are onsumed immediately does not aet any of the results. That is, we
ould allow players who have aepted an oer to reeive a positive amount even if the bargaining proess
is indenite.
110
3.2.3 Relation to the literature
Our hoie of negotiation models is rooted in the existing literature.
13
Model ΓNR
views all ontrats as nal. Important ontributions that have applied this approah
are Chatterjee et al. (1993), Bloh (1996), Ray and Vohra (1999), and Ray and Vohra
(2001). A entral onlusion in this literature is the persistene of ineieny. The rea-
son for suh ineienies is that (Ray 2007, p. 85) the very at of making a proposal
opens the door to possible ounteroers and hene, the proposer must give away part of
the soial surplus when a group is formed. This drives a wedge between the proposer's in-
entives and the soially eient outome. We ontribute to this literature by larifying
the onnetion between the grand oalition and the ore (Theorem 2).
Aknowledging the inentives to ollet rents at the expense of eieny, are proposers
able to do so through intermediate ontrats, whih are eventually renegotiated until the
soially eient outome prevails? In order to provide an answer Perry and Reny (1994)
and Seidmann and Winter (1998) introdue endogenous renegotiation, i.e. after signing
ontrats, oalitions an hoose to ontinue negotiations or may redibly end negotiating.
Interestingly, the latter paper shows that renegotiation an lead to gradual formation of
oalitions, but even absent externalities, eieny is not guaranteed.
14
In ontrast, we nd
in Corollary 1 that renegotiation always leads to the eient outome for harateristi
funtions. This is a onsequene of the assumption that only ounter-proposals entail
time osts. Corollary 1 is in aordane with Bloh and Gomes (2006), who present
a model in whih ineienies are explained exlusively by externalities. We onrm
this nding, but in addition identify onditions on externalities that guarantee eieny
(Theorem 1). Moreover, Theorem 3 shows that in environments with strong free riding
inentives, renegotiation is inonsequential, i.e. equilibrium outomes in ΓR and ΓNR
oinide. This nding links oalition formation with non-renegotiable ontrats to the
13
Naturally, this setion annot over the vast literature on oalition formation. We refer to Ray (2007)
and Ray and Vohra (2014) for omprehensive disussions.
14
Model ΓR is losely linked to Seidmann and Winter (1998)'s model. The most important dierene
is that Seidmann and Winter assume that after an aeptane or rejetion of a proposal all players who
have signed at least one ontrat an hoose to implement. Beause we allow for externalities, this would
render the order in whih ontrats an be implemented an important objet.
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literature on endogenous renegotiation.
Finally, there is a literature on reversible ations with on-going negotiations, i.e. play-
ers annot terminate the negotiation proess. A remarkable result in Hyndman and Ray
(2007) is that if the grand oalition is the eient outome, then irrespetive of exter-
nalities, players will eventually end up forming the grand oalition.
15
Hene, while a lot
remains to be explored in the ontext of reversible ations  in partiular how the gains
of the grand oalition will be distributed  the basi message is in aordane with the
Coase Theorem.
3.3 Equilibrium Charaterization
3.3.1 Equilibrium onept
We restrit attention to subgame perfet equilibria in stationary strategies. Reall that
a state ω = (N ,A,B) is omposed of the urrent ontrolling players, the ative players,
and the negotiating players. In the bargaining phase, a strategy requires a player to
make a proposal whenever it is asked to do so, onditioned only on the state ω. As a
responder, a player's deision to aept or rejet a proposal depends also on the nature
of the proposal. In the implementation phase, a strategy speies, onditional only on ω,
whether to implement the urrent ontrat or to enter the next negotiation round.
Equilibrium oalition strutures will be ompared in terms of their eieny proper-
ties. Γi(v, δ) % Γj(v, δ) indiates that all equilibria in Γi(v, δ) are weakly more eient
than the most eient equilibrium in Γj(v, δ), depending on δ and partition funtion v.
For instane, we ould say that the omparison holds for all δ above a ertain value δˆ and
for all partition funtions v that are also harateristi funtions. If Γi(v, δ) ∼ Γj(v, δ),
then for eah equilibrium oalition struture in Γi(v, δ) there is an equilibrium oalition
struture in Γj(v, δ) that is equally eient (and vie versa), given δ and v.
The following proposition guarantees existene of equilibrium in all three models. The
15
This onlusion is true without the ommonly imposed restrition to stationary strategies. Other im-
portant ontributions inlude Seidmann and Winter (1998), Gomes and Jehiel (2005), and Gomes (2005).
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proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 4. ΓRR, ΓR and ΓNR admit a stationary subgame-perfet equilibrium.
3.3.2 Optimal proposals
Fix a state ω. Let xi(ω,P(R)) be the payo i obtains at ω given that he is the next oerer
and his proposal must be to a oalition S ∈ P(R), where P(R) is the power set of R.16
If R = B we simply write xi(ω). We also adopt the onvention xi(ω,P(B−i)) = xi(ω).
Importantly, xi(ω) is interpreted as the payo to i net of the payments he has made to
the non-ontrolling players in his oalition. This does not aet i's behavior, sine the
payments are sunk osts. Let yi(ω, j) be i's equilibrium response value to j at ω. It is the
oer of j that is just aepted by i, knowing that every player ating after i aepts the
proposal. From the denition of a ounter-proposal, it follows that
yi(ω, j) =


xi(ω,P(B−j)) if xi(ω,P(B−j)) > δxi(ω),
δxi(ω) otherwise.
(3.1)
A proposal (S, t) is optimal for i if it yields a payo of xi(ω). Fix a player i with an
optimal proposal to oalition S. We must have
xi(ω) ≥ wS(ω)−
∑
j∈S−i
yj(ω, i) = wS(ω)−
∑
j∈K(i,S)−i
xj(ω,P(B−i))− δ
∑
j∈K(i,S)
xj(ω), (3.2)
where wS(ω) denotes the ontinuation value of oalition S. The weak inequality holds,
beause i an guarantee aeptane by oering yj(ω, i) to every j ∈ S−i. Expression
(3.2) holds with equality if i's oer is aeptable. The set K(i, S) ⊆ S onsists of all
j ∈ S for whih xj(ω,P(B−i)) ≥ δxj(ω). Note that i ∈ K(i, S). Aording to (3.1),
yj(ω, i) = xj(ω,P(B−i)) for j ∈ K(i, S) and yj(ω, i) = δxj(ω) for j ∈ K(i, S) = S\K(i, S).
The setK(i, S) is pinned down uniquely by the following ondition.17 We have j ∈ K(i, S)
16
Note that in priniple xi(ω,P(R)) also depends on the set of players who have already made an oer
to i at ω. However, Lemma 3 will show that we an safely ignore this.
17
To see that the solution to (3.3) is unique, take K(i, S) and K ′(i, S) and let |K(i, S)| < |K ′(i, S)|.
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for all j ∈ S−i if and only if
xj(ω,P(B−i)) ≥ y(i, S) =
δ
(
wS(ω)−
∑
k∈K(i,S)−j
xk(ω,P(B−i))
)
1 + δ (|S−j | − |K(i, S)−j|) , (3.3)
where y(i, S) is the equilibrium response value of j ∈ K(i, S) obtained by solving (3.2)
for xed outside options of j ∈ K(i, S)−i. We now turn to a powerful result.
Lemma 3. There exists δˆ ∈ (0, 1) suh that for δ ≥ δˆ the following holds. If i proposes
to S and is aepted, then for every j ∈ S it is also optimal to propose to S. If i stritly
prefers to propose to S, proposing to S is stritly optimal for all j ∈ S.
Proof. We start with two observations. If i stritly prefers S, then xi(ω,P(B−j)) < xi(ω)
and thus
yi(ω, j) = δxi(ω) ∀j ∈ S−i, (3.4)
beause there is δ ≥ δˆ for whih xi(ω,P(B−j)) < δxi(ω).18 By the same reasoning it
follows that
yj(ω, i) = xj(ω,P(B−i)) = xj(ω)⇔ j ∈ K(i, S). (3.5)
We prove the seond statement of the lemma. Consider j ∈ K(i, S) and suppose j has
an alternative (weakly or stritly) better than S. We have yj(ω, i) = xj(ω) by (3.5) and
hene yj(ω, i) ≥ wS(ω)− yi(ω, j)−
∑
k∈S−ij
yk(ω, j). Using (3.4), it follows that xi(ω) >
wS(ω)− yj(ω, i)−
∑
k∈S−ij
yk(ω, j). Combining this with (3.2) for i yields an immediate
ontradition for |S| = 2 and otherwise, we obtain ∑k∈S−ij yk(ω, i) < ∑k∈S−ij yk(ω, j).
Note that K(i, S) ⊂ K ′(i, S). Let J = K(i, S)′\K(i, S). For all j ∈ J , we have j 6∈ K(i, S) and
j ∈ K′(i, S). Using (3.3) for both ases implies δ(wS(ω) −
∑
k∈K(i,S)−j
xk(ω,P(B−i)))/(1 + δ(|S| −
1 − |K(i, S)|)) < ∑k∈J−j xk(ω,P(B−i))/|J−j |. Hene, there exists at least one j ∈ J ∩ K(i, S), a
ontradition.
18
Beause gradualism does not neessarily indue disounting, a oalition may build up gradually, even
if it is optimal for all i ∈ S to form S in one step. Thus, the fat that xi(ω,P(B−j)) < xi(ω) if i stritly
prefers S is not obvious. We show that if at ω it is ertain that S will form eventually, it is stritly optimal
to form S immediately. Notie that at some state ω′ oalition S will form. Beause it was optimal to form
S at the initial state, xi(ω) = xi(ω
′). As a responder at ω′, i obtains max{xi(ω′,P(B′−j)), δxi(ω′)} <
xi(ω
′), beause xi(ω
′,P(B′−j)) < xi(ω′) holds as S is now the only optimal proposal. But beause
ρ(ω′, i) < 1, i stritly prefers to oer S immediately.
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Hene, for at least one k ∈ S−ij , yk(ω, i) < yk(ω, j). But k ould have rejeted i's oer
and obtain at least δxk(ω), whih is either larger than or arbitrarily lose (for δ ≥ δˆ) to
yk(ω, j). It follows that δxk(ω) > yk(ω, i), whih ontradits (3.1).
Consider now j ∈ K(i, S). Let S ′ be the proposal that j (weakly or stritly) prefers
to S. We have i ∈ S ′ by (3.5). Thus, xj(ω) = wS′(ω) −
∑
k∈S′
−j
yk(ω, j). Moreover,
xi(ω) > wS′(ω) −
∑
k∈S′
−i
yk(ω, i) beause S is stritly optimal for i. If xi(ω) ≤ xj(ω)
then yi(ω, j) ≤ yj(ω, i), beause of (3.4) and yj(ω, i) = δxj(ω), where the latter is im-
plied by j ∈ K(i, S). For |S| = 2, the ontradition is obvious. Otherwise, we need∑
k∈S′
−ij
yk(ω, i) >
∑
k∈S′
−ij
yk(ω, j). By the same argument as above, at least one k ∈ S ′
should rejet j's oer. Hene, xi(ω) > xj(ω). But then (3.2) for i (holding with equality),
(3.4) and yj(ω, i) = δxj(ω) imply xj(ω) < wS(ω) −
∑
k∈S−j
yk(ω, j), whih ontradits
(3.2) for j. This ompletes the proof of the seond statement.
Assume now i's proposal to S is weakly optimal, but some j ∈ S stritly prefers a dier-
ent proposal S ′. By the rst part of the proof, i 6∈ S ′ and hene, xj(ω) = xj(ω,P(B−i)) =
yj(ω, i). Thus, yj(ω, i) > wS(ω) −
∑
k∈S−j
yk(ω, j). Combining the latter with (3.2), it
follows that xi(ω) +
∑
k∈S−ij
yk(ω, i) < yi(ω, j)+
∑
k∈S−ij
yk(ω, j). By the same reasoning
as above, we obtain a ontradition for |S| = 2 and otherwise, at least one k ∈ S should
rejet i's oer. Also note that S annot be stritly preferred by j due to the rst part of
the proof. Hene, S is weakly optimal for j.
Lemma 3 and expressions (3.1) - (3.3) desribe the nature of proposals that are a-
epted. Are proposals sometimes rejeted?
Lemma 4. There exists δˆ ∈ (0, 1) suh that for δ ≥ δˆ no ounter-proposals are made
along the equilibrium path.
Proof. Suppose there is a ounter-proposal. By denition ∃ i, j, ω suh that i) i has an
optimal proposal (S, tS), where j ∈ S, and ii) for j it is optimal to turn down tSj and oer
(R, tR), where i ∈ R. Moreover, j is the player who atually rejets (S, tS) with positive
probability.
First, i) and ii) imply that i nds it (weakly) optimal to pass the initiative to j. This
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holds beause either j rejets tSj for sure, or, if j is indierent between aepting and
rejeting, a slight inrease in tSj would eliminate the risk of being rejeted by j.
Seond, we show that (R, tR) is aepted with probability 1. Suppose by ontradition
that there is a k ∈ R who rejets j's proposal with probability p ∈ (0, 1]. If k 6= i, j nds
it (weakly) optimal to pass the initiative to k (this again holds, beause any mixing by k
ould be turned into aeptane by a slight inrease in tRk ) using a proposal that inludes
i. But this annot be true, sine by exluding i, j's equilibrium payo inreases by fator
1/δ (assuming stationarity). If k = i, using the same reasoning as above, it is (weakly)
optimal for i and j to indenitely pass the initiative to eah other, whih ontradits the
fat that equilibrium payos stritly exeed 0.
Combining the rst and seond observation, we onlude that (S, tS) yields i an ex-
peted payo of δtRi . Moreover, beause (R, t
R) is aepted, it follows that tRi = yi(ω, j)
and by Lemma 3 that proposing to R must also be optimal for i. Hene, (R, tR) yields
xi(ω) ≥ tRi . But xi(ω) > δtRi means that (S, tS) is not optimal.
To be sure, it may well be that proposals are rejeted.
19
However, it follows from
Lemma 4 that the full set of equilibrium outomes an be identied by onsidering only
aeptable proposals. To see this, suppose ρ(ω) selets i to propose and j rejets. Sine
there is no delay, the resulting equilibrium outome must be idential to the one in whih
j was seleted to be the next proposer at ω.
3.4 Gradual Coalition Formation
3.4.1 Endogenous outside options
We start with an example that illustrates how renegotiation helps to reah eient
outomes and laries the role of ounter-proposals. The notation v(S1, . . . , SM) =
(v1, . . . , vM) is used throughout the paper, where vm is the worth of oalition Sm in
oalition struture {S1, . . . , SM}. When onvenient we write ij instead of {i, j}.
19
See Seidmann and Winter (1998)'s Example 1 for a ase that involves a rejetion.
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Example 1. This example is due to Seidmann and Winter (1998). N = {1, 2, 3}. Let
the harateristi funtion be given by v(1, 2, 3) = (0, 0, 0), v(ij, k) = (z, 0) and v(N) = 1,
where z > 2/3 and i, j, k = 1, 2, 3.
There annot be immediate formation of the grand oalition. To see this note that
xi(ω
0, k)+xj(ω
0, k) ≥ z where ω0 is the singleton struture, i.e. eah two-player oalition
an obtain a worth of at least z. However, an oer to the grand oalition must alloate
an aggregate payo below z to at least one pair of players. In equilibrium some player
proposes a two-player oalition that is aepted, say, player 1 proposes oalition {12}. In
ΓNR the equilibrium oalition struture is thus {12, 3}.
In both models with renegotiation, players ould enter round 2 where they fae a
two-player bargaining game. Consider player 1's behavior.
20
Suppose player 3 makes the
rst oer in round 2. If player 1 (who ontrols oalition {12}) enters the seond round
and player 3 were to oer less than z, player 1 would rejet and onsume his guaranteed
outside option without suering any time ost. Applying (3.3) shows that player 1
aepts exatly z. However, beause ρ(1, ω) > 0 for all ω, there is a positive probability
that player 1 is seleted to make the rst proposal in round 2. In this ase he seures
z + (1− δ)(1− z) > z. It is therefore stritly optimal to form the grand oalition.
In ontrast, the grand oalition does not form if we assumed that time osts are inurred
after any rejetion. Optimal behavior in the rst negotiation round is unaltered. If player
1 does not implement its ontrat in round 1, he is not guaranteed his outside options,
sine player 3's oer of δz must be aepted. Player 1 leaves in round 1 to obtain z (minus
his payment to player 2). Interestingly, this is true even if player 1 is almost ertain to
oer rst in round 2. Note that player 1's oer must be δ(1−δz). Hene, player 1 hooses
to leave in round 1 if z > 1− δ(1− δz), whih holds for δ > (1− z)/z < 1/2. In Example
1 the outome for ΓNR is the same for both approahes to modeling time osts. This does
not hold in general, as will be shown in Example 3.
We believe that neither the grand oalition nor the ineient outome should be dis-
20
For large δ, player 3 obtains the main share of the gains realized by forming the grand oalition and
will thus not implement in round 1.
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missed as unrealisti in Example 1  indeed in some ases walking away may be preferred
to keep negotiating for negligible gains. However, the notion of ounter-proposals saves us
from simultaneously dealing with negotiation breakdowns attributable to oalitions trying
to avoid being pushed below status quo payos and breakdowns due to externalities.
3.4.2 Dening free riding inentives
It will turn out that free riding inentives (or absene thereof) are entral for eetive
renegotiation. Our goal in this setion is to make preise what we mean by free riding. We
start with a standard ondition on v (see Yi, 1997). Under positive (negative) externalities,
oalitions that are not involved in a merger are better (worse) o after the merger.
Positive Externalities. v(S, π) ≥ v(S, π′) where S ⊂ π, π′ and π\{S} an be derived
from π′\{S} by merging oalitions in π′\{S}.
The next ondition ombined with positive externalities aptures free riding: a
merger inreases (dereases) the worth of eah oalition not involved in the merger by
more (less) than the aggregate worth of the merging players.
Free Riding. Let {S1, . . . , SM} ⊂ π and R ∈ π, R 6= Sm for all m = 1, . . . ,M . Dene
S = ∪Mm=1Sm. Let π′ = π\{S1, . . . , SM} ∪ {S}. Then, v(R, π′) − v(R, π) ≥ v(S, π′) −∑M
m=1 v(Sm, π).
Note that Free Riding neither implies nor is implied by Positive Externalities. In a
symmetri game v depends only on the numeri oalition struture. For symmetri games,
Free Riding implies that smaller oalitions enjoy higher per member payos than larger
oalitions.
21
Symmetri Free Riding. v(S, π)/|S| ≥ v(S ′, π)/|S ′| if and only if |S| ≤ |S ′|.
Games of publi good provision represent an important lass of games that typially
satisfy Positive Externalities and Free Riding or Symmetri Free Riding. We will verify
this in Setion 5. Another example is artel formation in Cournot oligopolies.
21
The reverse is false. Consider the example v(i, j, klm) = (ǫ, ǫ, 0), v(ij, klm) = (1, 0), all other
partitions yield payos of 0 to all players, to onvine yourself that Symmetri Free Riding holds but
Free Riding does not.
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Importantly, games for whih Free Riding fails to hold may still allow for free riding
opportunities. The lass of games for whih there are no free riding inentives for any
merger satises the following ondition.
No Free Riding. Let {S1, . . . , SM} ⊂ π and R ∈ π, R 6= Sm for all m = 1, . . . ,M .
Dene S = ∪Mm=1Sm. Let π′ = π\{S1, . . . , SM} ∪ {S}. Then, M (v(R, π′)− v(R, π)) <
v(S, π′)−∑Mi=1 v(Sm, π).
Under No Free Riding, a merger implies a larger inrease of the average payo of the
merging players than the payo inrease of eah outsider. That is, to fully exlude free
riding inentives, a oalition must be able to simultaneously guarantee all its members a
larger inrease in payo (with appropriate transfers) than the outsiders obtain.
Finally, Grand Coalition Superadditivity (GCS) states that the grand oalition is
stritly eient.
Grand Coalition Superadditivity.
∑
S∈pi v(S, π) < v(N, {N}) for all π ∈ Π.
3.4.3 Eient negotiations
One of the entral questions we attempt to answer in this paper is whether endogenous
renegotiation results in an eient outome. If eieny annot be obtained, what are
the reasons for this? Our rst set of results links ineieny to the presene of free riding
externalities. It will also be shown that eieny for harateristi funtions games is
guaranteed if either renegotiation is possible, or the strit ore is non-empty.
Theorem 1. Let v satisfy GCS, Positive Externalities and No Free Riding. There exists
δˆ ∈ (0, 1) suh that for δ ≥ δˆ, ΓRR(v, δ) and ΓR(v, δ) always result in the grand oalition.
Moreover, ΓRR(v, δ) ∼ ΓR(v, δ) % ΓNR(v, δ).
Intuitively, the onditions in Theorem 1 imply that oalitions draw their bargaining
power from being involved in mergers whih improve their position relative to outsiders.
Stated dierently, a oalition's bargaining power is not based on threats to leave the
bargaining table, and thereby foring others to ooperate. It is this absene of free riding
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inentives that allows for eient renegotiation. To be sure, there an still be a gradual
proess, but Theorem 1 establishes that all players remain ative in order to ollet some
of the gains that are realized by forming the grand oalition.
Proof. To see that ΓNR(v, δ) may be ineient, note that Example 1 satises Positive
Externalities and No Free Riding and yet we have shown that the grand oalition does
not form.
We now show that ΓR and ΓRR are eient. Let v(i,A) be the value of oalition
i if the set of ative players is A (the oalition struture of N\A is xed). We write
v(A,A) simply as v(A). Positive Externalities and No Free Riding jointly imply weak
superadditivity,
v(A) ≥
∑
i⊂A
v(i,A) for any A ⊆ N . (3.6)
The inequality in (3.6) is strit whenever at least one player in N\A stritly benets from
the merger of A (GCS implies strit superadditivity for mergers to the grand oalition).
If |A| = 2 eah player earns at least its status quo worth, i.e. yj(A, i) ≥ v(j,A),
where we abuse notation by writing yj(A, i) instead of yj(ω, i). Equation (3.6) and
ρ(ω, j) > 0 imply that the two-player oalition forms unless the singleton struture is
also eient (hene, it forms for sure if n = 2). Moreover, all players k ∈ N\A earn at
least v(k, {π(N\A) ∪ {ij}}), i, j ∈ A.
Suppose we have shown that no player leaves the negotiations before A has formed
for |A| = r. Showing that the same holds for |A| = r + 1 indutively proves that the
grand oalition forms when |A| = n. Suppose by ontradition that at the implementation
stage of ΓR or ΓRR, there is a set J(A) 6= ∅, where for j ∈ J(A) it is (weakly) optimal
to terminate negotiations. By the previous indutive step we know that if any j leaves,
Mj = A\{j} forms (for |A| = 3 the following follows from the disussion of |A| = 2).
Thus,
xj(A) = y(A, i) = v(j, {j,Mj}), ∀j ∈ J(A) and i ∈ A−j. (3.7)
We selet a partiular state, whose existene is guaranteed whenever J(A) 6= ∅. Fix
j ∈ J(A) and onsider some players who trigger a sequene of mergers whih do not
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inlude j. Let A′ be the resulting state. If J(A′) 6= ∅, hoose A′ to be the state under
onsideration. Suppose therefore J(A′) = ∅. We must have xj(A) ≤ xj(A′), beause
the previous indutive steps imply that v(j, {j,Mj}) is still obtainable. Next, xj(A) <
xj(A′) is only possible if there exists A′′ with J(A′′) 6= ∅, where A′′ 6= A,A′ is some
state along the sequene of mergers. To see this, note that Positive Externalities imply
v(j, {j,Mj}) ≥ v(j,A′) for all possible states A′ and thus, if leaving is optimal at A, the
same will be true at A′, unless there was some i ∈ A′′ who either left, or deided not
to leave but leaving was a weakly optimal strategy. Hene, either xj(A) = xj(A′) or, if
not, pik state A′′ to be the state under onsideration and repeat the hain of arguments.
Without loss of generality, hoose A suh that there is a j for whih leaving is (weakly)
optimal and all other agents do not want to merge.
Suppose now that
∑
j∈J(A) v(j, {j,Mj}) +
∑
i 6∈J(A) v(i,A) < v(A). Consider k ∈ J(A)
proposing (A, t) with tj = xj(A)+ǫ = v(j, {j,Mj})+ǫ for j ∈ J(A)−k and ti = y(A, k)+ǫ
for i 6∈ J(A), where y(A, k) is pinned down by (3.3). Clearly, this oer is aepted.
This oer is also feasible, sine we hose A suh that all i 6∈ J(A) neither leave the
negotiations nor have an inentive to form other oalitions, and ti > v(i,A). Hene, one
k is seleted to be the next proposer, (A, t) is a protable deviation from leaving. But
then it is also not optimal to leave in the implementation phase, beause v(k, {k,Mk})
is guaranteed and with a positive probability k will be the proposer. We onlude that∑
j∈J(A) v(j, {j,Mj}) +
∑
i 6∈J(A) v(i,A) ≥ v(A). Moreover, sine v(i, {i,Mi}) ≥ v(i,A),
∑
i∈A
v(i, {i,Mi}) ≥ v(A). (3.8)
We now use ondition No Free Riding to arrive at a ontradition. Let i be the player
identied with oalition Mi. By (3.6),
v(i, {i,Mi}) + v(i, {i,Mi}) ≤ v(A), ∀i ∈ A. (3.9)
121
By No Free Riding, we have
|Mi| (v(i, {i,Mi})− v(i,A)) < v(i, {i,Mi})−
∑
j∈Mi
v(j,A), ∀i ∈ A. (3.10)
Combining (3.9) and (3.10) one obtains (|Mi| + 1)v(i, {i,Mi}) − |Mi|v(i,A) < v(A) −∑
j∈Mi
v(j,A) for all i ∈ A. Summing over all i ∈ A and noting that |Mi| = |A|−1 for all
i ∈ A, it follows that |A|∑i∈A v(i, {i,Mi})− (|A| − 1)∑i∈A v(i,A) < |A|v(A)− (|A| −
1)
∑
i∈A v(i,A). Hene, ∑
i∈A
v(i, {i,Mi}) < v(A). (3.11)
Expressions (3.8) and (3.11) yield a ontradition. This ompletes the indutive step.
In the next setion there will be ample opportunity to explore the onsequenes of
dropping No Free Riding. For now we stay in a world without free riding inentives but
allow for negative externalities.
Example 2. N = {1, 2, 3}. Let the v be given by v(1, 2, 3) = (z, z, 0.6), v(12, 3) =
(0, 0.4), and v(N) = 1, with z ∈ (0, 0.2). Coalitional worths are 0 in all other oalition
strutures. Player 3 moves rst.
For ΓNR it an be shown that the grand oalition forms with equilibrium payos
yi(ω
0, 3) = δ0.4/(1 + δ) for i = 1, 2 and x3(ω
0) = (1 + δ0.2)/(1 + δ). Player 3 obtains
stritly more than 0.6. On the other hand, in ΓR players 1 and 2 an seure themselves
an aggregate payo of approximately 0.5 one they are asked to respond to player 3's
oer. This is ahieved by forming the two-player oalition {12} and subsequently enter
into negotiations with player 3. Antiipating this, player 3 leaves the negotiations at the
start, enforing the singleton oalition struture. Hene, ΓR performs worse than ΓNR
in terms of eieny.
22
Interestingly enough, ΓRR predits again the grand oalition!
However, gains are distributed dierently than in ΓNR (player 3 earns approximately 0.5
and players 1 and 2 eah approximately 0.25).
22
To be sure, there are games with negative externalities for whih renegotiation is eieny-enhaning.
Let N = {1, 2, 3} and v(i, j, k) = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1), v(i, jk) = (0, 0.7), v(N) = 1. It is easy to verify that the
rst proposer will propose a two-player oalition, followed by the grand oalition. ΓNR is ineient.
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Example 2 is linked to the Ubiquitous Bad Partnership example of Gomes and Jehiel
(2005). In their setting, oalitions an renege their ontrats if all members agree to do so.
Players may then have an inentive to form oalitions that are unprotable in the short
term, if suh a move redues payos of outside players even more. This allows to extrat
ransoms from outsiders who urge to move bak to the more eient state. However, in
Example 2 the merging oalition loses more than the outsider whenever z > 0.1. It is the
threat to level out bargaining power one the initiative is seized that hinders eieny.
Sine harateristi funtions by denition abstrat from free riding inentives, given
Theorem 1 the following observation is hardly surprising.
Corollary 1. Let v be a harateristi funtion that satises GCS. There exists δˆ ∈ (0, 1)
suh that for δ ≥ δˆ ΓRR(v, δ) and ΓR(v, δ) result in the grand oalition.
Proof. Consider a state at whih A = N , i.e. all players are still ative. For harateristi
funtions, v(i,N ) is guaranteed for all i ∈ N . Assuming that J(N ) 6= ∅ and applying
the same reasoning that lead to (3.8) in Theorem 1 implies
∑
i∈N v(i,N ) ≥ v(N ), a
ontradition with GCS.
In absene of externalities, GCS is suient to obtain eieny when renegotiation is
possible. This result is intimately onneted to Bloh and Gomes (2006), where eieny
is also guaranteed, if there are no externalities. We an, however, say something more
about the ase when renegotiation is not possible.
Core. The ore C(N, v) of a harateristi funtion v onsists of all alloations z for
whih
∑
i∈N zi = v(N) and S ⊂ N ⇒
∑
i∈S zi ≥ v(S).
Denote the interior of the Core by C◦(N, v). Interestingly, exluding a speial ase
to be made preise in the following, the grand oalition forms in ΓNR if and only if
C◦(N, v) 6= ∅. A diret impliation of this is that in the models with renegotiation the
grand oalition forms immediately only if the interior of the Core is non-empty. Otherwise
gradualism should be observed.
Theorem 2. Let v be a harateristi funtion. There exists δˆ ∈ (0, 1) suh that for
δ ≥ δˆ the following holds for ΓNR(v, δ). If C◦(N, v) 6= ∅ the grand oalition is the unique
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equilibrium struture. If C(N, v) = ∅ the grand oalition is not an equilibrium struture.
In the remaining ase C◦(N, v) = ∅ and C(N, v) 6= ∅, the grand oalition does not form
if v(N) 6=∑j∈N xj(ω0,P(B)\N) and is weakly optimal otherwise.
Proof. For the following, note that yj(ω, i) is independent k ∈ S−ij as long as tSk ≥ yk(ω, i)
for all k.
We rst show that a non-empty strit ore leads to the grand oalition. Suppose the
grand oalition does not form. Let (Si, t
Si) with Si ⊂ N be the proposal that is optimal
for i as the rst proposer, but is not allowed to oer to the grand oalition. Let Ψ be
the set of all distint Si. A player i earns at most (he may earn less if he rst passes the
initiative to a dierent player) xi(ω
0,P(B)\N) = v(Si)−
∑
j∈Si,−i
yj(ω
0, i). It follows that
v(N) =
∑
j∈Si
zj >
∑
j∈Si
xj(ω
0,P(B)\N) =
∑
j∈Si
xj(ω
0) ∀Si ∈ Ψ. (3.12)
The inequality holds, beause i) by (3.1) and (3.2), δ
∑
j∈Si
xj(ω
0,P(B)\N) ≤ v(Si) and
ii) C◦(N, v) 6= ∅ implies that there exists a vetor of payos z suh that ∑j∈Si zj > v(Si)
for all Si ∈ Ψ and thus there also exists δ ≥ δˆ suh that δ
∑
j∈Si
zj > v(Si). The
last equality holds, beause the grand oalition is assumed to not be stritly optimal
for any player (Lemma 3). Let i's best oer to N be (N, tN). Hene i earns xi(ω
0, N) =
v(N)−∑j∈N−i yj(ω0, i). Beause xj(ω0) ≥ yj(ω0, i), it follows from (3.12) that xi(ω0, N) >
xi(ω
0,P(B)\N). Hene, (Si, tSi) is not optimal.
Assume now that the ore is empty and the grand oalition forms. There exists Si
suh that
∑
j∈Si
zj < v(Si). By Lemma 3, it is optimal to oer the grand oalition for all
players and thus also for i ∈ Si. It follows that
v(Si) = xi(ω
0,P(B)\N) +
∑
j∈Si,−i
yj(ω
0, i) >
∑
j∈Si
xj(ω
0, N) =
∑
j∈Si
xj(ω
0). (3.13)
The inequality holds, beause i) by (3.1) and (3.2), δ
∑
j∈Si
xj(ω
0, N) ≤∑j∈Si zj and ii)
there exists δ ≥ δˆ suh that ∑j∈Si zj < δv(Si). The last equality holds, beause N is
optimal. Sine xj(ω
0) ≥ yj(ω0, i), it follows that xj(ω0,P(B)\N) > xj(ω0, N). Proposal
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(N, tN) is not optimal.
For the remaining ase, C(N, v) 6= ∅ requires ∑j∈Si zj ≥ v(Si) for all Si ∈ Ψ and
C◦(N, v) = ∅ requires ∑Si∈Ψ∑j∈Si zj ≤ ∑Si∈Ψ v(Si). Thus, the vetor of payos z
indued by (N, tN ) satises ∑
j∈Si
zj = v(Si) ∀Si. (3.14)
We now show that N an only form if z satises zj = xj(ω
0,P(B)\N) for all j ∈ N . This
implies that N is at best weakly optimal. Moreover, it implies that C◦(N, v) = ∅, N is op-
timal if and only if v(N) =
∑
j∈N xj(ω
0,P(B)\N). To prove this, suppose N is optimal for
i and suppose there are j, k ∈ Si suh that xj(ω0,P(B−k)) < xj(ω0,P(B)\N). By Lemma
3, we an pik a player not in Si who optimally oers to N with t
N
l ≥ xl(ω0,P(B)\N)
for all l ∈ Si. But
∑
j∈Si
xj(ω
0,P(B)\N) > v(Si) = xk(ω0) +
∑
j∈Si,−k
yk(ω
0,P(B−k)),
beause we know that xj(ω
0,P(B−k)) < xj(ω0,P(B)\N) for at least one j ∈ Si and
xj(ω
0,P(B−k)) ≤ xj(ω0,P(B)\N) for all j ∈ Si. This ontradits (3.14). Thus, if
N forms, xj(ω
0,P(B−k)) = xj(ω0,P(B)\N) for all j, k ∈ Si and all Si ∈ Ψ. Thus,
tNj = zj = xj(ω
0,P(B)\N).
This result ontrasts with the previous literature.
23
The dierene stems from the fat
that in our model only ounter-proposals are time-onsuming. We revisit the Employer-
Employee Game of Chatterjee et al. (1993) to highlight this point.
Example 3. N = {1, 2, 3}. Let v be given by v(1, 2, 3) = (0, 0, 0), v(12, 3) = v(13, 2) =
(1, 0), v(1, 23) = (0, ǫ), and v(N) = 1+µ, 0 < µ < 0.5. This game has a non-empty strit
Core.
Chatterjee et al. show that when agreements are non-renegotiable and there are time
osts after every rejetion, the equilibrium oalition strutures for large δ are {12, 3} or
{13, 2}. On the other hand, Theorem 2 implies that the unique equilibrium for ΓNR is the
grand oalition. To illustrate the dierene, suppose player 3 makes the rst proposal.
In Chatterjee et al., player 3 hooses between proposal ({13}, t) with t1 = δ/(1 + δ) and
23
Seidmann and Winter (1998) and Chatterjee et al. (1993) nd that a non-empty (strit) Core does
not in general imply eieny.
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proposal ({123}, t′) with t′1 = t′2 = δ(1+µ)/(1+2δ). For large δ, player 3 prefers the two-
player oalition (yielding a payo of t1/δ) to the grand oalition (yielding a payo of t
′
1/δ).
If time osts are only inurred for ounter-proposals, player 1 would rejet player 3's oer
δ/(1+δ) and subsequently oer to player 2. Player 3 therefore ompares proposal ({13}, t)
with t1 = 1/(1+ δ) to proposal ({123}, t′) with t′1 = 1/1+ δ and t′2 = δ(1+µ− t′1)/(1+ δ).
The grand oalition is stritly preferred. Note how it is impossible for player 3 to fore
time osts upon player 1, beause player 1's option to sign an agreement with player 2
funtions as endogenous outside option.
3.4.4 Coneding bargaining power
So far renegotiation has been disussed in settings that satisfy No Free Riding. Strikingly,
we show next that in the presene of free riding inentives, renegotiation as in ΓR is unable
to promote ooperation.
Theorem 3. Let v satisfy Positive Externalities and Free Riding. For symmetri games,
let v satisfy Symmetri Free Riding. There exists δˆ ∈ (0, 1) suh that for δ ≥ δˆ, ΓR(v, δ)
and ΓNR(v, δ) have the same set of equilibrium oalition strutures (implying ΓR(v, δ) ∼
ΓNR(v, δ)) with the same distribution of payos.
Proof. We start with the following Lemma.
Lemma 5. Consider ΓR(v, δ) at state ω. Suppose Positive Externalities and Free Riding
holds. For symmetri games, suppose symmetri Free Riding holds. There exists δˆ ∈ (0, 1)
suh that for δ ≥ δˆ, if oalition S is part of the equilibrium oalition struture, then for
eah i ∈ S it is optimal to make an aeptable proposal to S (referred to as one-step
proposal) at ω.
Assume S is part of the equilibrium oalition struture in ΓR(v, δ) and the urrent
state is ω. Lemma 5 shows that proposing S is optimal for all i ∈ S already at ω. Hene,
no subset of S an inrease its payo by forming intermediate oalitions. Moreover, the
behavior of a player i 6∈ S an only depend on whether S forms in one step or gradually
if i is indierent between some optimal proposals. Hene, all equilibrium outomes also
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exist in ΓNR(v, δ) for the dierent optimal behaviors of i. Given S forms, we an abstrat
from behavior of i 6∈ S. It follows that gradual build ups of S in ΓR(v, δ) do not lead to
equilibrium outomes not also present in ΓNR(v, δ). Moreover, Lemma 5 also proves the
reverse. Suppose S does not form in ΓR(v, δ) but does in ΓNR(v, δ). By stationarity, one
i ∈ S must have a stritly better proposal to S ′ 6= S that is aepted. Beause one-step
equilibrium outomes in ΓR(v, δ) also exist in ΓNR(v, δ), oalition S ′ is part of multiple
step oalition formation proess. But this is exluded by Lemma 5.
We now prove Lemma 5. Let S be the redution of A to the players eventually forming
S. Let v(i,S) be the value of oalition i ∈ S (taking the rest of the oalition struture as
given). It needs to be shown that S annot form if the one-step proposal is not optimal.
The latter implies that there is a k suh that
xk(S) > v(S)−
∑
i∈S,i 6=k
yi(S, k). (3.15)
Thus, k proposes to a proper subset of S and the proposal is aepted. Collet k in set
R. Let Sk be the resulting set of ative players. Denote by M(Sk) the set of players who
merge from S to Sk. If (3.15) holds with equality at Sk (if not repeat the same argument
until it is true), and sine xk(Sk) ≥ xk(S) for the proposer and all other j ∈M(Sk) earn
yj(S, k), it must be that
xi(Sk) < xi(S) for at least one i 6∈M(Sk). (3.16)
Pik a player k′ for whom (3.16) is true and onsider the initial state S. There must
be a merger M(Sk′) ⊂ S, M(Sk′) 6= M(Sk) whih k′ is able to indue with positive
probability suh that xk′(Sk′) ≥ xk′(S). Collet k′ in set R. If (3.15) holds with equality
at Sk′ (if not repeat the above reasoning for S = Sk′ until it is true), there must be a
l 6= k′ for whih (3.16) holds for M(Sk′). Repeat this proess until the rst instane at
whih l ∈ R, whih is guaranteed if the number of players is nite. Hene, there exists a
set R suh that (i) |R| > 1, (ii) (3.15) holds with equality at Sk for all k ∈ R, and (iii)
(3.16) holds for all k ∈ R for (at least) one M(Sk′), k′ ∈ R. This implies xk(S) > xk(Sk′)
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for all k ∈ R and one k′ ∈ R, where xk(S) and xk(Sk′) are given by
xk(S) = v(k,Sk)−
∑
i∈M(Sk),i 6=k
yi(S, k) + αSkk
[
v(S)−
∑
i∈Sk
v(i,Sk)
]
, (3.17)
xk(Sk′) = v(k,Sk′) + αSk′k

v(S)− ∑
i∈Sk′
v(i,Sk′)

 . (3.18)
Note that (3.17) reets the fat that if k proposes to M(Sk) and the proposal is
aepted, k ontrols the oalition of worth v(k,Sk), pays the aeptors their equilibrium
response values, and obtains some share αSkk of the surplus from moving to oalition S
in the next step. In (3.18), v(k,Sk′) is guaranteed by (3.1) and Positive Externalities.
Moreover, it an be shown that k ∈ K(i,Sk) for all i ∈ Sk.24
Sine xk(Sk, i) = v(S) −
∑
i∈K(k,Sk)−k
v(i,Sk) −
∑
i∈K(k,Sk)
y(k,Sk) → v(Sk) as
δ → 1, we get αSkk → 0. Summing (3.17) and (3.18) over all k ∈ R, yields∑
k∈R
(
v(k,Sk)−
∑
i∈M(Sk),i 6=k
yi(S, k)
)
>
∑
k∈R v(k,Sk′). Positive Externalities imply
yi(S, k) ≥ v(i,S) for all i. Thus,
∑
k∈R

v(k,Sk)− ∑
i∈M(Sk),i 6=k
v(i,S)

 >∑
k∈R
v(k,Sk′). (3.19)
Next, ondition Free Riding gives
v(k,Sk)−
∑
i∈M(Sk)
v(i,S) < v(k′,Sk)− v(k′,S) ∀k ∈ R, k′ 6∈M(Sk).
24
Let R = {k′ : xk′ (Sk) < xk′ (S)}. For eah k′ ∈ R, ∃ j ∈ M(Sk) ∩M(Sk′). Otherwise k′ at Sk still
has an outside option v(k′,Sk′\{i : i ∈M(Sk)} ∪M(Sk)) ≥ v(k′,Sk) due to Positive Externalities. This
implies that the players j ∈ M(Sk) ∩M(Sk′) will extrat all the gains ∆R ≡
∑
k′∈R(xk′ (S) − xk′ (Sk)).
Also note that i ∈ K(k,Sk)⇒ i ∈ K(k,S). Thus for large δ, (v(S)−
∑
i∈K(k,Sk)−k
x(i, Sk)−∆R)/((1 +
δ(|M(Sk)| − 1))(1+ δ(|Sk| − |K(k,Sk)| − 1))) < (v(S)−
∑
i∈K(k,S)−k
x(i, S))/(1+ δ(|S| − |K(k,S)| − 1)),
where we also used |S| = |Sk|+|M(Sk)|−1. The LHS is the maximum payo obtained by k if k ∈ K(i,Sk).
The RHS is the payo k obtains if he makes an aeptable proposal to S at S. Hene, the merger M(Sk)
would not be optimal.
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Summing over all k ∈ R and noting that ∑k′∈R v(k′,S) =∑k∈R v(k,S),
∑
k∈R

v(k,Sk)− ∑
i∈M(Sk),i 6=k
v(i,S)

 <∑
k∈R
v(k,Sk′),
a ontradition to (3.19).
For symmetri games, Symmetri Free Riding guarantees eah player a payo of at
least x = δv(S)/(1 + δ(|S| − 1)), whih is obtained by staying a singleton (if some other
players merge, the payo of the singleton will inrease). Consider player j who ontrols
the (weakly) largest oalition Sj at S and suppose j proposes to form S (as a respondent
he earns weakly less). The maximum payo player j an obtain is v(S)/(1+ δ(|S|−1))−
(|Sj| − 1)δv(S)/(1 + δ(|S| − 1)), beause by expression (3.3), j annot extrat more than
v(S)/(1+ δ(|S|−1)) at S and eah singleton in Sj has earned at least x. As δ approahes
1, the latter expression only exeeds x if |S| > |Sj ||S|, a ontradition.
Notie that we do not need GCS for Theorem 3. The key observation is that players
annot extrat rents from others by following a gradual formation proess. Remarkably, in
environments with free riding inentives abstrating from renegotiation as in ΓR is without
loss of generality.
25
This raises important questions. For instane, are the repeated
international meetings and eorts to agree on joint measures against global warming in
vain? In general, should we expet gradualism to play no role in games with free riding
inentives?
Model ΓRR is motivated by the negative result of Theorem 3. It reestablishes the
importane of gradualism for games with free riding inentives.
Example 4. N = {1, 2, 3}. The partition funtion is dened by v(i, j, k) = (0, 0, 0),
v(i, jk) = (z, ǫ), and v(N) = 1 for i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, ǫ small, and z ∈ (1/3, 1).
This example satises Symmetri Free Riding. Without the possibility to renegotiate,
the initial proposer deides to leave immediately. Sine the remainder prefers to merge,
25
The equivalene between ΓNR and ΓR also provides a valuable short ut when searhing for equilib-
rium outomes.
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the singleton obtains a payo of z. Any oer to the grand oalition would be aepted only
if eah responder obtains no less than z, whih implies that the proposer earns stritly
less than z. By Theorem 3, ΓR predits the same outome. What happens in ΓRR?
Again, the rst-mover, say player 1, will sign the singleton ontrat in the rst negotiation
round. However, before player 1 gets to the implementation phase, players 2 and 3 form a
oalition. This eliminates player 1's inentive to leave the negotiations, as he an apture
some of the gains set free when moving to the grand oalition. Eieny is restored.
Player 1 obtains approximately max{0.5, z}, players 2 and 3 eah earn approximately
(1−max{0.5, z})/2.
The dierene between Example 1 (in whih ΓR is eient) and Example 4 is the
motivation to form the two-player oalition in the rst negotiation round. In Example 1,
the initial mover is part of the two-player oalition, whih forms to inrease its bargaining
power in subsequent negotiations. In Example 4, the initial mover is not part of the
two-player oalition, whih forms to onede bargaining power to the initial mover. The
ruial point is that before player 1 implements, players 2 and 3 an redibly ommit to
not make use of their free riding possibilities, and they are willing to do so beause player
1 will be the one who moves rst in the implementation phase.
Unfortunately, strong free riding externalities may prevent eieny also in ΓRR.
Example 5. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the partition funtion be given by v(i, j, kl) =
(0.4, 0.4, 0), v(i, jkl) = (0.55, 0.4 + ǫ), v(N) = 1 for i, j, k, l = 1, 2, 3, 4 and ǫ small. All
other oalition strutures result in a payo of 0 for everyone.
In Example 5, players benet if others form oalitions, but only as long as they them-
selves remain singletons. This ould represent a setting where the formation of a oalition
entails high xed osts. For similar reasons as in the previous example, in ΓNR and ΓR
the equilibrium oalition struture is {i, j, kl}. Are players willing to onede bargaining
power in ΓRR? We desribe equilibrium behavior. In round 1, the rst two proposers,
say players 1 and 2, sign the singleton ontrat, players 3 and 4 form a oalition. In the
implementation phase, player 1 leaves, prediting orretly that player 2 remains ative to
obtain some of the gains obtained from the merger to the three-player oalition in round
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2. The nal oalition struture is thus {1, 234}. The possibility to onede bargaining
power helps to some extent, but full eieny is not obtained. The reason is that the
seond proposer prefers free riding on players 3 and 4 to induing the grand oalition.
The fat that Example 5 features four players is no oinidene.
Corollary 2. If n ≤ 3, ΓRR is eient.
Proof. Follows by Example 4 and exhaustively disussing all ases. See Appendix.
These insights raise the question whether it is possible to rank the dierent negotiation
protools in terms of eieny. Example 2 has already shown that ΓNR and ΓR annot be
ranked in general. Perhaps surprisingly, the same onlusion applies to the omparison
between ΓNR and ΓRR.26 Moreover, in all examples we have disussed, ΓRR(v, δ) %
ΓR(v, δ). We onjeture that this holds in general, but leave the question for future work.
3.5 Publi Goods
This setion applies our ndings to a model of publi good provision disussed in
Ray and Vohra (2001). There are n symmetri regions negotiating over the level of pollu-
tion ontrol z a region should undertake. Reduing emissions involves a private ost c(z),
taken to be inreasing and stritly onvex in z. Let Z =
∑n
i=1 zi be the total amount of
pollution ontrol. The payo to a region with ontrol level z is
Z − c(z) (3.20)
Beause regions are symmetri, the pollution ontrol level will only depend on the size of
oalitions. Beause of the strit onvexity of c(·), zi = zs for all players that are part of a
oalition S of size s. The payo of S is thus s[szs − c(zs) + Z−S], where Z−S denotes the
aggregate pollution ontrol of all other oalitions. Observe that the optimal hoie of zs
is independent of the behavior of other oalitions, beause of the linearity of the external
26
The ounter-example involves 6 players and features both, mergers for whih Free Riding holds and
mergers for whih No Free Riding holds. The example is available from the author upon request.
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eets (of ourse, payos do depend on the ations of other regions). A oalition of size
s solves
max
zs
szs − c(zs) (3.21)
Binding agreements allow players to internalize benets of pollution ontrol within but not
aross oalitions. To what extent do players make use of this possibility? For negotiation
model ΓNR, Ray and Vohra show that eieny is generally not attained.27 Interestingly,
Theorem 3 implies that the same is true for ΓR.
Corollary 3. In the publi goods model introdued above, ΓNR and ΓR have the same
(unique) equilibrium outome.
Proof. Note that aording to (3.20), players' payos only dier in the ost of pollution
ontrol. Solving (3.21) shows that members of larger oalitions undertake larger eorts.
It follows that smaller oalitions enjoy higher per member payos than larger oalitions.
Symmetri Free Riding is satised. Theorem 3 applies. Ray and Vohra (2001) show that
the outome is unique.
In ontrast, the possibility to onede bargaining power (as made possible in ΓRR)
aets preditions.
Example 6. Consider the publi goods model with n = 3. Let c(z) = z3/3. It follows
that zs =
√
s and the aggregate payo of a oalition S of size s is s [szs − 1/3z3s + Z−S] =
s
[
2/3s2/3 + Z−S
]
. The partition funtion is thus given by v(1, 2, 3) = (2.6, 2.6, 2.6),
v(i, jk) = (2
√
2 + 2/3, 2(1 + 2
√
8/3)) where i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, and v(123) = 6
√
3.
Ray (2007) disusses this example for ΓNR. We omit a detailed disussion, as in terms
of inentives, Example 6 is idential to Example 4. The reader an easily onvine herself
that the equilibrium oalition struture in ΓNR and therefore also in ΓR is {i, jk}. On the
other hand, ΓRR leads to the grand oalition. Ray and Vohra (2001) provide bounds on
the maximal amount of ineieny observable in ΓNR (as the number of players inreases).
27
Ray and Vohra (2001)'s model diers from ΓNR in the way proposals are made, but their arguments
diretly apply to ΓNR.
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It would be interesting to see to what extent ΓRR shifts these bounds towards the eient
outome. We were not able to solve this question.
3.6 Conlusion
This paper studies oalition formation with endogenous renegotiation. In aordane with
the Coase Theorem, we nd that renegotiation leads to eieny even in the presene
of widespread externalities. Only if externalities involve free riding inentives, the fully
ooperative outome may not be reahed. We also propose an extension of the oalition
formation model that unovers the inentive to onede bargaining power as a novel
explanation for gradualism. On the methodologial side, it is shown that a bargaining
model in whih time osts are only inurred for ounter-proposals allows to isolate the
eets of externalities on equilibrium outomes.
We provide a set of testable preditions. Does the grand oalition form in absene
of free riding inentives? Is the strit Core a good preditor of outomes without rene-
gotiation? In games of publi good provision, does renegotiation indeed only play a
limited role? There is a vast empirial literature on oalition formation in international
negotiations on environmental or trade issues, but only few studies make the link to the
theoretial oalition formation literature.
28
We believe that there is also a role for exper-
iments on oalition formation. For instane, by foussing on externalities and the degree
of renegotiation, do we miss some other important features of a bargaining environment?
This study has not disussed inomplete information, whih should be expeted to
play a role in explaining gradualism. Inomplete information in multilateral bargaining
is diult to analyze, beause of the multiple ways information may get revealed in
the proess of oalition formation. Three hannels that ome to mind are signalling
and sreening via proposals, learning by observing the evolution of ooperation, and
information sharing within oalitions.
We have onluded that renegotiation and binding agreements annot fully eliminate
28
An exeption is Esteban et al. (2012).
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ineienies if ations are irreversible. In ontrast, for reversible ations and ongoing ne-
gotiations, Hyndman and Ray (2007) show that as long as the grand oalition is eient,
it is guaranteed to form for arbitrary externalities. Ultimately, it would be insightful to
have a model of ostly reversible ations. By subsuming reversible and irreversible a-
tions suh a model would allow to takle new questions. For instane, is the relutany of
many ountries to substantially urb arbon dioxide emissions part of a reversible proess
in whih players try to extrat rents, or are inentives suh that renegotiation will be
unable to eventually bring about ooperation?
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Appendix
3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Proposition 4
The proof adapts the proofs of existene in Ray and Vohra (1999) and Bloh and Gomes
(2006). For a given strategy prole, let φji (ω) denote the ontinuation value of player
i at the bargaining phase when the state is ω and the proposer is player j. Note that
φii(ω) = xi(ω). Let ϕi(ω) denote the ontinuation value of player i at the implementation
phase.
Let σ2 = (σ2i )i∈A be a strategy prole at the implementation phase. Clearly, σ
2
i is a
probability distribution over {implement, remain} for eah ω ∈ Ω. In equilibrium σ2i (ω)
maximizes the ontinuation value φji (ω
2), where ω2 is the state after the implementation
phase as implied by σ2(ω).
We desribe the optimal behavior of proposers and respondents in the bargaining phase
when the state is ω. Let Πi(B) be the set of all possible oalitions ontaining player i. Let
Σ1i be the set of probability distributions over Mi = (Πi(B), ({j})j∈N\{i}). This means
that i an either make a proposal to a set of ative oalitions that inludes itself or make
an unaeptable proposal, say to player j. Let σ1i (S, ω) be the probability with whih i
makes an aeptable proposal to S ∈ Πi(B) at ω. Similarly, σ1i ({j}, ω) is the probability
with whih i makes an unaeptable oer.
Dene Σ1 =
∏
i∈B Σ
1
i and x a proposer strategy prole σ
1 ∈ Σ. This prole desribes
for all players their proposer hoies for eah possible state. Let αS(ω) be the probability
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distribution indued by σ1 over the set of possible states ω1 ∈ Ω at the end of the
bargaining phase. Thus, σ1(ω) and αS(ω) x a vetor of expeted ontinuation values
ϕ(ω1).
Aording to (3.1) a respondent j's minimal aeptable oer is y(ω, i) ∈ [δφjj, φjj]. A
proposer i in the bargaining phase has two options. First, i an name a oalition S ∈ Πi(B)
and make an aeptable proposal (S, t). If the proposal is aepted, it must be given by
S ∈ argmax
R∈Πi(B)
∑
ω1∈Ω
αR(ω
1)ϕi(ω
1)−
∑
j∈R;j 6=i
tj (3.22)
tj = yj(ω, i) for all j ∈ S, j 6= i (3.23)
Denote by g(S, x, ϕ) the maximal payo i an obtain by solving this problem.
Seond, i an make an unaeptable proposal to j. For a xed i, the value player i
reeives when player j proposes is
φji (φ, ϕ, σ
1) =W ji +
∑
k 6=j
σ1j ({k})φki (φ, ϕ, σ1)
for all j and k, where W ii ≡
∑
S∈Πi(B)
σ1i (S)g(S, φ, ϕ) and for j 6= i,
W ji ≡ yi(ω, j)

 ∑
S∈Πj(B);i∈S
σ1j (S)

+∑
l∈B
ρ(l, ω)
∑
S∈Πj(B);i 6∈S
σ1j (S)φ
l
i(φ, ϕ, σ
1),
where player l is determined by ρ. Ray and Vohra (1999) show that φji is ontinuous in
σ1, φ and ϕ for all j. Now dene a funtion on Φ× Φ× Σ1 × Σ1i by
φi(φ, ϕ, σ
1
−i, σ
1′
i ) ≡
∑
S∈Πi(B)
σ1
′
i (S)gi(S, φ, ϕ) +
∑
j 6=i
σ1
′
i ({j})φij(σ1, φ, ϕ) (3.24)
and maximize with respet to σ1
′
i ∈ Σi. Let the set of maximizers to this problem
be σˆ1i (φ, ϕ, σ
1). The implied payo is denoted by φˆ1i (φ, ϕ, σ
1). Using the maximum
theorem and the fat that φi(φ, ϕ, σ
1
−i, σ
1′
i ) is ontinuous, one an see that φˆ
1
i (φ, ϕ, σ
1)
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is a ontinuous funtion and that σˆ1i (φ, ϕ, σ
1) is a onvex-valued, upper hemiontinuous
orrespondene.
Sine v({i}, π) > 0 for all i and π ∈ Π, for all (φ, ϕ, σ1, σ2) ∈ Φ × Φ × Σ1 × Σ2,
φ1i (φ, ϕ, σ
1) ∈ [0, v(N)] for all i. Thus ∏φ1i maps from Φ× Φ× Σ1 × Σ2 into Φ.
Dene now a orrespondene F : Φ×Φ×Σ1×Σ2 →→ Φ×Φ×Σ1×Σ2. A xed-point
of F is an equilibrium (we still need to desribe the behavior of respondents). Reall
that Φ is a losed, onvex interval of a nite-dimensional Eulidean spae. Σ1 is the
set of proposers' strategies σ1 in the bargaining phase. We have seen that σ1i (·, ω) is
a probability distribution over the nite set {Mi}i∈B. Σ2 is the set of strategies σ2 at
the implementation stage and σ2i is a probability distribution over a binary hoie for
eah state. Both Σ1 and Σ2 are thus onvex and ompat subsets of a nite-dimensional
Eulidean spae. Thus, Z = Φ× Φ× Σ1 × Σ2 is a ompat and onvex subset of a nite
dimensional Eulidean spae. Moreover, F (Z) ⊂ Z. F (z) is a onvex and non-empty set
for all z ∈ Z. The graph of F is losed. Kakutani's xed point theorem guarantees that
a xed point exists. It is now possible to onstrut a stationary equilibrium using the
derived x point. This is done as in Ray and Vohra (p. 311f.), exept that the argument
has to be repeated for eah negotiation round.
3.A.2 Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose players i, j, k enter the implementation phase in τ = 1 in oalition struture
{ijk}. The grand oalition must be eient, for if v(i, {ij, k}) + v(k, {ij, k}) > v(ijk) we
know that one player has not reeived its equilibrium response value. Suppose players
enter the implementation phase in oalition struture {ij, k}. The two-player oalition ij
forms only if v(i, {ij, k}) ≥ v(i, {i, j, k}) + v(j, {i, j, k}). Moreover, if the grand oalition
is eient, no player implements beause ρ selet both oalitions with positive probability
and outside options are safe. Suppose therefore, players enter the implementation phase
as singletons. If the singleton struture is eient, all players leave in τ = 1. If struture
{ij, k} is eient, the two-player oalition will form in one of the future rounds and it
is unimportant whether k leaves before this happens. Suppose the grand oalition is
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eient. If there is a two-player oalition ij that an extrat some payo from k by rst
induing {ij, k}, this will be done in a future round. Moreover, the third player does not
leave, beause one the two-player oalition forms, ρ selets both oalitions with positive
probability and outside options are safe. If i an extrat payo by leaving as a singleton,
he signs the singleton ontrat seuring at least the payo for {i, jk}. If j, k expet i
to leave if the implementation phase is entered as singletons, jk forms already in the
bargaining phase of τ = 1, beause in expetation both obtain a positive share of the
eieny gains when merging in the next negotiation round.
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